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Good Thoughts, Bad Thoughts? 
Investigating the Nature of the Wandering Mind and How to Capture It  
Preface 
“Do penguins have knees? And how come their feet never get cold? Oh, where was 
I?” Even though I am eager to write a preface to my dissertation and even though I find its 
topic particularly interesting, it is impossible for me to keep my thoughts from trailing off 
every once in a while. Sometimes, such mind-wandering episodes contain random content and 
my thoughts might drift towards the anatomy of penguins. Other times, I might try to figure 
out a solution to a personal problem or plan tonight’s dinner, which many would probably 
consider more useful than thoughts about penguin knees. Independent of its content, the 
phenomenon that thoughts trail off from a task at hand is ubiquitous in everyday life. It is 
found that people spend up to 50 percent of their waking hours mentally occupied with 
thoughts that are unrelated to current external events (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger, 
1999), a fact that already demonstrates the high relevance and the resulting need for empirical 
investigations of the mind-wandering construct.  
It probably comes as no surprise that mind wandering is often associated with negative 
outcomes, such as performance decrements within various domains (Mooneyham & Schooler, 
2013; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Everybody knows the feeling of being annoyed 
by drifting thoughts as they hamper focused work. Taking an important exam, reading a book, 
or talking to one’s mother on the phone: The number of situations, in which mind wandering 
depicts a potential source of disturbance and error, is infinite. In some circumstances, it can 
even endanger others or ourselves, for example when driving at a high speed on the highway 
(Albert et al., 2018). Because of such far-reaching and omnipresent consequences, the costs of 
mind wandering have been extensively studied in the last two decades. The benefits, however, 
have initially been neglected. I believe that the phenomenon deserves to be viewed from a 
more balanced perspective. And indeed, current research is catching up on the positive side of 
mind wandering. It is argued that drifting thoughts could represent a source of inspiration and 
creativity, an opportunity for future planning or memory maintenance, a restful mental break, 
or a short and joyful escape from a currently unpleasant reality (Schooler et al., 2011).  
This dissertation aims at painting a balanced picture of the wandering mind’s nature, 
strengthening an adaptive view of the phenomenon. Figure 1 depicts a flow chart including 
the dissertation’s main topics. First, negative consequences of drifting thoughts will be 
contrasted with positive ones, and I further aim to bring both sides of the medal more in line 
by focusing on thought-regulation processes. Previous insights will then be enriched by new 
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contributions: I will introduce memory as a newly considered domain, which I found to 
benefit from mind-wandering processes. From a more methodological perspective and within 
the domains of creativity and problem-solving, I will not only take a look at possible further 
mind-wandering benefits, but also present a new research paradigm. This paradigm allows for 
the closer investigation of possibly thought-altering and intrusive effects of thought probes, 
the most widely applied mind-wandering assessment method. Thought probes ask participants 
about their current thoughts during a task and might thus modify the mind-wandering 
experience itself, thereby complicating the search for positive effects of the phenomenon. As 
such probes further rely on self-reports and thus contain a subjective component, I will finally 
report a review and validation study of eye-movement measures as objective mind-wandering 
indicators. Thus, the following dissertation presents an investigation of the nature of the 
wandering mind as well as of subjective and objective thought-assessment methods. 
Oh, by the way, penguins do have knees. I googled it when my wandering mind 
needed to know the answer. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Flow chart. The figure integrates this dissertation’s main topics, their order of 
consideration within the present work, as well as the respective manuscripts (in parentheses) 
covering the individual topics. When examining contentual topics such as costs and benefits, 
research results and conclusions are always dependent upon the quality of the employed 
assessment methods, which is why mind-wandering assessment is depicted in a curly bracket. 
This dissertation covers contentual as well as methodological topics concerning the mind-
wandering concept.   
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1 Introduction to Mind Wandering 
1.1 Definition  
Many everyday tasks require focused and sustained attention with so-called task-
related thoughts enabling successful task-goal fulfillment, such as understanding the plot of a 
movie or solving a mathematical equation. However, thoughts sometimes trail off from the 
task at hand (Schooler et al., 2011). Task-unrelated thought (TUT) represents an attention 
shift, oftentimes towards personal issues, such as worries or unsolved problems (Mooneyham 
& Schooler, 2013). However, in general, people are able to generate task-unrelated content on 
an unlimited number of topics.  
A description of mind wandering as TUT already represents one of many attempts at 
defining the construct (Seli et al., 2018). The TUT definition always involves an ongoing task 
and implies that the mind wanders as soon as thoughts are unrelated to this specific task, 
independent of the exact thought content or nature (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Other 
definitions cover, for example, thought in the absence of a current task, or the intentionality of 
thought, as terms such as daydreaming (Singer, 1966; Singer & Antrobus, 1963), stimulus-
independent thought (Teasdale et al., 1995), unintentional thought (McVay & Kane, 2010), or 
meandering and unguided thought (Christoff et al., 2016) and their underlying conceptions of 
mind wandering suggest. Seli et al. (2018) offer an exhaustive description of a wide range of 
mind-wandering definitions.  
Oftentimes, various definitions overlap. But imagine sitting in a lecture with the 
current task goal being understanding its topic, and yet willfully thinking about your 
upcoming birthday party. Following, for example, the unintentional-thought definition, you 
are not mind wandering because your birthday-party thoughts occur with intention. Following 
the TUT definition, you are mind wandering, because your birthday party is unrelated to the 
lecture’s topic. It seems that the term mind wandering itself should rather be seen as an 
umbrella term subsuming similar, yet slightly differing constructs. The term was introduced 
by Smallwood and Schooler (2006) to, among other things, unify such constructs and elevate 
the status of the research topic, which it did quite successfully, as the research field 
“exploded” starting 2006 (Callard et al., 2013; Weinstein, 2018).  
The variety of different labels already demonstrates that mind wandering is not a 
unitary construct, neither concerning the definition and theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenon, nor the resulting operationalization in empirical research (Seli et al., 2018). In 
order to reconcile this heterogeneous conceptual structure, Seli and colleagues suggested that 
“mind-wandering is best considered from a family-resemblances perspective; that is, as a 
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heterogeneous, fuzzy-boundaried construct that coheres amid patterns of overlapping and 
nonoverlapping features” (p. 1). Acknowledging this heterogeneity and accepting that one 
single definition does not fully capture the variety of the construct, but yet in need of a 
specific conceptualization as a working basis, I will refer to mind wandering as TUT and will 
use both terms synonymously within this dissertation. Thereby, following the 
recommendations of Seli and colleagues, I specifically conceptualize the concept of mind 
wandering, making a classification within the literature possible and constraining my 
theoretical conclusions to this exact definition. I chose the TUT definition because it helpfully 
allows the experimental researcher to set up a certain (stable across participants, when 
desirable) task context and to therein investigate and identify negative as well as positive 
consequences of drifting thoughts, as is desirable within an experimental context. Seli and 
colleagues further argued that it allows investigating the wandering mind as an everyday 
phenomenon by recreating daily-life activities, such as reading or studying, giving practical 
relevance to findings obtained applying the TUT conceptualization. From a functional 
perspective, the TUT definition further is precise and concrete, facilitating the classification 
of reported thoughts in psychological studies.  
1.2 Subjective In-The-Moment Mind-Wandering Assessment  
 Human thought is externally not observable. We cannot see what others are thinking. 
Therefore, in order to capture the phenomenon of mind wandering, researchers often ask 
participants to self-report on their own internal states (Weinstein, 2018). The validity of self-
reports is a heavily discussed topic in general psychological research. On the one hand, it was 
argued that people have only limited conscious access to their own cognitive processes and 
that self-reports underlie subjective distortions and cause reactive behaviors (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). On the other hand, it was found that thought protocols strongly correlate with 
objective measures and that the self-reports‘ distorting influence is only weak (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1980). 
In mind-wandering research, the self-report method can be broadly divided into two 
approaches (Weinstein, 2018) when it comes to measuring the phenomenon in the moment it 
is happening (i.e., online). Researchers employing the self-caught approach ask participants to 
monitor their own thoughts and to report, often via a simple button press, whenever they 
consider their thoughts as mind wandering. It is discussed whether the self-caught approach 
produces estimates of off-task thought awareness rather than frequency, because participants 
need to be aware of their current thought processes in order to observe and categorize drifting 
thoughts (Schooler, 2002; Schooler et al., 2004). Researchers employing the probe-caught 
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approach, which is most widely applied in mind-wandering research, do not have to rely on 
meta-awareness to such an extent (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). So-called thought probes 
allow for the collection of self-reports concerning participants’ current thoughts at random or 
specific points in time during an empirical investigation. While working on a task, such 
probes interrupt participants and ask them to respond to short questions concerning their 
current thought experiences. Thus, thought probes are able to catch participants mind 
wandering sometimes even before they become aware of it, producing a more reliable 
estimate of off-task thought frequency (Schooler et al., 2011).  
In recent years, the question of the validity of such thought probes emerged. At least 
three of their features (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Schooler & Schreiber, 2004) speak for their 
eligibility as one of the main data sources within mind-wandering research. First, thought 
probes do not suffer from retrospective distortion, as they represent direct and immediate 
prompts to report on current thoughts. Second, on the part of the participants as well as the 
researchers, ambiguity is reduced when a discrete decision is required. Third and finally, no 
further knowledge, or expert knowledge, is required on the part of the participants since they 
merely have to report thought descriptions without speculating about the cause of their current 
mental state. And indeed, the validity of thought probes is supported by several studies 
showing that mind wandering reported via this method varies with situational influences, such 
as alcohol intake (Sayette et al., 2009), sleep deprivation (Poh et al., 2016), or hunger 
(Rummel & Nied, 2017). Further, mind wandering reported via thought probes correlates with 
behavioral and physiological markers, such as reaction times (Csifcsák & Mittner, 2017; 
McVay & Kane, 2012a; Seli, Cheyne, et al., 2013), eye movements (for a review on eye 
movements during mindless reading, please see Manuscript 1), and the activation of the 
Default Mode Network (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Mittner et al., 2016), which subsumes 
brain regions that have been connected to resting as well as mind-wandering states. It is, thus, 
not surprising that the probe-caught approach emerged as the most popular thought 
measurement tool in recent years (Weinstein, 2018). 
1.3 Deleterious Effects of Mind Wandering 
 As mentioned above, the phenomenon of mind wandering has been given many 
names, which are not limited to specific scientific terminology, but also include informal, 
colloquial labels such as mind lapses or cortical idling. Together with terms such as cognitive 
failure, rumination, or attentional failure, a rather negative connotation is revealed, already 
hinting towards a detrimental and costly side of mind wandering. And indeed, TUTs are often 
associated with performance decrements within various domains. When minds drift, the risk 
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of comprehension failure during reading increases (Feng et al., 2013; McVay & Kane, 2012b; 
Schad et al., 2012; Schooler et al., 2004; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). In typical mind-
wandering-during-reading experiments, participants are asked to read a given text while their 
thoughts are probed from time to time to assess mind-wandering levels. High levels are most 
often found to be related to worse performance on subsequent comprehension tests, affecting 
not only text information presented right before a thought probe (Reichle et al., 2010; Smilek 
et al., 2010), but going far beyond: Due to mind-wandering episodes, readers are found to 
experience trouble connecting single events to a full situational model of a story, leading to 
difficulties when, for example, identifying the villain in a crime novel (Smallwood, 
McSpadden, et al., 2008). Besides reading, one of the tasks employed most often to study 
detrimental effects of mind-wandering is the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART). 
In this go/no-go task, participants are asked to respond to frequent non-target stimuli and to 
withhold responses to infrequent target stimuli. Errors on the SART have been connected to 
mind-wandering occurrences so frequently that they have even become a common behavioral 
marker of TUT episodes (Cheyne et al., 2009; Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012; 
Smallwood et al., 2004).  
TUT occurrence is further associated with performance decrements in working 
memory tasks and intelligence tests (McVay & Kane, 2009; Mrazek, Smallwood, Franklin, et 
al., 2012), and, more generally, with disruptions to learning and lower academic achievement 
(Farley et al., 2013; Seli, Wammes, et al., 2016; Wammes & Smilek, 2017). Higher mind 
wandering levels assessed in the laboratory have even been connected to lower scores on the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), that had been taken by participants one to three years before 
(Mrazek, Smallwood, Franklin, et al., 2012), highlighting drifting thoughts’ negative 
influence within an educational setting. Of course, mind wandering not only happens when 
people are sitting at their desks, in front of a laboratory computer, or in a comfortable reading 
chair. Applied research has tracked mind-wandering deficits from the laboratory into daily life 
(McVay et al., 2009) and has identified TUTs as a potential safety hazard. When driving a 
car, wandering thoughts can quickly become dangerous (Albert et al., 2018; Lin et al., 2016; 
Yanko & Spalek, 2014), as, among other things, braking reaction times increase and headway 
distances decrease when thoughts are off-task.   
 However, not only performance suffers when the mind wanders. Off-task thoughts are 
furthermore associated with negative emotional consequences, as the title of a much cited 
research article (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) already suggests: “A wandering mind is an 
unhappy mind.” In this study, time-lagged analyses showed that mind-wandering episodes 
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preceded negative mood in daily life, at least hinting towards such a causal relationship. Other 
studies suggest that a low mood causes people to engage in more self-referential mind 
wandering (Smallwood et al., 2009; Taruffi et al., 2017). It is thus possible that the 
relationship between mind wandering and mood is bidirectional. Concerning TUT content, 
mood decreasing effects are found particularly often when the mind wanders to the past, 
sometimes even when the thought content itself is positive (Ruby et al., 2013; Smallwood & 
O'Connor, 2011; Stawarczyk, Majerus, et al., 2013). 
 Solely concentrating on such far-reaching negative consequences of mind wandering, 
one can quickly get the impression that TUTs should be inhibited at all times. And indeed, 
intervention options exist, which aim at decreasing mind-wandering frequencies in daily life 
including mindfulness trainings based on meditation or mindful breathing (Bennike et al., 
2017; Mrazek et al., 2012; Rahl et al., 2017). However, a different strategy, focusing on 
regulating rather than simply decreasing TUTs, becomes desirable or even necessary as soon 
as TUTs are found to not only have costs but also benefits, as the first should be minimized 
and the latter maximized.  
 
2 Adaptive Mind Wandering 
2.1 Beneficial Effects of Mind Wandering  
Since mind wandering is found to be both ubiquitous and deleterious, it probably 
comes as good news to all of us wandering companions that the phenomenon has also been 
related to beneficial effects (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 
2013). As early as in the 1970s, the facet of positive constructive daydreaming was introduced 
by Singer (1975). Challenging the one-sided impression that drifting thoughts come at nothing 
but high costs, he characterized this specific style of daydreaming as planful and creative. At a 
time when wandering thoughts were even associated with psychopathology (McMillan et al., 
2013), he shaped a new, adaptive view of the phenomenon, and his ideas still influence 
current research in the field to this day.  
From an adaptive perspective, it seems unlikely that people would spend up to 50 
percent of their waking hours mind wandering (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger, 
1999), if drifting thoughts were not functional to at least some extent. And indeed, studies 
investigating the adaptive value of mind wandering support Singer’s (1975) positive-
constructive-daydreaming framework. Recent findings demonstrated that mind wandering can 
foster skills such as future and autobiographical planning (Baird et al., 2011; D'Argembeau et 
al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 2009), as well as social problem solving and socio-emotional 
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adjustment (Poerio et al., 2016; Ruby et al., 2013). In addition, creative incubation and 
creative problem solving have been found to benefit from drifting thoughts (Baird et al., 2012; 
Gable et al., 2019; Leszczynski et al., 2017; Preiss et al., 2016; Zedelius & Schooler, 2015), 
supporting the widely-held belief that creative thinkers often let their minds wander (but see 
section 2.3.3). Other positive effects of mind wandering have been proposed, but still need to 
be examined. For example, Singer (1966) suggested that daydreaming can offer relief from 
boredom. Having to work on an uninteresting, tedious task, mind-wandering episodes offer a 
temporary way out. They might also function as mental breaks, during which people 
“recharge”, as well as serve as a dishabituating activity by temporarily taking people away 
from a current task and enabling a “fresh look” when returning to it (Schooler et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, using mind-wandering episodes to mentally travel through time might allow us 
to bring in line our past and imagined future selves to the person we are today (Smallwood & 
Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Such processes might provide us with a sense of self-identity, 
meaning, and continuity across time (Prebble et al., 2013). 
2.2 When to Wander, When Not to Wander?  
2.2.1 Task-Difficulty as a Moderator of Mind-Wandering Frequency. With more 
and more evidence emerging for negative as well as positive effects of drifting thoughts, both 
sides of the medal needed to be brought in line. To reconcile costs as well as benefits of mind 
wandering, Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna (2013) argued that the relationship between 
TUTs and their outcome is context dependent within their context-regulation-hypothesis. The 
authors stated that under attention-demanding conditions (e.g., when taking a difficult exam), 
mind wandering is unproductive and inefficient due to it representing a potential source of 
error for the task at hand. In contrast, low attentional task demands allow an individual to 
successfully perform a given task as well as to simultaneously engage in mind wandering. 
Such conditions enable drifting thoughts to come at no, or rather low and tolerable, costs and 
thus make room for beneficial effects of mind wandering to unfold. To make use of TUT 
benefits and to prevent costs, one should therefore know when to wander and when not to 
wander. And indeed, two patterns emerge from previous mind-wandering research, supporting 
the assumption of the context-regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015): First, there are high performance costs of mind wandering 
during demanding tasks. Second, TUTs are more prevalently found under conditions with low 
attentional demands. More direct evidence for the context-regulation hypothesis comes from 
Rummel and Boywitt (2014), who found that people with higher working memory capacities 
in particular are flexible in their adjustment of mind wandering to situational demands. People 
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are able to coordinate on- and off-task thoughts in such a way that TUTs are more likely to 
occur under undemanding task conditions and less likely to occur during demanding tasks. 
Notably, this adjustment ability benefits task performance when task demands increase. 
Further support for the idea of a flexible TUT adjustment comes from Cognitive Control 
Theories concentrating on the allocation of cognitive control (Shepherd, 2019), such as the 
Expected Value of Control Theory (Shenhav et al., 2013; Shenhav et al., 2016). According to 
this theory, costs and benefits of directing cognitive control towards a current task are 
weighted against each other to decide how much control to exert. If costs and/or benefits of 
succeeding in the current task are low (e.g., during an easy task whose fulfillment is not 
personally relevant), only low levels of cognitive control are exerted. In turn, this could allow 
possibly adaptive mind wandering processes to “take over,” particularly if the current mind-
wandering content is personally relevant or promises higher benefits than current task 
fulfillment. In a very similar vein, Kurzban et al. (2013) argued that cognitive resources, 
which are not urgently required for current task-goal fulfillment, can and will be allocated to 
another task. Thinking about, or mentally working on, another task, can in turn be considered 
mind wandering, at least according to the TUT definition. Such a reallocation of cognitive 
resources and thoughts enables maximized combined task-goal fulfillment.  
In our everyday life, it would come in handy if we were able to regulate our mind-
wandering behavior in such a way. Given that thought adjustment could allow us to make use 
of mind-wandering benefits while keeping mind-wandering costs low, the importance of 
identifying cognitive (like working memory capacity, see Rummel & Boywitt, 2014) and 
other dispositional factors which facilitate and control adjustment processes becomes 
increasingly clear. However, this is not merely an individual differences approach, but rather 
a complex interplay of person- and situation-related factors. Taking the study by Rummel and 
Boywitt (2014) as an example, the level of task demands (situation-related) specifies the 
appropriateness and the costs of mind wandering. In turn, working memory capacity (person-
related) contributes to the ability to regulate mind-wandering behavior in accordance to task 
demands. Thus, besides person-related trait-variables, situations allowing mind-wandering 
processes to take over, such as those with low task difficulty (Rummel & Boywitt, 2014), 
have to be identified. Factors, which describe such situations, might include but are not 
limited to the level of a task’s personal relevance, the promise of expected financial or other 
incentives, or the level of interest in the given topic. In Manuscript 1, we built on the work by 
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Rummel and Boywitt (2014) and focused on meta-cognitive beliefs1 of task difficulty as a 
potential moderator of mind-wandering frequency.   
2.2.2 Meta-Cognitive Beliefs as a Moderator of Mind-Wandering Frequency 
(Manuscript 12). Meta-cognition can be defined as the knowledge about one’s own cognitive 
processes (Flavell, 1979). The interplay of monitoring and control functions of meta-
cognition allows us to continually adjust ongoing behavior (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Son & 
Schwartz, 2002). Thus, meta-cognitive beliefs about task demands might facilitate targeted 
employment of mind-wandering adjustment processes: Imagine a situation in which you are 
studying for a test. You usually have a “feeling” about the test’s difficulty, which depends on 
the subject matter, your current abilities concerning the subject, and other factors. Expecting 
the upcoming test to be very demanding might lead to the direction of cognitive control 
towards the learning material (Shepherd, 2019), blocking out intruding TUTs. Using the terms 
of a highly influential framework of executive functions (Miyake & Friedman, 2012), one 
could argue that inhibition processes take over, making it possible to mainly aim attention at 
and perform well in the current learning task. In such a situation, mind-wandering costs would 
outweigh its benefits (ignoring further moderators such as personal interest or relevance), 
making a strategy to keep costs low decisive. Then again, knowing that an upcoming test will 
not be demanding might facilitate the employment of a different strategy. If attention, or 
cognitive control, could be directed towards task-related as well as task-unrelated thoughts, 
people could benefit from the positive effects of mind wandering, while still keeping its costs 
low. The low demands of the task make a shifting strategy possible (Miyake & Friedman, 
2012) and thought processes centered on studying and, for example, planning tonight’s dinner 
could alternate. 
To examine the influence of meta-cognitive beliefs about task difficulty on mind 
wandering, we asked participants to read two book chapters for up to 30 minutes. We 
manipulated expectancies regarding an upcoming reading-comprehension test by telling one 
 
 
1 The main focus of Manuscript 1 was to validate eye-movement measures as indicators for 
mindless reading (see section 4.2). However, we also aimed to apply these indicators to 
examine meta-cognitive knowledge as a possible driving factor for mind-wandering 
adjustment. Including this research question within our validation study further allowed us to 
test for convergent validity between objective (eye movements) and subjective (self-reports) 
mind-wandering measures. 
2 Steindorf, L., & Rummel, J. (2020). Do your eyes give you away? A validation study of eye-
movement measures used as indicators for mindless reading. Behavior Research Methods, 
52(1), 162-176. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-019-01214-4 
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group of participants that the test would be very difficult while the other group was told that it 
would be fairly easy. To create credibility, we embedded the manipulation within a 
background story concerning the development of a standardized reading comprehension test 
for an adult population. During self-paced reading, participants were asked to report on their 
current thoughts via ten thought probes, which were allocated over the total reading time 
according to a specific pattern (section 4.2). A retrospective mind-wandering questionnaire, a 
manipulation check concerning difficulty expectations, as well as a moderately difficult 
reading-comprehension test followed for both groups. We assumed that participants in 
expectation of a difficult reading comprehension test would mind wander less during reading 
compared to participants with low-difficulty expectations. In addition, we expected less mind 
wandering to result in better test performance. 
Meta-cognitive beliefs about task difficulty were successfully induced, as revealed by 
the significant differences in expected task difficulty reported during the manipulation check. 
However, these beliefs did not result in group differences concerning mind-wandering 
behavior. Both experimental groups reported the same amount of TUTs, online as well as 
retrospectively. However, within the group expecting a difficult test, we found difficulty 
expectations to negatively correlate with online and retrospective TUTs, while there was a 
near-zero correlation within the group expecting an easy test. Additionally, both groups 
performed equally well on the reading-comprehension test. Still, overall, more off-task 
thoughts went along with worse test performance, which is well in line with the literature on 
mind-wandering costs3. 
Our assumptions regarding the relationship between meta-cognitive beliefs about test 
difficulty and mind-wandering behavior were not supported by our data. The relationship 
between meta-cognitive beliefs and mind wandering might be more complicated than 
assumed. Concerning our study, we suggested in retrospect that extrinsic as well as intrinsic 
motivational factors might have been at play. In the experimental group expecting a difficult 
comprehension test, thoughts during reading might have been influenced by the high 
difficulty expectations acting as extrinsic motivation to perform well. This extrinsic 
motivation might have overshadowed intrinsic motivational factors, such as interest in the 
topic. As there was still variance concerning the test-difficulty expectations within this group 
(as the manipulation check revealed), we concluded that the higher these expectations, the 
 
 
3 For a more detailed description of the experiment’s materials and results, please see 
Appendix A1. 
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more TUTs might have been inhibited so that they would not disturb reading comprehension 
(see our a priori assumptions). However, lacking such extrinsic motivation, low-difficulty-
expectation participants’ thoughts might have been more prone to being influenced by 
intrinsic motivational factors, possibly explaining the lack of a link between test-difficulty 
expectancies and mind wandering within this group. Factors such as topic interest might have 
superseded our experimental manipulations in the direction that highly interested participants 
might have nevertheless inhibited TUTs, even though there was no urgent need to do so due 
to beliefs about test difficulty. 
Nonetheless, this reasoning remains a post hoc explanation of our data. The existence 
and interplay of various situation- and person-related factors influencing mind-wandering 
adjustment might hamper the isolated examination of one single factor. Identifying main 
effects and interactions of such factors is still a work in progress. Situations in which mind 
wandering is appropriate and even desirable need yet to be identified as well as trait factors 
that control or benefit adjustment processes in accordance with current situational demands. 
Further insights could expand the context regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-
Hanna, 2013) in the direction of a more comprehensive framework of mind-wandering 
adjustment. Experiments such as ours should be extended and potential further influence 
factors besides the one(s) being manipulated should at least be assessed and statistically 
considered. In a follow-up experiment, one could, for example, assess personal interest in the 
text being read and include this measure as a covariate. 
2.3 In Search of Further Beneficial Effects of Mind Wandering 
2.3.1 Memory Benefits Due to Mind Wandering (Manuscript 24). Although, in 
Manuscript 1, we were not able to identify situations with metacognitive low-difficulty beliefs 
as occasions for increased mind-wandering frequencies, situations with actual low task 
difficulty do indeed allow the mind to wander (section 2.2.1). However, just because one can 
and does mind wander during easy tasks, does not mean that anything good has to come of 
such mind-wandering episodes. Thus, besides identifying situations in which mind wandering 
occurs most frequently and with no or only low costs, it should be of great interest to examine 
positive consequences of drifting thoughts. As mentioned above (section 2.1), researchers 
have demonstrated positive effects of TUTs in various domains such as creativity (e.g., Baird 
 
 
4 Steindorf, L., & Rummel, J. (2017). “I should not forget the apples!” – Mind-wandering 
episodes used as opportunities for rehearsal in an interrupted recall paradigm. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 31(4), 424-430. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3328  
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et al., 2012; Gable et al., 2019), future planning (e.g., Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 
2009), and social problem solving (Ruby et al., 2013). Memory represents yet another domain 
that may benefit from mind-wandering processes. The superiority of spaced versus massed 
learning has been the subject of a large body of psychological studies (e.g., Cepeda et al., 
2006; Donovan & Radosevich, 1999; Godbole et al., 2014). As Ebbinghaus (1964, p. 89) 
already stated more than fifty years ago, “a suitable distribution of [repetitions] over a space 
of time is decidedly more advantageous than the massing of them at a single time”. In 
Manuscript 2, we suggested that mind-wandering episodes might offer an opportunity for 
such spaced learning. People could be able to adaptively make use of their wandering 
thoughts by including material-rehearsal episodes within a different ongoing task. 
Memorizing materials, such as a grocery-shopping list or the date and time of an upcoming 
appointment, is part of our everyday life. Using mind-wandering episodes for this kind of 
rehearsal could constitute an efficient way of improving memory performance and would be 
well in line with the cognitive-resources-allocation ideas introduced in section 2.2.1. 
When, for example, reading a book chapter, understanding its content can be defined 
as the present task goal. However, this goal might not be the only active task goal. As Klinger 
(1967, 2013) suggested, people usually have more than one current concern, meaning that 
there are goals extending beyond the here and now. For example, keeping to-be-studied 
materials, such as a grocery-shopping list, in mind could be considered a further task goal, 
which might play a subordinate role in the moment, but will become important in the future. 
In a situation with active present and future task goals, one can allocate thoughts to either the 
present (i.e., on-task thought) or the future task goal, or to completely unrelated issues. 
Therefore, in Manuscript 2, we defined goal-related mind wandering as TUTs, which are 
used for the maintenance of future task goals. Conversely, goal-unrelated mind wandering 
can be characterized as TUTs, which do not concern any present or future task goals, such as 
those concerning the weather, or the reminiscence of a past vacation. Considering the context-
regulation hypothesis (see above and Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013), people should 
benefit from engaging in goal-related mind wandering when the situation requires and/or 
allows it. More precisely, during undemanding tasks, people might easily be able to allocate 
thoughts towards a pending task goal, such as the rehearsal of a shopping list. The situation 
allows goal-related mind wandering because the ongoing task does not require the entirety of 
attentional resources. The situation also requires goal-related mind wandering, because the 
pending task goal will become important in the future. Consequently, people should in fact 
allocate a certain amount of thoughts towards the future task goal to gain the memory-benefits 
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of rehearsal. Furthermore, it seems advisable to prevent general, goal-unrelated mind 
wandering in order to not sacrifice the active task goals. First evidence for our assumptions 
concerning thought allocation comes from a study by Rummel et al. (2017), who revealed that 
people show lower levels of goal-unrelated mind wandering when a special kind of future task 
goal (i.e., a pending prospective-memory intention) is present. 
Accordingly, in our work, we aimed to investigate whether people use mind 
wandering in an adaptive way when, besides a present task goal, a future memory-task goal is 
present. Further, we intended to examine the nature of rehearsal strategies. Put more precisely, 
we took a closer look at the persistence of goal-related mind wandering over time. Finally, to 
demonstrate the actual success of rehearsal during mind wandering, we examined people’s 
memory for the to-be-remembered materials, which can be described as the degree of future 
task-goal fulfillment. In our experiment, we asked the participants to study a grocery-
shopping list and to recall half of the items after the study phase. The recall phase was framed 
as a “trip to the supermarket”. Intending to activate a future task goal in one experimental 
condition (interrupted condition), we told participants that they would have to recall the other 
half later (“in another supermarket”). First, they would work on a different task, namely a 
moderately demanding letter-task. In order to not activate this future task-goal in the other 
experimental condition (finished condition), participants were told that the recall task was 
completed before they started working on the letter task. While participants worked on the 
letter task, we assessed the amount of mind wandering as well as participants’ thought 
contents in order to test for effects of the future-task goal (in)activation. To this end, we 
employed ten thought probes, which interrupted the task, to ask participants to categorize their 
current thoughts as being either on- or off-task and to type in a brief description of their 
current thoughts’ content. Finally, in order to measure the degree of future task-goal 
fulfillment, we asked all participants to recall the second half of the shopping list (see Figure 
2 for a depiction of the procedure). 
The results showed that all participants performed equally well during the first recall 
phase, which was not surprising given that the experimental manipulation took place only 
after this phase. Working on the following letter task, all participants performed similarly well 
and showed similar levels of overall self-categorized mind wandering. Still, participants in the 
interrupted condition showed higher levels of goal-related mind wandering towards the 
shopping list than participants in the finished condition, as assessed by the short thought 
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descriptions5. That is, the activation of a future task goal influenced the proportion of goal-
related and goal-unrelated mind wandering without influencing the overall level of TUTs.  
Furthermore, the likelihood for the occurrence of goal-related mind wandering generally 
decreased over time. However, this time course differed between conditions: Participants in 
the interrupted condition showed a stronger and more persistent mental engagement with the 
future task goal than participants in the finished condition, who stopped thinking about the 
shopping list early on. Not only did interrupted participants show a more efficient rehearsal 
strategy, they also performed better in the second recall phase6.  
We interpreted our results in such a way that the increased and more persistent mental 
engagement in goal-related mind wandering may indeed have been a successful rehearsal 
strategy for the fulfillment of a future task goal. Using mind-wandering episodes to rehearse a 
shopping list might actually prevent people from forgetting important items at the 
supermarket. Interestingly, our interrupted participants displayed a highly efficient thought-
adjustment behavior. They did not sacrifice any of their on-task thoughts (i.e., present-task-
goal-related thoughts) for the maintenance of the future task goal. Instead, they showed lower 
levels of general, goal-unrelated mind wandering. This flexible thought adjustment might 
have been the reason why interrupted participants’ performance on the current task did not 
suffer in the presence of a future task goal. People seem to be able to adjust their mind-
wandering content according to active future task goals while still fulfilling their present task 
goals. They are able to efficiently allocate thoughts to present as well as future task goals. 
Thus, in Manuscript 2, we demonstrated mind-wandering benefits in the domains of memory 
and goal maintenance.    
2.3.2 No Problem-Solving Benefits Due to Mind Wandering (Manuscript 37). 
Aside from the maintenance of memory content, finding a solution to a pending problem 
represents another key future task goal in daily life. In Manuscript 3, we examined whether 
people would allocate thoughts towards a pending decision problem during an incubation 
interval and whether this mental occupation with the problem would foster a solution. Put 
more precisely, we took a closer look at the so-called Unconscious Thought Effect 
 
 
5 Participants’ brief thought descriptions were rated as to whether they related to the shopping 
scenario or not. 
6 For a more detailed description of the experiment’s materials and results, please see 
Appendix A2. 
7 Steindorf, L., Boywitt, C. D., & Rummel, J. (2020). A fresh look at the Unconscious 
Thought Effect: Using mind-wandering measures to reveal thought processes in decision 
problems with high information load. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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(Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), which manifests itself in the form 
of better solutions to complex problems supposedly due to previous unconscious thought in 
contrast to conscious problem-elaboration. When faced with the decision which of four 
different apartments to rent or cars to buy, one has to integrate a multitude of attributes. 
According to the Unconscious Thought Theory, the high information-processing capacity of 
the unconscious system should be better suited to make such a decision than the conscious 
system, which suffers from a low information-processing capacity. In a standard unconscious 
thought paradigm, participants are introduced to several objects and corresponding attributes 
(e.g., “Apartment 1 has a balcony.”, or “Apartment 3 does not have a washing machine.”). A 
higher number of positive attributes characterizes objectively better objects. After being 
presented with and before being asked to choose from the list of objects, participants work on 
a distraction task or engage in conscious thought concerning the decision. The distraction 
task, especially when it is highly demanding, is supposed to only allow for unconscious 
occupation with the decision problem, as it otherwise engages the participants’ conscious 
resources. Evidence for an Unconscious Thought Effect comes in form of better decisions or 
more accurate object evaluations after distraction periods in contrast to conscious-elaboration 
periods without a distraction task. However, it should be noted that the Unconscious Thought 
Theory has been heavily criticized and, despite many successful replications, the effect does 
not always replicate (Acker, 2008; Calvillo & Penaloza, 2009; Newell & Rakow, 2011; Rey et 
al., 2009).  
In Manuscript 3, our aim was to use mind-wandering measures to reveal thought 
processes in a standard unconscious thought paradigm, as one of the still open questions 
concerning the Unconscious Though Effect is the one addressing cognitive processes 
underlying the effect (Strick et al., 2011). In all three experiments of Manuscript 3, thought 
probes and/or retrospective mind-wandering questionnaires were employed to measure 
thought-contents. Besides offering insights into the cognitive processes during distraction and 
conscious-deliberation periods, measuring participants’ thoughts was supposed to allow us to 
test for an alternative explanation for Unconscious Thought Effects in standard paradigms: 
The presentation of object-attribute combinations might activate a goal to solve the current 
decision problem. When the solving process is interrupted by a distraction task in the 
respective experimental conditions, the goal might remain pending and active (Watkins, 
2008), which might further result in an increased mental occupation with the problem 
(Zeigarnik, 1927). Such mental occupation can be considered mind wandering and might, in 
turn, foster problem solving (Baars, 2010). Wandering apartment thoughts, aware or 
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unaware8, might be what is referred to as “unconscious” within the Unconscious Thought 
Theory. More precisely, people could integrate short problem-solving episodes into the 
distraction task. Furthermore, such adaptive mind-wandering processes should be better able 
to unfold during low-demanding distraction tasks, as high-demanding tasks might act as a 
competitor for attentional resources, suppressing adaptive TUTs9, thus contradicting some of 
the Unconscious Thought Theory’s assumptions.  
In three experiments, participants worked on a complex apartment-evaluation task, as 
exemplarily described further up in this section. We separated the evaluation task’s 
presentation and evaluation phases by periods of different activities varying between 
participants, including demanding as well as undemanding distraction tasks and conscious 
apartment elaboration10 (see Figure 2 for a depiction of the procedure). Conscious-thought 
conditions were supposed to test for the existence of an Unconscious Thought Effect by 
representing a criterion for comparison to distraction-task conditions. Distraction-task 
conditions were further supposed to test for our alternative explanation: We expected more 
general and more apartment-related TUTs for participants working on an undemanding 
distraction task compared to participants working on a demanding distraction task (e.g., 
Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). In turn, participants working on the undemanding task should 
perform better on the later evaluation task due to previous adaptive mind-wandering 
processes. Assessing thoughts during (via thought probes) and after (via retrospective 
questionnaires) the distraction period was supposed to allow us to relate the respective 
thought frequencies to evaluation performances.  
An Unconscious Thought Effect, that is better evaluation-task performance for 
distraction-task groups than conscious-thought groups, was present in the first two 
experiments, but not in the third. Further, lower distraction-task demands resulted, in general, 
in more mind wandering towards the apartment-evaluation task as well as towards other 
distraction-task unrelated issues than higher distraction-task demands. However, higher 
 
 
8 Please see Appendix A3 for a more extensive discussion of awareness issues.  
9 The assumption that the highest amount of apartment thoughts is probably present in 
conscious-thought conditions does not imperatively challenge our alternative explanation for 
the Unconscious Thought Effect for two reasons: First, too much problem deliberation could 
have destructive effects, as the problem might be “thought to pieces” (Waroquier et al., 2010). 
Second, conscious-thought conditions might not benefit from a potential fresh look at the 
pending problem due to a dishabituating function of the distraction task. 
10 For a full description of our methods, experimental conditions, and the underlying 
theoretical assumptions and hypotheses, please see Appendix A3. 
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apartment-thought rates did not go along with a better performance in the evaluation task. On 
the contrary, less apartment-related mind wandering seemed to be associated with better 
evaluation performance.11 However, in two experiments, this relationship was confounded by 
thought-probing effects, which I will refer to in section 312.  
Even though we employed similar methods in all three experiments, evidence 
concerning the Unconscious Thought Effect was mixed, adding to the discrepancies in the 
currently ongoing discussion concerning the size of the effect. Additionally, we confirmed 
that high distraction-task demands compete with (adaptive) mind-wandering processes for 
attentional resources. However, there was no evidence for a connection between the level of 
apartment-related mind wandering and the evaluation performance. Thus, in general, there 
was no evidence for mind wandering as an alternative explanation for the Unconscious 
Thought Effect and no evidence for problem-solving benefits due to TUTs.  
2.3.3 No Creativity Benefits Due to Mind Wandering (Manuscript 413). It is not 
always a precise problem with one single correct solution, as the one examined in Manuscript 
3, that occupies our minds. Sometimes we have to come up with novel and useful ideas within 
a wide-open space of possible solutions. It is common belief that creative ideas arise when 
minds are allowed to wander freely (off-task thought) and that focusing too intently on a 
problem (on-task thought) does not foster a creative solution. Referring to this belief, recent 
research has discussed the beneficial effects of mind wandering for creativity and creative 
incubation. Manuscript 4 adds to this ongoing discussion.  
According to the explicit-implicit interaction model of creative thinking (Hélie & Sun, 
2010), creative incubation involves unconscious and implicit associative processes, which, 
while not exclusive to the wandering mind, might increasingly emerge during TUT episodes. 
And indeed, a positive relationship between mind wandering and creative performance was 
reported, for example, for professional writers and physicists, who indicated that many of 
their most significant ideas arose during mind-wandering periods (Gable et al., 2019). Also, 
increased mind-wandering tendencies were found to be connected to the occurrence of aha-
experiences (Zedelius & Schooler, 2015), such as the popular Archimedes’ "Eureka!" 
 
 
11 For a more detailed description of the experiment’s results, please see Appendix A3. 
12 This summary of results is oversimplified as it ignores a further experimental manipulation, 
namely the existence or absence of thought probes during the distraction task. I will refer to 
this issue in section 3.1 by focusing on thought-awareness-inducing effects of such probes. 
13 Steindorf, L., Hammerton, H. A., & Rummel, J. (2019). Mind wandering outside the box – 
About the role of off-task thoughts and their assessment during creative incubation. 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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moment, as well as better performance on divergent and convergent thinking tests 
(Leszczynski et al., 2017; Preiss et al., 2016). Besides such correlational findings, a study by 
Baird et al. (2012) reported causal evidence for mind wandering benefitting creativity within 
an incubation paradigm. Engaging in an undemanding task during an incubation interval 
resulted in performance improvements on previously worked-on creativity tasks. Such an 
improvement was not present after engagement in a demanding task, a period of rest, or after 
having no break at all. Importantly, in a retrospective questionnaire, participants who had 
worked on the undemanding incubation task reported increased mind-wandering levels. The 
authors thus concluded that incubation mind-wandering fosters creativity. However, in a 
methodologically very similar study, Smeekens and Kane (2016) were not able to replicate 
this finding, as mind wandering during incubation did not predict post-incubation creativity. 
One major aim of Manuscript 4 was to resolve this inconsistency by focusing on mind-
wandering assessment issues, which will be covered in section 3.1. At this point, I will focus 
on possible beneficial effects of mind-wandering within the domain of creativity. 
 In our study, participants worked on verbal as well as figural creativity tests (i.e., first 
creativity assessment) before being assigned to one of three incubation conditions14 or a no-
incubation condition. During incubation, all incubation participants worked on an easy letter 
task, which had previously been found to allow for fairly high mind-wandering levels (e.g., 
Baird et al., 2012). A retrospective assessment of incubation mind-wandering towards the 
creativity tests as well as towards other letter-task unrelated issues followed, before 
participants worked on both creativity tests once more (i.e., second creativity assessment). For 
participants in the no-incubation condition, this second creativity assessment directly followed 
the first assessment. Afterwards no-incubation participants worked on the letter task and filled 
out the retrospective mind-wandering questionnaire (see Figure 2 for a depiction of the 
procedure). In general, we expected creative incubation benefits, namely better performance 
in the second creativity assessment for incubation participants than for no-incubation 
participants. Further, and more specifically, we expected levels of incubation mind-wandering 
to differ between the three incubation conditions (see section 3.1), with at least one of the 
incubation conditions showing higher TUT levels as well as better performance in the second 
creativity assessment than the baseline no-incubation condition to support the idea of mind 
wandering benefitting creative incubation. We differentiated between general TUTs (i.e., 
 
 
14 The three incubation conditions were designed to test for effects of different mind 
wandering assessment methods and are not of interest here, but in section 3.1.1. 
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implicit associative processes) and creative TUTs (i.e., target-oriented and directly focused on 
creative solutions) to be able to test for influences of both kinds of mind wandering.  
We did not find post-incubation creative performance benefits for any of the three 
incubation conditions when comparing their performance on the second creativity assessment 
(verbal as well as figural) to the no-incubation condition. Furthermore, neither via incubation-
condition comparisons nor via correlational analyses did we find evidence for incubation 
mind-wandering being related to post-incubation creative performance15. Thus, our 
experiment supports the findings by Smeekens and Kane (2016) and we concluded that it 
might not be possible to increase creativity with mind-wandering manipulations. The mere 
opportunity to mind wander in an artificial lab environment might not be sufficient for 
creative incubation. However, we did not rule out the possibility that incubation mind-
wandering might be found to be beneficial within paradigms producing reliable incubation 
effects and that mind wandering and creativity could be related on a trait level, as previous 
questionnaire research suggests (see above within this section).   
          2.3.4 Discussion of the Search for Further Beneficial Effects of Mind Wandering 16.  
Manuscript 2 introduced memory and goal maintenance as further domains which benefit 
from mind-wandering processes, adding to the current literature on adaptive mind wandering. 
However, in Manuscripts 3 and 4 we did not demonstrate beneficial effects of mind 
wandering within the domains of problem solving and creativity. As described in section 2.1, 
benefits of mind wandering have received increased attention in the past decade. However, as 
there are also studies that do not detect such positive effects, specific patterns and regularities 
emerging in the literature should be of great interest, beyond a pure listing of effects. Why 
and when do positive effects show? Is there good mind wandering and bad mind wandering? 
And more specifically, concerning this dissertation, why did we find mind-wandering benefits 
in Manuscript 2 but not in Manuscripts 3 and 4, although the studies’ designs were quite 
similar (see Figure 2)? Is there a central difference between memory tasks and creativity or 
decision task, which could explain that we found positive effects of TUTs for one, but not the 
other? Trying to answer these questions, I will take a look at adaptive mind wandering from a 
 
 
15 For a more detailed description of the experiment’s materials and results, please see 
Appendix A4. 
16 Individual discussions of the respective manuscripts’ results can be found in the respective 
appendices. The current section aims at a rather collective discussion of patterns emerging 
from all three manuscripts (2-4). 
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content and a methodological perspective and I will further propose an individual-differences 
approach based on the assumption that not everyone mind wanders in the same way.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Simplified depiction of the study designs of Manuscripts 2, 3, and 4. In all studies 
there was a first problem engagement phase before participants worked on a filler task within 
the filler interval. We were interested in participants’ mind-wandering behavior during this 
interval and expected it to be positively related to their performance in the following second 
problem engagement phase.  
 
2.3.4.1 Adaptive Mind Wandering From a Content Perspective. The specific topic of 
a mind-wandering episode determines its outcome valence to a great extent (content 
regulation hypothesis, Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). It sounds self-evident that positive 
mind wandering (pleasant, cheerful, planful, etc.) leads to positive effects. However, the 
picture is more diverse. Negative outcomes are often found when the mind wanders to the 
past, sometimes even when the thought content itself is positive (Ruby et al., 2013; 
Smallwood & O'Connor, 2011; Stawarczyk, Majerus, et al., 2013). In contrast, future 
thinking, which is very common during mind-wandering episodes (e.g., Smallwood et al., 
2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011), is found to go along with rather positive outcomes such as the 
improvement of mood, or future and autobiographical planning benefits (Baird et al., 2011; 
D'Argembeau et al., 2011; Ruby et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2009). Besides the temporal 
THE NATURE OF THE WANDERING MIND                                                                                   27 
 
focus, personal interest in a current mind-wandering topic determines the valence of TUT 
outcomes. For example, drifting thoughts focused on topics, which people find highly 
engaging, are associated with an increase in positive mood (Franklin, Mrazek, et al., 2013).  
Most of the aforementioned effects of specific TUT contents refer to mood. In addition 
to temporal focus and interest, and referring to positive effects on specific active tasks, further 
content-related factors such as personal relevance or goal-orientation could play an important 
role in determining the functional outcome of mind-wandering episodes. As a possible reason 
for the differences in results between Manuscripts 2-4, I propose a post-hoc explanation 
utilizing the interplay of such factors. Future orientation and personal relevance have already 
been found to go together (Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013): Future-related mind wandering 
is more personally relevant than non-prospective mind wandering. Also, most of our daily-life 
present and future goals are personally relevant to us. My reasoning within the scope of this 
dissertation is that personally relevant and goal-oriented prospective TUTs are beneficial 
when it comes to fulfilling a task goal: A task such as remembering a shopping list represents 
a potential personally relevant, future oriented goal. The shopping task in Manuscript 2 was 
operationalized in a way that resembles everyday grocery shopping. Everyone knows the 
feeling of being annoyed when cooking and realizing that one forgot to buy one of the most 
important ingredients. A failure in remembering parts of a shopping list has obvious future 
consequences in everyday life. A failure in coming up with creative solutions to verbal or 
figural creativity tasks (Manuscript 4) cannot as easily be translated into daily-life 
consequences, and such a task is probably not personally relevant to most people. Although 
many people might know the situation of having to choose between apartments or other 
objects, the way such a decision-task is operationalized in the unconscious thought paradigm 
(Manuscript 3) is rather artificial and might not evoke a feeling of personal (future) relevance 
or the goal to do well in the apartment evaluation within participants. Thus, shopping-task 
related TUTs in Manuscript 2 might represent the only mind-wandering content which can 
easily be applied to everyday life, has personal future relevance, and is strongly goal-related 
in comparison with creative thoughts (Manuscript 4) and apartment thoughts (Manuscript 3). 
However, the relation between such mind-wandering content features and positive mind-
wandering outcomes remains a post-hoc explanation for the data and should be further tested 
by specifically manipulating the respective features. For example, a random word list without 
a goal-related (shopping) context might not be as continuously rehearsed within mind-
wandering episodes as was the case in Manuscript 2. Further, tasks, which naturally lack 
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personal relevance (as I propose is the case within Manuscript 3 and 4), could be incentivized 
to add an external relevance-factor.  
 Besides the specific thought content, the task formulation and the type of problem 
might also play a role. Referring to control theories, Shepherd (2019) argues that the mind 
might look for another active goal when the current task goal does not require all resources or 
is deemed insufficiently rewarding. This goal-search as well as the following attempt at goal-
fulfillment might be easier and more successful if there is a very concrete active goal with a 
clear solution. The goal of memory or shopping-item maintenance (Manuscript 2) is a very 
specific one. The desired final state (recall of all shopping items) as well as the means to this 
end (rehearsal of the items) are known. These features might make goal switching fairly easy 
in comparison to rather vaguely defined final states such as a coming up with creative 
solutions (Manuscript 4). Moreover, even if switching to a creative goal was successful, 
solution approaches are even more vague. There is no known recipe for creativity as there is a 
recipe for memory maintenance (e.g., rehearsal). You cannot simply evoke or force creative 
thoughts, but you can make yourself, or a participant in the lab, rehearse items. The desired 
final state in the apartment task (Manuscript 3) may be clear to most participants (finding the 
best apartment). However, the solution approach is not that simple in a standard unconscious-
thought paradigm. It might be considered a mixture of object-attribute memory maintenance, 
single-attribute evaluation, and the comparison of objects (including, at best, all object-
attribute pairs) against each other. Such a solution approach is not as straight forward as 
simple maintenance of single grocery shopping items. Concreteness and simplicity of task 
formulation and goals, as well as of solution approaches, represent further content-related 
factors, which differ between Manuscripts 2-4 and might explain why there were mind-
wandering benefits in one but not the others. These factors should be especially relevant for 
laboratory experiments because they only offer a limited time frame for the search of active 
goals and their fulfillment and thus for beneficial mind wandering (see also section 2.3.4.2). 
2.3.4.2 Adaptive Mind Wandering From a Methodological Perspective. Shortly 
summarizing the previous sections, TUTs might be beneficial for some tasks, but not for 
others. But how can we make sure to empirically capture benefits, given they exist? From a 
methodological perspective, one could argue that identifying benefits of drifting thoughts 
might require different approaches than identifying costs. When examining costs, the research 
focus lies mostly on TUT frequency: More TUTs lead to increased costs. Thought content is 
oftentimes ignored. However, when examining benefits, content might become a crucial 
component. Manuscript 2 built on this idea as it was a content-focused examination of 
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beneficial mind-wandering effects. Focusing only on mind-wandering frequency would not 
have been insightful in the reported experiment17. Instead, short descriptions of the 
participants’ thought contents revealed the adaptive nature of drifting thoughts used as 
opportunities for rehearsal. When examining costs, it is not as important whether people think 
about penguin knees or their last breakfast. It is the sole fact that people do mind wander, 
mostly independent of thought content, that influences current task performance. Thinking 
about penguin knees, however, does not help when it comes to planning the next trip to the 
supermarket and cannot be equated with shopping-list maintenance. Thus, more exhaustive 
methods assessing participants’ thought content might be necessary when examining mind-
wandering benefits. 
A further difference between the examination of costs and benefits might be a 
temporal one. Costs often reveal themselves right away in the form of performance 
decrements. In contrast, benefits might rather tend to occur time-delayed or manifest 
themselves on a trait-based level only. Recent research connecting mind wandering with 
creative benefits illustrates the methodological difficulties that can occur when examining 
positive effects of mind wandering: The experimental method produced mixed effects 
concerning the causal relation between mind wandering during incubation intervals and later 
creative performance. In several experiments, Smeekens and Kane (2016) as well as our own 
research group (Manuscript 4) did not detect beneficial effects of mind wandering as were 
found by Baird et al. (2012). Manipulating state mind wandering in an artificial lab 
environment in order to examine positive effects of drifting thoughts thus seems to be a rather 
difficult endeavor, at least in the domain of creativity (but see Manuscript 2). We further do 
not know if creative benefits would have manifested themselves at a later time, as a laboratory 
experiment is bound to a very limited time period.  
Correlational content analyses as well as trait-based questionnaire studies, however, 
support the idea of mind wandering fostering creative problem solving (e.g., Hao et al., 2014; 
Preiss et al., 2016; Zedelius & Schooler, 2015). To name one recent example, Gable and 
colleagues (2019) asked professional writers and physicists about their most creative idea of 
the day and the circumstances of its emergence. Thus, their participants’ creative solutions 
were not time limited and not limited to state-creativity. The authors found that one fifth of 
such ideas emerged during mind-wandering episodes and that these ideas were more likely to 
 
 
17 In Manuscript 2, overall mind-wandering frequencies did not differ between experimental 
conditions and could thus not be associated with memory-performance benefits.  
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be experienced as “aha” moments compared to ideas created during on-task-thought episodes. 
This pattern within the domain of creativity (namely the existence of correlational effects in 
trait-based studies, but an unclear picture when it comes to experimental, state-based 
examinations) suggests that researchers investigating beneficial effects of mind wandering 
should be encouraged to take advantage of the methodological diversity available in the field, 
which goes far beyond simple questionnaire studies. For example, mobile-phone applications 
that transfer the experience sampling method to daily life (e.g., McVay et al., 2009) allow for 
the examination of time courses and might hint to causal relationships.  
Ultimately, researchers should have in mind that benefits of mind wandering might 
reveal themselves under different circumstances than costs might do and should select their 
methodological approach carefully. Besides study-design issues and independent of the 
benefits-or-costs question, the methods and materials used to assess mind wandering online 
(e.g., thought probes) should also be added to this methodological perspective. All three 
manuscripts searching for mind-wandering benefits employed thought-probing methods, 
which might be considered a limitation as thought probes interrupt people’s trains of thought 
and make thought contents aware. This issue will be considered in more detail in section 3. 
2.3.4.3 Adaptive Mind Wandering Within an Individual-Differences Approach.  
Besides the question whether positive effects of mind wandering exist, the question of 
whether they exist for everyone should be considered. People differ in many traits and 
behaviors. It would thus be foolish to assume that all people mind wander in the same way 
and that mind-wandering benefits arise in the same manner for everyone. When it comes to 
mind-wandering benefits, employing an individual-differences approach can quickly become 
complex. Taking the creativity topic from Manuscript 4 as an example, only a specific mind-
wandering style might improve creative performance, only highly creative people might 
benefit from mind-wandering processes, or only a specific belief about the relationship 
between mind wandering and creativity might lead to mind-wandering benefits. Individual 
differences might thus play a role at various levels. At the mind-wandering level, one could, 
for example, argue that people with higher manifestations of trait-level deliberate mind 
wandering (Seli et al., 2015; Seli, Risko, et al., 2016) or positive constructive daydreaming 
(Huba et al., 1981; Singer, 1974; Singer & Antrobus, 1970) practice a more constructive form 
of mind wandering and might be more prone to positive effects. However, at this point in 
time, not much is known about the characteristics of people who score high on questionnaires 
measuring such traits (but see Seli et al., 2015 for a relation to mindfulness facets and Zhiyan 
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& Singer, 1997 for a relation to personality variables) and, to my knowledge, no studies 
examining mind-wandering benefits have considered differences in mind-wandering traits.  
At the creativity level, one could further argue that only highly creative people know 
how to adaptively make use of mind-wandering periods and might even have developed 
specific thought strategies which help them to come up with creative ideas. Thus, mind-
wandering benefits might only be present for people scoring high on creativity measures. At 
the intermediate level between mind wandering and creativity, one could argue that only 
people who believe in the existence of a relationship between the two concepts show 
creativity benefits due to mind wandering. Such beliefs, or implicit theories, can be 
considered schemas, which simplify people’s grasps of the external world and even guide 
cognition or behavior (Dweck et al., 1995; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kong & Jolly, 2019). 
Zedelius and Schooler (2017) suggested that some people might believe mind wandering to be 
valuable when it comes to creative insights and that these people might thus make better use 
of TUTs and experience beneficial TUT effects.     
The ideas concerning individual differences discussed within the scope of the 
creativity example can be translated to other domains and present starting points for future 
research. Maybe only people with high problem-solving abilities know how to make use of 
mind-wandering episodes to solve previously presented problems. Maybe people who often 
mind wander intentionally can remember even more grocery shopping items than people who 
do not consider themselves frequent wanderers. As individual differences have been mostly 
ignored in the investigation of adaptive mind wandering, I believe this individual-differences 
perspective to be a very fruitful approach for future research.   
 
3 Deleterious Effects of Thought Probes   
All four manuscripts discussed in this dissertation employ the thought-probe method 
(section 1.2), mirroring its popularity in the mind-wandering field. As more and more 
researchers are currently using this approach to measure TUTs in the exact moment they are 
happening (Weinstein, 2018), the measurement method itself has become a research topic of 
interest. Although thought probes seem to be reasonably valid mind-wandering assessment 
tools (section 1.2), methodological problems shine through, starting with the observation that 
probes come in many shapes and forms (Weinstein, 2018). Studies using thought probes differ 
in features such as the wording and framing of instructions as well as of probes and response 
options, the number of response options (if any), or the time between probes. It has been 
argued that variations in such probe characteristics can lead to considerable differences in 
THE NATURE OF THE WANDERING MIND                                                                                   32 
 
results (Robison et al., 2019): Honesty primes have been found to reduce self-reported mind 
wandering (Vinski & Watter, 2012). Furthermore, the probe rate seems to affect mind-
wandering reports in the direction that people report higher TUT levels when the time 
between probes increases (Seli, Carriere, et al., 2013). Additionally, the framing of thought 
probes has been found to influence reported mind-wandering rates. Asking participants 
whether they were on-task can lead to fewer reported TUTs than asking whether they were 
off-task (Weinstein et al., 2018)18.   
3.1 Thought Probes’ Influence on Mind-Wandering Processes   
Besides effects of special thought-probe characteristics, effects of the mere presence of 
thought probes have become a topic of interest. Wiemers and Redick (2019) raised the 
question of whether people perform differently on a task when thought probes are employed. 
The authors found that such probes do not interfere with performance on an ongoing cognitive 
task. Furthermore, Robison et al. (2019) used a very similar task and found that performance 
did not differ between two experimental conditions varying in thought-probe frequency. 
Therefore, thought-probe presence does not seem to interfere with current task performance. 
 However, thought-probe presence might still alter thought or mind-wandering 
experiences during ongoing tasks. By continually disrupting the task, probes also interrupt the 
“train of thought”, may it currently be on-task or off-task thought. Furthermore, going beyond 
purely interrupting effects, (repeatedly) asking people about their current mental states could 
increase their meta-awareness about thought contents and mind wandering behavior in general 
(Zedelius et al., 2015).    
3.1.1 Development of a New Paradigm Dissociating Between Interruption and 
Awareness Effects of Thought Probes (Manuscripts 3 and 4). This reasoning might be 
especially problematic when it comes to demonstrating positive effects of mind wandering. In 
Manuscripts 3 and 4, we had expected beneficial mind wandering in the form of (associative 
and) continuous thought that produces (creative) solutions to previously presented problems 
during incubation-task intervals. One might argue that by continually inter- and disrupting the 
 
 
18 However, recent findings by Schubert et al. (2019) suggest that TUT reports’ susceptibility 
to probe variations might not be a threat to thought-probes’ validity. In their study, changes in 
probe characteristics were not reflected in changes in the relationship between mind 
wandering and SART performance. Thus, changes in TUT reports due to variations in thought 
probing methods might simply reflect varying absolute levels of reported mind wandering, 
possibly due to response biases. At least when held constant in an experimental setting (or 
when controlled for), such variations on the absolute level do not threaten the validity of 
probe-caught mind wandering. 
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ongoing incubation task, detrimental effects concerning the wandering mind’s natural 
dynamics might occur. We therefore specified an interruption hypothesis in Manuscripts 3 
and 4, which stated that thought probes’ interrupting nature might cut off associative, 
continuous, and possibly beneficial trains of thought, influencing the mind-wandering 
experience. On the one hand, this interruption might not give the participants enough time to 
produce TUTs before being interrupted once again. On the other hand, probing on a consistent 
basis might be too disruptive, so that participants are prevented from focusing on the current 
task, producing even higher rates of TUTs (Seli, Carriere, et al., 2013).  
We further specified an (alternative or) additional awareness hypothesis, which goes 
beyond purely interrupting effects. Since thought probes might increase meta-awareness and 
alert participants of their state of thought, participants might become more aware and cautious 
of their own mind-wandering behavior, possibly changing the experience itself, including 
potentially beneficial TUTs. On the one hand, participants could try to down-regulate their 
mind-wandering behavior because thought probes could make them believe that they should 
be thinking about the task. On the other hand, thought probes might remind participants of the 
opportunity to mind wander, leading them to engage in more TUTs. If both interruption and 
awareness play a role, there further might be a cumulative effect, causing even more changes 
in mind-wandering behavior. In Manuscripts 3 and 4, we expected such changes due to 
interruption and/or awareness to interfere with beneficial mind-wandering processes. We 
expected thought probes to disrupt creative and problem-solving TUTs.     
To test and disentangle the proposed interruption and awareness hypotheses, we 
developed a new experimental paradigm, which we employed in Manuscripts 3 and 4. Three 
experimental conditions were crucial for this paradigm: In all conditions, participants were 
presented with a (creativity or apartment) problem and engaged in a problem-solution phase, 
followed by a filler interval (see Figure 3) and a subsequent second problem-engagement 
phase (see Figure 2). In the first (baseline) condition, participants worked on the filler task 
without any probes interrupting the task. In the second condition, participants worked on the 
same filler task and were interrupted by trivia probes from time to time, which consisted of 
general knowledge questions. Trivia probes should prompt an interruption, as proposed in the 
interruption hypothesis. If mere interruption were sufficient to evoke the proposed detrimental 
effects of thought probing, mind-wandering behavior (during the filler interval) for 
participants in this condition should deviate from the behavior observed in the baseline 
condition. If thought awareness were a necessary criterion for detrimental effects of thought 
probing (i.e., interruption by itself were not a sufficient disruption), trivia probes, in contrast 
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to thought probes, should not have an effect on mind wandering. Consequently, in the third 
condition, including the to-be-tested awareness component, participants working on the filler 
task were interrupted by typical thought probes (same number and format as trivia probes). 
Finally, before working on the second problem-engagement phase, all participants filled in a 
retrospective questionnaire concerning on-task and off-task experiences during the incubation 
task. Retrospectively reported off-task experiences represented our central dependent 
variables. We further expected mind-wandering benefits, namely better performance in the 
second problem-engagement phase, to be greatest for participants in the uninterrupted 
baseline condition as their minds were allowed to actually run freely without any disturbance. 
Mind-wandering benefits were expected to depend on possible detrimental interruption and/or 
awareness effects, as trivia and/or thought probing may have disruptive effects on associative, 
continuous problem-solving processes during incubation.    
 
 
 
Figure 3. Schematic overview of the newly developed paradigm’s filler interval. Participants 
in the baseline condition worked on the letter task without being interrupted and without 
instructions concerning the mind-wandering construct. Participants in the trivia- and thought-
probe conditions were interrupted by the respective probes asking trivia questions or 
questions concerning current thoughts. Trivia probes were supposed to induce interruption 
effects, whereas thought probes were supposed to additionally induce awareness effects. Pure 
awareness effects were supposed to be induced within the self-caught condition (only 
employed in the unpublished study) by asking participants to continuously monitor their 
thoughts during the letter task. 
 
In both manuscripts, we differentiated between general TUTs (unrelated to the current 
task and the to-be-solved active problem) and TUTs concerning the previously presented to-
be-solved problem, as measured by the retrospective questionnaire. In Manuscript 3 
(Experiment 3), we found that participants who had received thought probes reported 
significantly higher levels of general TUTs than participants who had received trivia probes or 
no thought probes. We did not find group differences for TUTs related to the apartment 
problem, which participants were supposed to solve. In Manuscript 4, we did not find group 
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differences for general TUTs. However, there were significant group differences for TUTs 
related to the creativity problem. Participants in the thought-probe condition reported lower 
levels of creativity-problem-related thoughts than participants in both the baseline and the 
trivia-probe condition19. Figure 2 shows the result pattern for problem-related TUTs for 
Manuscripts 3 and 4 as well as an additional yet unpublished study, replicating Manuscript 4.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Depiction of rates of problem-related mind wandering collected via the new 
paradigm as reported in Manuscripts 3 and 4 as well as in an unpublished study. In 
Manuscript 3, apartment-problem-related thoughts did not vary between conditions. In 
Manuscript 4 and in the unpublished study, awareness-inducing manipulations (see thought 
probe conditions and self-caught condition) yielded lower reports of creativity-problem-
related thoughts as the baseline and only-interruption inducing conditions.  
 
In the unpublished study (a preregistration can be found at 
https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/X74F2), I added a fourth condition to the new paradigm, in 
which participants were not interrupted by any kinds of probes during the incubation phase 
between two creativity problem-solving phases20. However, before incubation they were 
asked to monitor their own on- and off-task thought behavior and to press a button whenever 
they caught themselves mind wandering (self-caught mind wandering assessment, e.g., 
Weinstein, 2018). After incubation, they answered to the same retrospective thought 
questionnaire (see above). This fourth condition can be interpreted as a pure awareness 
condition. Such a condition usefully complemented the paradigm employed in Manuscripts 3 
and 4, as there were pure interruption and combined interruption and awareness, but no pure 
 
 
19 For a more detailed description of the experiments’ materials and results, please see 
Appendices A3 and A4. 
20 Participants worked on two Unusual Consequences Tasks (Fulgosi & Guilford, 1968; Hass 
& Beaty, 2018). 
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awareness conditions. As apparent from Figure 2, results from this unpublished study 
replicated results from Manuscript 4 concerning creativity TUTs and further make a point in 
favor of the awareness hypothesis: Participants in the thought-probe and the self-caught 
conditions (both including an awareness component) showed lower levels of thoughts 
regarding the creativity task compared to participants in the baseline and the trivia-probe 
conditions (both excluding an awareness component). In the unpublished study, as in 
Manuscript 4, there were no group differences concerning general TUTs.  In all studies, 
however, group differences in mind-wandering behavior were unrelated to apartment-task or 
creativity performance. As discussed in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, we did not find beneficial 
mind-wandering effects within the problem-solving and creativity domains. We could thus 
not relate disruptive effects of thought probes to the non-appearance of mind-wandering 
benefits.      
3.1.2 Discussion of the New Paradigm. In Manuscripts 3 and 4 as well as in a yet 
unpublished study, we developed and tested a new paradigm to disentangle possible 
interruption and awareness effects of thought probes. In all studies, thought probes had an 
effect on retrospectively reported mind-wandering behavior, although in Manuscript 3 this 
pertained to general TUTs whereas in Manuscript 4 as well as in the unpublished study this 
pertained to problem-related (creativity) TUTs. It has, however, yet to be determined why 
different to-be-solved problems produce different effects thought-probe existence.  
Participants who had been interrupted by trivia probes generally reported similar 
levels of TUTs (general as well as problem-related) as participants in the baseline conditions. 
It seems that the interrupting nature of thought probes is not disruptive to thought experiences 
during incubation. However, thought probes as well as self-caught instructions led to 
differences in incubation mind-wandering, indicating that thought awareness might influence 
actually experienced or reported thought processes. Especially the combination of results 
from Manuscript 4 and the unpublished study speaks for the interfering nature of thought 
awareness when it comes to problem-related (creative) thought processes. Levels of creativity 
TUTs were roughly halved in awareness-inducing experimental conditions21. It remains an 
open question, which mechanisms underlie this reduction in creative thoughts. Thought 
awareness might change actual mind wandering by altering the participants of their thought-
processes, leading to a suppression of TUTs. Thought awareness might, however, also change 
 
 
21 It should, however, be mentioned that this lack of creative thought processes was not 
reflected in worse post-incubation creativity performance. 
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later reports of mind wandering due to demand characteristics without actually changing 
mind-wandering behavior: Participants might have felt that it was inappropriate to mind 
wander creatively because thought awareness might have made them speculate about the 
background of the experiment. Independent of the underlying mechanisms, thought probes 
seem to make it difficult to detect true mind-wandering rates.    
Thought probes have been found to not influence current task performance (Wiemers 
& Redick, 2019). However, to our knowledge, we were the first to show that such probes 
influence current mind-wandering behavior or reports. We also took a closer look at the 
processes which might underlie this TUT alteration, namely interruption as well as awareness 
effects. As thought probes are used highly frequently in mind-wandering research (section 
1.2), it is of great importance to the field that we as researchers know how this tool works and 
what effects it might evoke. In Manuscript 4 as well as in the unpublished study, thought 
probes decreased creative TUTs (or reports of the latter), in other words, thoughts directed at 
a pending problem. Representing a limitation of our results, we did not find a negative 
relation between such a TUT decrease and beneficial mind-wandering effects. We had 
expected the latter to occur as long as minds were allowed to wander freely without any 
interruption. In the domains of creativity and problem solving, however, we did not find any 
mind-wandering benefits independent of probing conditions. This does not rule out the 
possibility that thought probes might impede the search for positive effects of mind wandering 
in other domains in which possibly productive TUTs might be affected by thought probing. It 
might, for example, be difficult to demonstrate positive effects of mind-wandering episodes as 
opportunities for mental breaks or as having a dishabituating function (see section 2.1 and 
Schooler et al., 2011) when people are constantly made aware of their own thought processes. 
Further, in Manuscript 2, mind-wandering benefits might have been more substantial if we 
had refrained from making participants aware of their memory-maintenance behavior due to 
thought probing. Further research should focus on these assumptions and identify further 
domains as well as types of TUTs which are influenced by the common method of thought 
probing.   
4 Eye-Movement Measures as Mind-Wandering Indicators  
4.1 Objective Mind-Wandering Assessment  
 The apparent subjectivity of thought probes as well as the previously described 
problems (section 3), which come with thought-probe employment, have led to a search for 
objective biological or behavioral indicators of TUTs. The central aims behind this search are 
the validation of subjective thought reports, but further also the direct measurement of mind 
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wandering without a subjective component. The basic idea behind such direct and objective 
measurement methods is, that when thoughts trail off, the external perception is affected. Put 
more precisely, during mind wandering, attention is decoupled from external, perceptual input 
towards internal processing (Schooler et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Objective mind-
wandering markers are supposed to make such an attentional decoupling process visible and 
several different markers have been proposed.  
Reaction times were found to be sensitive to attentional lapses with people showing an 
increased variability on this measure when mind wandering (McVay & Kane, 2012a; Seli, 
Cheyne, et al., 2013). In addition, neurological markers are being explored. The Default 
Mode Network was identified as a set of brain regions becoming active when the brain is at 
rest. However, it is not a passive network, as it was found to play an active role in internally 
directed cognition. Its activation was connected to mind wandering in several studies and 
seems to be a stable mind-wandering correlate (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Buckner et al., 
2008; Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Mittner et al., 2016). As a further 
neurological marker for drifting thoughts, the P300 event-related potential (an 
electroencephalography (EEG) measure) was proposed, as it was found to be reduced prior to 
TUT episodes (Smallwood, Beach, et al., 2008). Not only the brain, but also the eyes seem to 
reveal the wandering mind. Oculomotor behaviors such as pupil dilation and eye movements 
can be temporally associated with TUTs. Pupillary responses have not only been found to 
distinguish between on-task and off-task states (however with disagreement on the direction 
of effects, see Franklin, Broadway, et al., 2013; Grandchamp et al., 2014; Smallwood et al., 
2011), but Unsworth and Robison (2016) even suggested that they are sensitive to different 
types of inattention triggered by internal (mind wandering) versus external distraction.            
4.2 Eye Movements During Mindless Reading (Manuscript 122) 
 Eye movements, especially those during reading23, have also been examined as 
potential biological markers of mind-wandering processes. The objectivity of such measures 
 
 
22 Steindorf, L., & Rummel, J. (2020). Do your eyes give you away? A validation study of 
eye-movement measures used as indicators for mindless reading. Behavior Research 
Methods, 52(1), 162-176. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-019-01214-4 
23 The question of how mind wandering affects eye movements during reading has already 
been addressed in several studies. However, there are yet other domains in which eye 
movements have been found to be sensitive towards a drifting mind, such as driving (He et 
al., 2011), video lectures (Zhang et al., 2018), or movies (Mills et al., 2016).  
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is given because people are not able to deliberately control fixations and saccades24 (Rayner, 
1998). Also, from a practical perspective, the method of eye tracking has become more and 
more feasible in the last decades with easily usable devices and software available on the 
market (Holmqvist et al., 2011). Thus, would changes in eye movements robustly correlate 
with the occurrence of mind-wandering episodes, these measures could represent a suitable 
candidate for non-subjective mind-wandering assessment. The reason why eye movements 
might be associated with attentional decoupling (see above) and therefore the motivation to 
identify them as biological markers for mind-wandering episodes lies in the general idea 
behind eye-tracking research: There is a link between what people are looking at and what 
they are currently mentally processing (Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011). Given an attentional-
decoupling process during mind wandering, this link should be interrupted. To transfer this 
logic to the domain of reading, the duration of a fixation on a given word partially reflects the 
duration of its processing. The word-frequency effect (Inhoff & Rayner, 1986) nicely 
illustrates this idea: People take longer to identify and process an uncommon than a common 
word. This need for more intense processing is reflected in longer fixations on uncommon 
words. Thus, one could argue that cognitive forces drive eye-movement behavior (cognitive-
control theories, see Just & Carpenter, 1980; but for oculomotor-control theories see, Yang, 
2006). However, during mind wandering, these cognitive forces are engaged in internally 
generated thoughts, which might limit their power to control eye movements. Consequently, 
when thoughts (and therefore attention) drift away from lines of text, eye movements should 
become less sensitive towards lexical features, such as word frequency.  
 Which specific eye-movement measures are affected by a wandering mind was the 
central research question of several previous studies, all of which comparing eye movements 
during episodes of normal in comparison to mindless reading (Foulsham et al., 2013; Frank et 
al., 2015; Reichle et al., 2010; Smilek et al., 2010; Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011). Reading 
modes were self-classified by the participants using thought probes. This way, objective eye-
movements were supposed to validate subjective mind-wandering self-reports (and vice 
versa). In Manuscript 1, we reviewed these studies and found little consensus regarding the 
specific eye-movement measures that were found to be sensitive to attentional decoupling. As 
the search for eye-movement indicators of a wandering mind still seems to be a work in 
 
 
24 Eyes do not move continuously and “smoothly”. Simply put, almost all eye movements can 
be considered a sequence of fixations (short stops to “gather” information) and saccades 
(short, rapid movements to the next stop).  
THE NATURE OF THE WANDERING MIND                                                                                   40 
 
progress, we conducted a high-powered eye-tracking experiment with the aim to validate all 
previously identified indicators.  
 We asked participants to read a text for up to 30 minutes with their eye movements 
being tracked. Reading was self-paced, and participants were asked about their current 
thoughts after having read each of ten target sentences. These target sentences had been 
determined before data collection and five of them contained a high-frequency and the other 
five a low-frequency target word. After reading, a retrospective mind-wandering 
questionnaire as well as a reading-comprehension test followed. We were interested in 
differences in eye-movement measures between self-classified normal- and mindless-reading 
episodes. These comparisons regarded target sentences as well as target words. Concerning 
target sentences, the previous studies we had reviewed had found mixed evidence regarding 
six different possible mind-wandering indicators. For only three of them (reading time, 
fixation count, first-fixation duration), we found significant differences between on-task and 
off-task episodes. All of these three measures can be described as reading-speed related. 
When reading mindlessly, our participants slowed down, exhibiting longer and more fixations 
on the target sentences. Consequently, it took them longer to mindlessly “read” a sentence. 
Concerning target words, we compared the magnitudes of the word-frequency effect for 
normal- and mindless-reading episodes. For the fixation-count measure (number of fixations 
on a given word), we found smaller differences between high- and low-frequency target 
words during off-task episodes, i.e. a smaller word-frequency effect. Word features like word 
frequency seem to have a smaller impact on eye movements when people’s minds start to 
wander than they usually have during reading, which is well in line with the idea of 
attentional decoupling25. 
 Identifying objective measures of mind wandering is an important endeavor. However, 
in Manuscript 1, we found that it is still a work in progress. Our study constitutes one among 
several others assessing eye-movements to detect mind-wandering indicators, and it is 
noticeable that the studies’ results differ. Thus, it was all the more important for our study to 
review and combine the preexistent work, aiming at further validating previously reported 
effects. Although not all effects could be replicated, reading-speed-related measures turned 
out to be promising candidates for mind-wandering detection via eye-tracking methods. 
Identifying online-markers of mind wandering is not only important because it contributes to 
 
 
25 For a more detailed description of the experiment’s materials and results, please see 
Appendix A1. 
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theoretical assumptions of mind wandering and attentional decoupling. It could also 
eventually contribute to a non-intrusive, objective mind-wandering measurement, 
circumventing the intrusive effects of thought probes and the bias-prone nature of self-report 
measures. Further, from an applied perspective, objective indicators might foster the 
development of intervention systems for situations in which mind wandering is disruptive 
(e.g., educational context) and even dangerous (e.g., while driving). Still, more work is 
necessary, and we hope for our work to drive the validation process forward. The ultimate 
goal should be to develop algorithms that allow for real-time detection of mind wandering 
during reading, based on previously validated eye-movement measures. 
 
5 General Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Good Thoughts, Bad Thoughts? 
This dissertation investigated the wandering mind’s nature. I contrasted previously 
reported negative consequences of mind wandering (“bad thoughts”) with positive ones 
(“good thoughts”), before reporting new contributions to this line of research. The 
functionality and valence of mind-wandering processes appeared to be rather complex, 
depending, in the first place, on context and content. Section 2.2 focused on context-related 
issues, stating that a mind-wandering episode’s outcome-valence is situation- and trait-
specific. There are situations in which mind wandering is appropriate and even desirable, such 
as low-difficulty tasks. In other situations (e.g., high-difficulty tasks), mind wandering should 
be inhibited. The same off-task thoughts might thus be good in one situation, but bad in the 
other. There are also person-related factors which control or benefit adjustment processes in 
accordance with current situational demands (e.g., working memory), suggesting individual 
differences when it comes to mind-wandering outcome-valence.  
The discussion of section 2.3 covered content-related issues on which TUTs’ outcome 
valence might depend. Some mind-wandering content might be bad (or at least not good or 
useful), whereas other content might be good. I argued that personally relevant and goal-
oriented prospective TUTs (as in Manuscript 2) rank among the good, and that a high 
concreteness and simplicity of task formulation and task goals also facilitate the usefulness of 
TUT episodes, at least within laboratory experiments. Such content-related factors could 
explain why we found mind-wandering benefits within the domain of memory, but not within 
the domains of creativity or problem solving.  
I further argued (section 2.3.4) that benefits of mind wandering might reveal 
themselves under different circumstances than costs might do and that different 
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methodological approaches could be necessary when it comes to detecting good versus bad 
thoughts. When examining mind-wandering benefits, thought content becomes crucial and the 
researcher should not only refer to mind-wandering frequencies, as is often the case when 
examining costs. A further difference between costs and benefits might be that costs often 
reveal themselves right away whereas benefits might occur at a later time, also speaking for 
the use of different methodological approaches. I further considered the question of whether 
good and bad is equal for everyone by suggesting an individual-differences view on mind-
wandering benefits. 
To summarize, the question of good or bad is not an easy one to answer and demands 
a close investigation of situation- and person-related factors. Mind wandering should not be 
viewed one-sidedly, because, besides apparent and exhaustively studied costs, benefits exist. I 
added memory to the list of domains which have been found to benefit from TUT episodes 
and discussed moderating factors which should be further examined in future research, as 
described in more detail in the respective sections. Moreover, I would encourage the search 
for additional positive functions of mind-wandering processes (section 2.1, e.g., relief from 
boredom, mental rest, emotion regulation) to eventually complete a balanced picture of the 
wandering mind’s nature.  
5.2 Can We Measure Mind Wandering Online?  
 This dissertation further focused on how to capture wandering thoughts. In section 1.2, 
subjective in-the-moment mind-wandering assessment methods were introduced, and I stated 
reasons for thought probes’ frequent usage within mind-wandering research. These reasons 
were contrasted with certain deleterious effects they evoke (section 3). As thought probes 
might influence thought processes by interrupting participants and making them aware of 
their current thoughts, we developed a new paradigm to investigate such effects (section 
3.1.1). We found that interruption does not affect participant’s retrospectively reported 
thoughts. Awareness, however, reduced possibly creative thoughts in two experiments. 
Thought probes had already been found to not influence current task performance (Wiemers 
& Redick, 2019). We, however, now showed that they do influence thought processes or at 
least retrospective thought reports. Such intruding effects as well as the apparent subjectivity 
of self-report measures have led to a search for objective markers of TUTs (section 4.1), and 
we examined eye-movement measures as possible mind-wandering indicators, finding speed-
related variables to be associated with mind-wandering episodes.  
 As of now, no gold-standard for measuring in-the-moment mind wandering exists. 
Self-reports are subjective and some of them are intruding; identification of objective markers 
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is yet a work in progress. For relative group comparisons such as those between experimental 
conditions, subjective measures should suffice, as long as their distorting effects are stable 
(Schubert et al, 2019). For absolute measures of mind-wandering levels or for the 
investigation of relations between mind wandering and other factors (such as creativity 
performance, for example), they might be inadequate. Future research should thus focus on 
developing reliable objective, biological markers of TUTs. EEG as well as eye-movement and 
pupillometry markers are promising candidates because of their close connection to 
attentional processes and their high temporal resolutions (section 4). However, software, 
hardware, as well as corresponding algorithms linking such markers to mind-wandering 
behavior (e.g., Franklin et all., 2011) are still in need of improvement.    
 Further, it may be problematic that objective measures are most often validated using 
only (arguably flawed and biased) subjective measures. This limitation also concerns 
Manuscript 1. As of now, lacking a gold-standard measure, this seems to be the common 
practice when it comes to the development of objective assessment methods. In the future, 
however, validation studies should at best include more than one objective marker, as well as 
external variables from various domains that have previously been connected to mind-
wandering processes (e.g., personality, working memory, etc.). Including newly developed 
objective markers within such a wide framework would allow for stronger validity testing. 
5.3 Practical Implications26  
 Mind Wandering often represents a source of disturbance and error (section 1.3). One 
might thus easily get the impression that it should be inhibited at all times as it hampers 
focused work. However, a balanced view on the mind-wandering phenomenon and especially 
the growing list of mind-wandering benefits (section 2) implicate that besides intervention 
 
 
26
 Besides practical implications, this dissertation offers methodological ones. However, as 
they have already been covered, they will only be shortly listed here: Considering adaptive 
mind wandering from a methodological perspective (section 2.3.4), I suggested that (1) 
focusing on thought content (e.g., via assessing thought descriptions) rather than thought 
frequency should be crucial when it comes to detecting beneficial effects. I further (2) argued 
that methods aiming at revealing positive mind-wandering outcomes should consider time-
delayed effects (e.g., via long-term assessments using mobile-phone applications). Moreover, 
I (3) discussed adaptive mind wandering within an individual-differences approach and 
recommended including trait-based moderators when examining mind-wandering benefits. 
Considering methodological issues, I highlighted the importance of knowledge concerning 
employed research tools (section 3.1.2) and (4) suggested that thought probes can be a 
suitable choice of method (section 5.2) but should be applied with caution. Finally (5), eye-
movements might represent a promising measure to detect TUT episodes, but we showed that 
more validation work is necessary (section 4).  
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strategies that focus solely on decreasing mind-wandering frequencies in daily life (e.g., 
Bennike et al., 2017; Mrazek et al., 2012; Rahl et al., 2017), strategies focusing on regulation 
processes could be of use. For example, within work and educational contexts, it could be 
helpful for people to know when to wander and when not to wander (section 2.2) and to 
regulate thoughts accordingly to minimize costs and maximize benefits. Some people seem to 
be able to detect situations in which mind wandering is inappropriate and to downregulate 
TUTs accordingly (Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). On the other hand, in situations in which mind 
wandering is appropriate or even desirable, they show higher TUT levels. People who are not 
intuitively able to do so could be supported in their use of such regulation strategies. First 
steps might be creating awareness for wandering thoughts as well as for current task 
requirements and explicitly categorizing self-caught mind wandering as good or bad. For 
good mind wandering, further strategies or interventions should focus on shifting abilities, for 
bad mind wandering on inhibition abilities (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). 
In everyday life, some people might suffer more from wandering thoughts than others. 
For example, current research suggests that TUTs, especially those arising spontaneously, 
represent a central feature of ADHD symptomatology (Bozhilova et al., 2018; Seli, 
Smallwood, et al., 2015b). ADHD patients might benefit particularly well from intervention 
methods that focus on the detection of wandering thoughts in order to further inhibit them 
when they are inappropriate. However, as research employing self-caught methods (section 
1.2) unfolds, sometimes wandering thoughts are hard to detect (Schooler, 2002; Schooler et 
al., 2004), maybe even more so for people experiencing them highly frequently on a daily 
basis. Objective mind-wandering markers (when improved and practicable, section 5.2), 
especially ones that are easy to assess such as eye-movements (section 4) or pupil sizes, could 
facilitate the detection of wandering thoughts, for example while reading or studying. Within 
training sessions, (not only) ADHD patients could be informed as soon as their thoughts start 
drifting, giving them a feeling for their own thought processes and enabling them to explicitly 
work on inhibition strategies. 
Leaving the educational context, detection and inhibition strategies are further 
especially desirable in situations where mind wandering is dangerous. As objective, biological 
markers (section 4) could bring us one step closer to real-time detection, they might have the 
potential to increase road safety. Driving simulation studies have shown that wandering 
thoughts can quickly become dangerous (Albert et al., 2018; Lin et al., 2016; Yanko & 
Spalek, 2014) due to, for example, increasing braking reaction times. Eye-state bio-feedback 
methods to detect fatigue, a further cause of traffic accidents, have already been tested (e.g., 
THE NATURE OF THE WANDERING MIND                                                                                   45 
 
Devi & Bajaj, 2008). Further eye-focused methods detecting attentional lapses could warn 
drivers when their thoughts are drifting off and could thus be in the interest of road safety. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This dissertation aimed at painting a balanced picture of the wandering mind’s nature 
and at investigating subjective as well as objective measurement methods. Costs and benefits 
of mind wandering were reported and brought in line. Memory was introduced as a newly 
considered domain found to benefit from mind-wandering processes, before possible 
moderators of good versus bad were discussed. As mind-wandering research is dependent on 
reliable thought-measures, first subjective and then objective assessment methods were 
investigated and discussed.  
As a relatively new research field, which however “exploded” starting 2006 (Callard et 
al., 2013; Weinstein, 2018), many aspects of mind wandering have been extensively studied 
whereas there is still much to be discovered. Furthermore, there is already some “tidying up” 
to do (see, for example, Manuscript 1), as similar strings of research are developing in parallel 
and researchers are generating new methods on an almost daily basis (Weinstein, 2018). 
Besides mind wandering’s ubiquity in everyday life and one’s own personal experiences with 
the topic, this only makes the research field all the more interesting and worthwhile to be 
studied further. 
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Abstract 
Identifying eye-movement measures as objective indicators of mind wandering seems to be a 
work in progress. We reviewed research comparing eye movements during self-categorized 
episodes of normal versus mindless reading and found little consensus regarding the specific 
measures that are sensitive to attentional decoupling during mind wandering. To address this 
issue of inconsistency, we conducted a new, high-powered eye-tracking experiment and 
considered all previously identified mind-wandering indicators. In our experiment, only three 
measures (reading time, fixation count, and first-fixation duration) positively predicted self-
categorized mindless reading. Asides from these single measures, the word-frequency effect 
was found to be generally less pronounced during mindless-reading than during normal-
reading episodes. To additionally test for convergent validity between objective and 
subjective mind-wandering measures, we utilized eye-movement measures as well as thought 
reports to examine the effect of meta-cognitive awareness on mind-wandering behavior. We 
expected participants anticipating a difficult comprehension test to mind wander less during 
reading compared to those anticipating an easy test. Although we were able to induce meta-
cognitive expectancies about task difficulty, there was no evidence that difficulty 
expectancies affected either subjectively-reported or objectively-measured mind-wandering.  
Keywords: mind wandering, task-unrelated thought, eye movements, reading 
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Do your eyes give you away? A validation study of eye-movement measures used as 
indicators for mindless reading 
 Imagine you are reading a book. Your eyes are moving across the page, line by line. 
While processing words and sentences, you immerse yourself deeper and deeper into the 
story. You have been reading for a while now, and your eyes keep on scanning the pages, 
from top to bottom, from left to right. Suddenly you realize you have just been thinking about 
that huge fight you had with your best friend. It seems impossible for you to reproduce the 
last text passages, although you remember your eyes moving across the lines. You were mind 
wandering. That is, your thoughts trailed off from the task at hand, which was, in this case, 
reading for comprehension. When people mind wander, they think about personal problems, 
unfulfilled tasks, or other things unrelated to their current task (Schooler et al., 2011). Mind-
wandering episodes often occur without intention or even awareness (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006). For this reason, it is possible for you to mindlessly “read” a considerable amount of 
lines without noticing that your thoughts are trailing off. The fact that you maintain a reading-
like eye-movement behavior while doing so makes mindless reading an attractive research 
topic in the mind-wandering domain. What happens to eye movements when attention is 
directed away from ongoing text processing? Do eye movements differ systematically 
between normal and mindless reading in such a way that they could serve as objective, non-
intrusive indicators of mind wandering? In the present work, we tried to answer these 
questions by reviewing research comparing eye movements during self-categorized episodes 
of normal versus mindless reading. We also report a newly conducted, high-powered eye-
tracking experiment, with the objective of validating previously identified mind-wandering 
indicators. 
 Mind wandering is a ubiquitous phenomenon. As much as 30-50 % of all daily 
thoughts are unrelated to current external events (Kane et al., 2017; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 
2010; Klinger, 1999). When thoughts trail off, the perception of the external world is affected. 
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Thoughts about a fight you had with your best friend move your mental focus away from the 
words and sentences on the page in front of you. During mind-wandering episodes, attention 
is directed away from external, perceptual input towards internal processing (Schooler et al., 
2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, & D’Argembeau, 2011). 
When your thoughts trail off during reading, you no longer pay sufficient attention to the lines 
of text. This attentional decoupling process does not seem to work in an all-or-nothing 
fashion. Schad, Nuthmann, and Engbert (2012) proposed the levels-of-inattention hypothesis. 
Their findings support the idea of graded attentional decoupling at different levels of the 
cognitive hierarchy: Processing of external information can fail at early (deep decoupling, 
cascading down to later levels, see Smallwood, 2011) but also at late (weak decoupling) 
perceptual levels. We believe this extension of a dichotomous view of perceptual decoupling 
to be a very fruitful approach. For our purpose, however, we took a step back and critically 
reviewed research comparing eye movements during text-focused versus decoupled attention 
(mind wandering), regardless of decoupling levels.    
An attention shift towards internal processing renders external information-encoding 
errors more likely (Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003), thus causing 
performance decrements in external tasks (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 
2009). During reading, mind wandering is assumed to be reflected by attentional decoupling 
from the semantic input, meaning the lines of text one is reading. Consequently, reading 
comprehension is very likely to suffer. Previous research has confirmed that thoughts often 
trail off during reading and that high mind-wandering frequencies are associated with poorer 
reading comprehension (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004). It is assumed that readers fail 
to mentally connect events, or linguistic units, to create a situational model of the story during 
task-unrelated-thought (TUT) episodes (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008).  
But what does attentional decoupling have to do with eye movements, and how may eye 
movements aid us in detecting mindless reading? The basic idea behind eye-tracking research 
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in general is that what people are looking at reflects what they are mentally processing, at 
least to some degree (Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011). During reading—a behavior that can be 
broken down into a sequence of fixations and saccades—a fixation on a given word is 
assumed to reflect the mental processing of this word. This logic becomes apparent when 
taking a look at the robust word-frequency effect (Inhoff & Rayner, 1986). Identifying and 
processing a very uncommon word such as “vat” takes longer than processing a very common 
word such as “cat.” Fixation times are reflective of the need for more intense processing: 
Low-frequency words are fixated longer than high-frequency words. Cognitive-control 
theories (Just & Carpenter, 1980), in contrast to oculomotor-control theories (Yang, 2006), 
posit a close eye-mind link. Models such as SWIFT (Engbert, Nuthmann, Richter, & Kliegl, 
2005) and E-Z Reader (Pollatsek, Reichle, & Rayner, 2006) assume that cognitive and 
oculomotor processes are linked to cognitive forces driving eye-movement behavior during 
normal reading. Therefore, cognitive-control theories would predict differences in eye 
movements during normal versus mindless reading. The eye-mind link should be interrupted 
when the mind starts to wander away from external text processing towards internal 
processing. During mind wandering, cognitive forces are engaged in thoughts unrelated to the 
to-be-read text, limiting their power to drive eye movements. Mindless readers may thus 
move their eyes beyond the word “vat” without thoroughly processing it—and thus not taking 
the additional fixation time its processing usually requires. That is, when attention shifts from 
lines of text towards inner thoughts, eye movements should be (partially) decoupled from 
ongoing text processing, resulting in less sensitivity towards lexical features, as for example 
word frequency. Research applying the z-string reading paradigm (Nuthmann & Engbert, 
2009; Rayner & Fischer, 1996), during which participants mindlessly read “words” only 
containing the letter Z (e.g., “Zzzzz zz zzzzzz”), suggests that readers are not only less 
sensitive to lexical variables, but that single eye-movement measures, such as fixation 
duration, are erratic (in this case, longer) when thoughts are off-task. Furthermore, Smilek, 
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Carriere, and Cheyne (2010) noted that attentional decoupling during mindless reading could 
also be represented by a higher blinking frequency, thereby even physically reducing the 
processing of external input.  
This reasoning motivated several studies (see below) trying to identify eye-movement 
measures that are sensitive to attentional decoupling during mindless reading. Because people 
are not able to consciously control or manipulate fixations and saccades (Rayner, 1998), 
mind-wandering research would greatly benefit if eye-movement measures were found to be 
robust and stable indicators of TUT episodes. Eye movements could be used as biological 
markers in addition to or as a replacement for subjective self-reports. Until now, mind 
wandering has typically been measured via self-reports. In many mind-wandering 
experiments, participants are asked to briefly describe and/or classify their current thoughts’ 
content when a probe interrupts their present task. Although these self-reports proved to be 
reasonably valid (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2012), they might still be prone to memory-driven 
and/ or classification errors. Also, the demand characteristics of a given task might influence 
subjectively reported mind wandering (Vinski & Watter, 2012). The apparent subjectivity of 
self-reports has thus led to a search for objective biological or behavioral indicators of TUTs. 
If found, these could not only be used to further validate subjective thought reports, but also 
to directly measure mind-wandering behavior without a subjective component. Besides eye 
movements, reaction times seem to be promising objective markers of TUTs. McVay and 
Kane (2012) measured attentional lapses using thought probes and found that these lapses go 
along with higher τ parameters, which represent the tail of reaction time distributions. In other 
words, more mind wandering goes along with higher proportions of extremely long reaction 
times. Of course, a researcher’s choice of objective markers is task-dependent. For go/no-go 
tasks like the SART (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), which is often 
used by mind-wandering researchers (McVay & Kane, 2012; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014), 
reaction times could be the appropriate means and seem to be a fruitful approach. For reading 
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tasks, eye movements have started to emerge as biological mind-wandering markers. In the 
following sections, we review five studies that aimed to identify eye-movement measures as 
objective mind-wandering indicators. To this end, we will give an overview on the methods 
that have been applied in this line of research and discuss the results that were obtained (for 
an overview, see Table 1). 
For the present purpose, we only review studies in which participants’ thoughts were 
randomly probed (probe-caught method, see Schooler et al., 2004) during reading. The probe-
caught method does not rely on participants’ awareness of their mind-wandering behavior and 
is supposed to be a reliable estimate of mind-wandering frequency (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006). In the to-be-reviewed studies, self-categorized normal-reading episodes were 
compared to self-categorized mindless-reading episodes in order to determine changes in eye-
movement behavior. This approach is especially useful in order to make eye-movement 
measures utilizable as objective mind-wandering indicators, because it allows the validation 
of possible mind-wandering indicators by means of the most widely used mind-wandering 
assessment methods, namely online thought probes.  
Reichle, Reineberg, and Schooler (2010) had four participants read the entirety of Sense 
and Sensibility by Jane Austen in up to 15 hour-long sessions, while tracking their eye 
movements and applying the probe-caught method to assess mind-wandering behavior, with a 
total of 151.5 probes per participant, on average. The authors additionally applied the self-
caught method, which requires participants to press a certain key whenever they catch 
themselves mind wandering1. Eye-movement measures for six different time intervals 
 
1
 Although the results differed for self- versus probe-caught mind-wandering, we focus solely 
on probe-caught results in the present work. Distinguishing between self- and probe-caught 
mind-wandering provides important insights into awareness processes and further research 
will be needed to determine the influence of different levels of mind-wandering awareness on 
eye-movement behavior (see also Schad, Nuthmann and Engbert, 2012). Still, in most of the 
studies we reviewed, the probe-caught method was applied exclusively. Thus, we will focus 
on this method alone for comparability reasons.    
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preceding the probes (2.5, 5, 10, 30, 60, and 120s prior to a thought probe) were analyzed 
regarding differences between episodes of self-classified normal versus mindless reading. In a 
similar study, Smilek et al. (2010) analyzed data from 12 participants who had read two 
passages of A Short History of Nearly Everything by Bill Bryson with their eye movements 
being tracked and their thoughts being probed 20 times. The 5 s time intervals preceding 
thought probes were analyzed. Uzzaman and Joordens (2011) also analyzed eye-movement 
measures from the 5 s time intervals preceding thought probes. Data from 22 participants who 
had read 16 pages of War and Peace by Tolstoy entered their analysis. Again, the probe-
caught method was applied, and participants received a total of ten probes per participant on 
average. A slightly different method to detect differences in eye-movement behavior between 
normal and mindless reading was employed by Foulsham, Farley, and Kingstone (2013). In 
their experiment, not specific time intervals, but single sentences were analyzed. 26 
participants read 120 sentences, 48 of which being to-be-examined key sentences. Thoughts 
were probed approximately nine times with a probe always appearing after a key sentence. In 
the aforementioned three experiments, probes appeared randomly during full-text reading, 
resulting in different to-be-analyzed text passages for each participant and thus increasing 
error variance. The single-sentence-reading method by Foulsham et al. kept the to-be-
examined reading materials equal for all participants and even allowed for the manipulation of 
the linguistic input prior to thought probes. Participants read sentences containing either high- 
or low-frequency words, so that the influence of mind wandering on the word-frequency 
effect could be examined, which turned out to be smaller during mindless reading in this 
study. A potential disadvantage of this method is, however, that presenting single sentences is 
less ecologically valid than full-text reading. In a study by Frank, Nara, Zavagnin, Touron, 
and Kane (2015), participants again read chapters from Tolstoy’s War and Peace. 29 younger 
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adults’2 eye-tracking data from 3-8s time intervals preceding 20 thought probes were 
analyzed.  
By and large, the methods used in these five studies show a reasonable degree of 
similarity. The probe-caught method was always applied to identify passages read normally 
versus mindlessly, and eye-tracking data were compared for these passages. 
Methodologically, these studies differed concerning the lexical input (full text versus single 
sentences, different book chapters, number of lines on each screen, etc.), the total reading time 
(from less than an hour up to 15 hours), the probing procedure (frequency of probing, 
additionally assessed self-caught mind wandering, number and selection of response options, 
etc.), the number of participants (four to 29), and the analyzed areas of interest preceding 
thought probes (a single sentence versus a specific time interval). Some of these specific 
features might have had an influence on the assessment of mind wandering and the eye-
movement behavior. For example, differences in reported mind wandering can arise due to the 
framing and wording of thought probes and response options (Weinstein, 2018; Weinstein, De 
Lima, & van der Zee, 2018). Additionally, eye-movement behavior might have been 
influenced by the length of the experiment (e.g., due to fatigue) or by the lexical input (e.g., 
single sentences versus full text).  
At least for studies that employ similar methods, we would expect to find converging eye-
movement patterns for normal versus mindless reading if eye movements were robust 
indicators of mind wandering. Interestingly, all five studies varied widely regarding the 
selected eye-movement measures and the obtained results. Table 1 shows eye-movement 
measures that were found to differ significantly (p < .05) between normal and mindless-
reading episodes in at least one of the previously described studies. For comparability 
reasons, the table is limited to effects found for younger adults with the probe-caught method 
 
2 The authors tested older and younger adults. For comparability reasons, we only report the 
effects found for younger adults. 
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assessing TUT episodes, excluding task-related inferences that were additionally assessed 
only in the Frank et al. (2015) study. Whenever a significant effect was reported for a measure 
in any study, we checked all other studies as to whether they reported results for this measure. 
As becomes apparent from Table 1, there seem to be large differences between studies: 
Significant effects were found for several measures, but studies strongly differ as to which 
eye-movement measures were selected to be analyzed. Certainly, this is partially due to the 
theoretical focus of the respective study. However, to make eye-movement measures 
utilizable as objective mind-wandering indicators, a greater degree of consensus in the 
selection of eye-movement measures of interest is desirable. Importantly, even if the same 
measure was analyzed in two or more studies, effects could not always be replicated and even 
showed opposite directions. For example, Smilek et al. (2010) found a lower fixation count 
during mindless reading compared to normal reading, whereas Foulsham et al. (2013) found a 
higher fixation count during mindless reading.  
Such inconsistencies in results can indicate validity problems for eye-movement measures 
as indicators for mindless reading. However, they can also reflect meaningful processing 
differences due to methodological specifics. Therefore, discrepancies in results between 
studies do not have to be a knockout argument against the usefulness of eye-movements as 
mind-wandering indicators. For example, single-sentence reading like in the Foulsham et al. 
(2013) study likely imposes different cognitive demands as full-text reading. Although 
different contextual demands might generate discrepancies in results between studies, 
objective indicators should converge when contexts are similar. When contexts differ, 
boundary conditions should be identified, so that it becomes possible to predict when and why 
specific patterns of results will occur. To this end, studies manipulating the contextual 
demands of interest (e.g., single-sentence vs. full-text reading) are required.  
Notably, even for studies that applied similar methods and whose contextual demands 
appeared to be relatively comparable, Table 1 lists discrepancies in results between studies. 
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To address these inconsistencies, we conducted a new, high-powered eye-tracking 
experiment, in which we confined the analyses to the eye-movement measures that were 
previously identified as potential mind-wandering indicators (i.e., those listed in Table 1) a 
priori. In this study, we applied the standard approach (see above) and asked participants to 
read two chapters of Oliver Sacks’s Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain (Sacks, 2008) 
for comprehension, and further asked them to respond to ten thought probes while reading. 
We tracked participants’ eyes during reading so that we could compare eye-movement 
behavior between normal and mindless reading.   
Besides the validation of eye-movement measures as mind-wandering markers, the 
present study’s secondary aim was to actually apply these markers to examine the effect of 
meta-cognitive expectancies on mind wandering. Previous research has shown that mind-
wandering behavior during cognitive tasks changes in accordance with varying task demands. 
That is, mind wandering is usually reduced when task demands increase (e.g., Rummel & 
Boywitt, 2014). Considering that mind wandering is beneficial in some situations, this 
adjustment seems to be adaptive in everyday life. TUTs are often future related and focus on 
unfulfilled tasks or personal problems. In this way, they might help people plan future actions 
(Klinger, 1999; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013), come up with creative ideas (Baird et al., 
2012; but see Smeekens & Kane, 2016), or keep future task goals active (Steindorf & 
Rummel, 2017). Given these potential positive effects, and considering the context-regulation 
hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013), efficient adjustment should allow people 
to benefit from TUTs as long as the situation allows or encourages it, while also minimizing 
the costs of mind wandering when working on demanding tasks.  
However, directly manipulating the task demands for a reading task would have required 
us to change the to-be-read text between experimental conditions. Instead, we decided to 
focus on meta-cognitive awareness, the knowledge about one’s own cognitive processes 
(Flavell, 1979), as one possible underlying factor of mind-wandering adjustment. We 
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manipulated participants’ expectancies regarding the difficulty of an upcoming reading 
comprehension test. That is, all participants read the same text but some expected a difficult 
reading comprehension test afterwards, whereas others expected an easy test. During the 
reading phase, we tracked participants’ eye movements and periodically probed their 
thoughts. All participants then worked on the same reading comprehension test. Analogous to 
the results found for high task demands (e.g., Rummel & Boywitt, 2014), we expected 
participants with high-difficulty expectations to mind wander less than low-difficulty-
expectation participants. Convergent evidence for such an effect from subjective thought-
reports and (some) objective eye-movement measures (see above and Table 1) would further 
speak for the convergent validity of the respective measures. In addition, we expected 
participants with high-difficulty expectations to perform better in the reading comprehension 
test than those with low-difficulty expectations.   
Across the subsequent Method and Results sections, we report how we determined our 
sample size and all data exclusions, manipulations, and measures in the study (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). The study reported in this article was preregistered on June 28, 
2016 (https://osf.io/sbeqn/) and, if not otherwise indicated, we followed the research and 
analysis protocol as stated in the preregistration. 
Method 
Participants, data cleansing, and design 
For multilevel-modeling approaches, there is currently no common understanding 
regarding power analyses. However, simulations by Maas and Hox (2005) determined what 
constitutes a sufficient sample size for accurate parameter estimation. The authors 
recommend, as stated in the preregistration, collecting data of at least 50 second-level and 
seven first-level units. Considering the accuracy benefits (for variance estimation) that an 
increasing number of second-level units might offer (beyond 50, see also Paccagnella, 2011), 
but also the effort of an eye-tracking study, 122 participants (second-level units) were tested 
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at Heidelberg University, Germany. Using ten measurement points per participant, we 
ensured that our design also met the criteria of at least seven first-level units. To account for 
potential participant exclusions due to eye-tracking related problems, we tested 22 
participants more than we had preregistered. 
Eye-tracking data of one participant were lost due to a software problem. The eye-
tracking data quality for all other participants was determined sentence by sentence for all 
participants and all target sentences by two independent raters. A sentence’s eye-tracking data 
were categorized as unusable when technical errors were clearly evident (e.g., when 
calibration had failed), when a strong drift at the beginning or end of the lines was visible, or 
when a participant’s eyes accidently hit a thought probe trigger (see below) before reading the 
target sentence causing a premature thought probe appearance. For 88.96 % of all target 
sentences, both raters agreed on the categorization. For the other target sentences, a liberal 
decision was made, and the eye-tracking data were categorized as useable. Fourteen 
participants were excluded from the final data set due to their producing predominantly 
unusable eye-tracking data (less than five useable target sentences), resulting in N = 107 (Mage 
= 22.58, SDage = 4.01, 78.50 % female, normal or corrected-to-normal vision) for all further 
analyses. For the final data set, 93.77 % of all target sentences’ eye-tracking data were 
categorized as usable. Unusable data were excluded from further analyses, relying on 
multilevel models’ beneficial characteristic of being applicable to data sets with randomly 
missing values.  
We used a one-factorial design to investigate the influence of difficulty expectations 
(expectation of an easy versus a difficult comprehension test) on mind-wandering behavior 
and reading performance.             
Apparatus  
Eye movements were recorded using the SMI RED500 system (SensoMotoric 
Instruments, Potsdam, Germany) with a sampling rate of 500 Hz and a spatial resolution 
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(RMS) of 0.03°. Using a remote eye-tracking system, free head movements (in a 40 cm  20 
cm range) allowed for naturalistic reading, but participants were asked to move around as 
little as possible in 60 cm to 80 cm distance from the monitor (22″). The software BeGaze’s 
(SensoMotoric Instruments, Potsdam, Germany) algorithm was used to calculate eye 
movement measures, using a velocity threshold of 40 °/s to identify saccades3.  
Materials 
Reading task and target sentences. Participants read a shortened German version of 
two chapters of Oliver Sacks’s Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain (Sacks, 2008). 
The text was presented on 58 pages in black-on-gray 32-point Arial font with double spacing 
and a maximum of seven lines per page, using the software Experiment Center (SensoMotoric 
Instruments, Potsdam, Germany). Participants moved through the text autonomously using 
the space bar to turn pages. On each page, a participant’s fixation on a trigger cross (dwell 
time = 500 ms) in the top left corner made the text appear. This procedure ensured that, for 
each page, eye-movement recordings always started at the top left corner position. Ten target 
sentences (always presented in the middle of the page, Mword-count = 31.30; SDword-count = 5.27) 
were determined before data collection, five containing a high-frequency (Mfrequency = 
1892.80, SDfrequency = 1309.78), the other five containing a low-frequency (Mfrequency = 8.40, 
SDfrequency = 10.90) target word. Word frequencies were extracted from the dlex database 
(Heister et al., 2011) and target words were matched for length (see Appendix for a full list of 
target words including translations and information on frequency and length). After reading a 
target sentence, participant’s fixations on the first words of the following sentence (dwell time 
 
3 From the eye-tracking and mind wandering studies we reviewed, only one (Foulsham et al., 
2013) provided details about the event detection method that was applied. Because these 
authors used a velocity-based algorithm and none of the other studies’ authors indicated that 
they deviated from this standard procedure, we also employed the standard algorithm as well 
as parameter values our software recommends for comparability reasons. We acknowledge, 
however, that more sophisticated methods for event detection are currently under 
development (e.g. Nyström & Holmqvist, 2010) that will eventually replace this method in 
the near future.  
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= 300 ms) triggered the appearance of a thought probe. After responding to the thought probe, 
participants were redirected to the page they had been reading before the probe appeared. In 
doing so, we were able to define target sentences with specific features (high- versus low-
frequency words) and to keep to-be-examined passages equal for all participants (Foulsham et 
al., 2013). Still, participants could engage in natural reading in contrast to the Foulsham et al. 
study in which single sentences were presented sequentially.  
Thought probes. To subjectively assess mind wandering, participants’ thoughts were 
probed after each target sentence resulting in a total of ten probes. Participants were asked to 
categorize their current thoughts as being task-related thoughts (“I am thinking about the text 
I am reading,” later referred to as TRTs), task-triggered intrusions (“I am thinking about 
things related to the text I am reading,” later referred to as TTIs), or TUTs (“I am thinking 
about things unrelated to the text”).  
Procedure 
 In individual sessions, participants signed a consent form before receiving detailed 
written information about the eye-tracking procedure and instructions for the reading phase 
and the comprehension test. Furthermore, the concept of mind wandering, and the response 
options of the thought probes were explained. A five-point-calibration of the eye tracker was 
applied prior to the reading phase and was repeated once in the middle of the reading phase, 
as well as whenever considered necessary by the experimenter who monitored eye 
movements on a separate screen, nonvisible to the participants. Once the eye tracker was 
successfully calibrated, participants practiced turning pages in a self-paced fashion on a 
passage of instruction text, by pressing the space bar and fixating the trigger area on the 
following page. They also practiced the thought-probing procedure once before receiving 
critical instructions for the experimental manipulation. Participants in the high-difficulty-
expectation condition were told that the upcoming comprehension test was going to be very 
difficult for a student population whereas participants in the low-difficulty-expectation 
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condition were informed that the test was going to be fairly easy. This information was 
embedded in a cover-story referring to previous research to render the manipulation more 
trustworthy. Following these instructions, the reading phase began and participants 
autonomously read the two chapters within up to 30 minutes, and responded to a total of ten 
thought probes, with each probe occurring after a target sentence. After the reading task, 
participants completed a retrospective mind-wandering questionnaire categorizing the entirety 
of their thoughts during the reading phase into the three thought probe response categories 
(TRTs, TTIs, TUTs) using percentage scores. We then asked participants to rate how difficult 
they expected the upcoming reading comprehension test to be on a ten-point scale, from very 
easy to very difficult. The following test consisted of 15 multiple-choice items (four response 
options each, only one of which was correct) which had been experienced as moderately 
difficult in a pretest. After completion of the comprehension test, participants rated how 
difficult they had perceived the test to be on the previously used ten-point scale and answered 
demographic questions.  Finally, participants were debriefed and dismissed. 
Results 
The analyses reported in this section were executed as preregistered, if not indicated 
otherwise. We employed confirmatory strategies of analyses and conducted one-tailed tests 
(Cho & Abe, 2013) whenever we had preregistered a directional hypothesis, that is for all 
analyses concerning the difficulty-expectation manipulation. For these analyses, we 
considered any effect in the direction opposite from our preregistered expected outcomes to 
be non-significant. For those analyses concerning the validation of eye-movement measures 
(e.g., because previous research had found opposing results), we employed a standard non-
directional hypothesis-testing strategy. 
Behavioral measures 
Performance on the reading comprehension test was calculated as the percentage of 
correctly answered comprehension questions. The amount of online-reported TUTs and TTIs 
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during the reading phase was defined as the sum of probes in which participants categorized 
their thoughts as being either task-unrelated or task-triggered, respectively.  
Table 2 shows means, standard deviations, and correlations for the behavioral 
measures. Mean comprehension accuracy was satisfactory, implying that participants 
generally paid a decent amount of attention to the text, although, on average, TUTs or TTIs 
were reported in almost half of all thought-probe occurrences. Retrospective thought reports 
converged with online thought reports, as indicated by the moderate to strong positive 
correlations of the two. Comprehension accuracy weakly correlated with TUTs (online and 
retrospective); the better performance in the comprehension test was, the fewer TUTs were 
reported. The comprehension test’s expected difficulty correlated weakly with retrospectively 
reported TUTs: The fewer TUTs were reported, the more difficult the test was expected to be. 
A closer look at this pattern revealed that it was only present for participants in the high-
difficulty-expectation group. For this group, difficulty expectations negatively correlated with 
online TUTs, r(52) = -.31, p = .011 (one-tailed), and, numerically identically, with 
retrospectively reported TUTs, r(52) = -.31, p = .011 (one-tailed). For the low-difficulty-
expectation group, we found close-to-zero correlations. 
To test for further group differences on behavioral measures, we first ran a 
manipulation check. A 2 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with experimental condition 
(high- versus low-difficulty-expectation) as between-participants and point in time (before 
versus after test) as within-participants factor for comprehension test difficulty estimates 
revealed a significant difference between expected (before test, M = 6.42, SD = 2.01) and 
perceived (after test, M = 5.46, SD = 1.71) difficulty, F(1, 105) = 16.68, p < .001, η2p = .14. 
The main effect of experimental condition was also significant, F(1, 105) = 33.22, p < .001, 
η2p = .24, with higher difficulty estimates for high-difficulty-expectation participants (M = 
6.57, SD = 1.12) than for low-difficulty-expectation participants (M = 5.30, SD = 1.17). A 
significant interaction, F(1, 105) = 72.49, p < .001, η2p = .19, and additional simple effects 
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revealed that a group difference was only present for expected difficulty estimates, F(1, 105) 
= 62.27, p < .001, η2p = .37, and not for perceived difficulty estimates, F(1, 105) < 1, p = .734, 
η2p < .01. High-difficulty-expectation participants (M = 7.63, SD = 1.41) expected the 
comprehension test to be more difficult than low-difficulty-expectation participants (M = 
5.19, SD = 1.77), indicating a successful expectation manipulation. However, contradictory to 
our predictions, we did not find any significant group differences for online TUTs, online 
TTIs, retrospective TUTs, retrospective TTIs, or comprehension accuracy, all ts ≤ 1.1, all ps 
>.270. Taken together, although participants in the high-difficulty-expectations condition 
expected the comprehension test to be more difficult than those in the low-difficulty-
expectation condition, we did not find corresponding differences regarding either their mind-
wandering behavior during the reading phase or their test performance. Therefore, this 
manipulation was not successful in influencing mind-wandering behavior in any way.4 On 
that account, we refrained from testing the preregistered mediating effect of mind wandering 
on reading comprehension. 
Eye-tracking analyses 
Comparison of eye-movement measures during normal reading versus TUT episodes 
 We used the software BeGaze’s (SensoMotoric Instruments, Potsdam, Germany) 
algorithm to calculate all eye-movement measures of interest (Table 3) from the raw eye-
tracking data. For each eye-tracking measure, up to ten data points (depending on data 
exclusions) per participant were considered for the following analyses. For within-word-
regression count, between-word-regression count, blink count, and fixation count, the number 
of observed occurrences of the respective event (i.e., regressions, blinks, or fixations) during a 
given target sentence and for a given participant represents one data point. For reading time, 
 
4  An additional multilevel regression analysis for TUT occurrences with the predictors 
condition (effect-coded), difficulty expectation (as continuous predictor), and their interaction 
also showed no effect of difficulty expectancies on TUTs. We thank Jonathan Smallwood for 
suggesting this additional analysis.  
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the time it took a participant to read a given target sentence represents one data point. Last, for 
first-fixation duration, the mean of the entirety of a participant’s first fixations in one target 
sentence represents a data point. That is, all values are to be interpreted sentence-wise (e.g., 
two blinks per sentence), except for first-fixation duration, which is to be interpreted word-
wise (e.g. an average first-fixation duration of 150 ms for all words in one target sentence).  
Table 3 shows means (aggregated across target sentences and participants) and 
standard deviations for all relevant unstandardized and uncorrected eye movement measures 
for TRT and TUT episodes, respectively. Before sentence-wise calculated eye-movement 
measures were entered in the analysis, they were divided by the respective target sentence’s 
character count (to account for different sentence lengths) and z-standardized (to make the 
estimated coefficients comparable). The first-fixation-duration measure was also z-
standardized. 
 To test for differences in eye-movement measures between TUT and TRT episodes, 
we used a multilevel modeling approach. We chose this approach for several reasons: First, it 
can account for dependencies in the data due to repeated measures. In our case, eye-
movement measures and thought probe responses were nested in target sentences and 
participants. Second, because mind wandering is known to become more likely the more time 
is spent on a task (e.g., Foulsham et al., 2013; McVay & Kane, 2009; Rummel & Nied, 2017; 
Steindorf & Rummel, 2017), we also considered time-on-task as an additional predictor. 
Because, analogously to these previous studies, a strong time-on-task effect was apparent in 
the present data, we decided, other than preregistered, to detrend the present data (i.e. to 
remove the trend from a time series, Wang & Maxwell, 2015; Wu, Huang, Long, & Peng, 
2007). A third advantage of multilevel models is that parameters can be estimated despite of 
missing data, for example due to unusable eye-tracking data. Finally, using a logit-link 
function, we can account for the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable (TRT versus 
TUT responses). Other than preregistered, we did not specify a model containing all eye-
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movement measures of interest as mind-wandering predictors due to multicollinearity 
problems. Instead, we specified six separate multilevel models, one for each eye-movement 
measure. We included crossed random intercepts5 varying with target sentences and 
participants and regressed TUTs6 (with 1 indicating TUTs and 0 indicating TRTs) on the 
respective eye-movement measure (Level 1), time-on-task (Level 1, variable ranging from 0 
to 9, depicting the order of thought collection), and the effect-coded experimental condition 
(Level 2). We included time-on-task as a Level 1 predictor in order to detrend (see above and 
Wang & Maxwell, 2015) the outcome variable, to investigate the relationship between eye-
movement measures and TUT occurrences above and beyond the systematic increase of TUT 
occurrences over time. The coefficients estimated using the glmer function of the R package 
lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and the bobyqa optimizer for some of the 
models (if necessary to achieve convergence, Powell, 2009) are depicted in Table 4. Reading 
time, fixation count, and first-fixation duration significantly predicted TUT occurrences. 
Positive b-coefficients for these measures indicated longer reading times, longer first-fixation 
durations, and more fixations during TUT than during TRT episodes, as also descriptively 
apparent in Table 3. Within-word-regression count, between-word-regression count, and blink 
count did not predict TUT occurrences. In all multilevel logistic regression models, time-on-
task significantly predicted TUTs (all p-values < .001) with the likelihood for a TUT 
occurrence generally increasing over time. The effect-coded experimental condition remained 
a non-significant predictor in all specified models (all p-values > .05). Thus, comparable to 
 
5Adding random slopes did not improve model fits and we thus chose the more parsimonious 
approach. 
6 We conducted our analyses excluding all target sentences categorized as TTI episodes. In the 
literature, there is no common agreement on how to categorize and treat TTIs (they might 
reflect a thought mode between on-task and off-task thoughts). Additionally, studies 
examining mind-wandering using eye tracking do not differentiate between TUTs and TTIs. 
Using a compound TUTs + TTIs score as criterion, one more eye-movement measure proved 
to be a significant predictor (between-word-regression count, b = 0.15, Wald Z = 2.10, p = 
.036) compared to the analyses with only TUTs as criterion. Results for the other eye-
movement measures, however, did not change.   
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our results on the behavioral measures, we did not find evidence that the difficulty-
expectation manipulation affected eye-movement measures.     
Word-frequency effect for normal reading versus TUT episodes 
To test whether the word-frequency effect was less pronounced during TUT episodes, 
we compared eye-movements on high- versus low-frequency target words. We expected an 
interaction between word frequency (low versus high) and thought mode (TUT versus TRT), 
in terms of smaller differences in the eye-movement measures between high- and low-
frequency target words during TUT than during TRT episodes. We employed multilevel 
regression models using the lme function in the R package nlme (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, 
Sarkar, & R Development Core Team, 2010). Word frequency and thought mode (all effect-
coded) entered the analyses as fixed predictors for the eye-movement measures, while 
allowing intercepts to vary with participant and target word identity (cf. Baayen, Davidson, & 
Bates, 2008). In doing so, we simultaneously controlled for participant-specific and target-
word-specific variability in eye-movement measures. Again, we applied separate regression 
models for the prediction of gaze duration (sum of all durations of all fixations on a target 
word during the first pass), total viewing time (sum of all durations of all fixations on a target 
word including fixations following a regression), fixation count (total number of fixations on 
a target word), and regressions-into-target-word count (total number of regressions back to a 
target word). Table 5 shows estimates for main and interaction effects. For thought mode, we 
did not find significant main effects. A significant main effect of word frequency, with 
negative b-coefficients, represents the word-frequency effect. High-frequency target words in 
comparison to low-frequency target words were fixated for a shorter time (see gaze duration 
and total viewing time) and less often (see fixation count). Therefore, we found the typical 
word-frequency effect with three eye-movement measures. Regressions into target words 
were rare (see Figure 1) and did not show a reliable word-frequency effect.  
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To test whether the word-frequency effect became smaller during TUT as compared to 
TRT episodes, the interaction between word frequency and thought mode is crucial (see Table 
5). Figure 1 additionally illustrates the interaction patterns. Descriptively, the word-frequency 
effect appeared to be somewhat smaller during TUT than during TRT episodes for all 
analyzed eye-movement measures7. However, only the fixation count measure yielded a 
significant interaction.  
Discussion 
Identifying objective measures of mind wandering in addition to widely used 
subjective self-reports is an important endeavor, but is still a work in progress: Different 
authors have determined a large variety of eye-movement measures as mind-wandering 
indicators. However, as we reviewed in the Introduction section, there is little consensus as to 
the specific measures that are sensitive to attentional decoupling during mindless reading. To 
address this inconsistency problem, we conducted a new, high-powered eye-tracking 
experiment, in which we reanalyzed all previously identified mind-wandering indicators. In 
the present work, only three measures (reading time, fixation count, and first-fixation 
duration) positively predicted self-categorized mindless reading. Interestingly, aside from 
these single measures, the word-frequency effect was found to be less pronounced during 
mindless-reading than during normal-reading episodes. 
In addition to our validation efforts, we tested the idea that mind wandering might be 
adjusted to expectancies about task demands. More precisely, we expected participants in 
expectation of a difficult reading comprehension test to mind wander less while reading 
compared to participants with low-difficulty expectations. Furthermore, we expected less 
mind wandering to result in better performance on the test. Indeed, we found that having 
fewer off-task thoughts went along with higher comprehension accuracy in the reading test, 
 
7 For the regressions-into-target-word count, the word-frequency effect reversed during TUT 
episodes. Because these regressions were very rare and the measure did not produce a reliable 
word-frequency effect, we refrain from strongly interpreting this finding.  
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but we did not find significant group differences in test performance. Additionally, although 
we had successfully induced opposing expectancies about task demands, the groups did not 
differ regarding their mind-wandering behavior. However, for participants anticipating a 
difficult test, higher difficulty expectations (assessed prior to the test) were associated with 
less mind wandering during the reading task. In this group, thoughts might have been 
influenced by difficulty expectations as an extrinsic motivational factor. Lacking extrinsic 
motivation to focus on the text, low-difficulty-expectation participants’ thoughts might have 
been primarily influenced by intrinsic motivational factors such as interest in the topic, so that 
we could not find a relationship between difficulty expectancies and mind wandering. 
However, future research is necessary to test this assumption. Indeed, the relationship 
between meta-awareness and mind wandering behavior might be more complicated than 
assumed. In a study by Sanders, Wang, Schooler, and Smallwood (2017) directly enhancing 
meta-awareness of mind wandering improved task focus, but not reading comprehension, and 
only after a period of self-focus. 
Regarding the candidate mind-wandering indicators, all three eye-movement measures 
that we found to be sensitive to attentional decoupling are related to reading speed. While 
reading mindlessly, our participants seemed to “slow down”: Their fixation durations were 
longer and they exhibited more fixations. Consequentially, they needed more time to “read” a 
sentence. Changes in reading/processing time are often found to be related to mind 
wandering. For example, Reichle et al. (2010) also reported increased gaze durations and 
increased total viewing times during off-task thought episodes. Additionally, research 
applying the z-string reading paradigm (Nuthmann & Engbert, 2009; Rayner & Fischer, 1996) 
suggested that fixation durations are longer during mindless reading. Recently, other authors 
have made use of these findings and developed a machine-learned model that is able to 
discriminate between (self-caught) mindful and mindless reading based on eye movements 
(Faber, Bixler, & D’Mello, 2018). Such deceleration of cognitive processes during mind 
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wandering episodes is not only observed for reading tasks. During word-learning tasks, off-
task processing, or decoupling from the task, was found to be indexed by slower response 
times (Smallwood, O'Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007). Also, during simple go/no-go 
tasks, mind wandering has a prolonging effect on processing time and goes along with higher 
proportions of extremely long reaction times (McVay & Kane, 2012). Franklin, Smallwood, 
and Schooler (2011) used the relationship between mind wandering and temporal changes to 
develop an algorithm that successfully predicted participants’ mind-wandering reports during 
word-by-word reading. However, the authors found participants to be speeding up during 
mind-wandering episodes. They discuss that this substantial difference to the results reported 
by Reichle et al. (2010) might be due to paradigmatic differences (word-by-word reading 
versus naturalistic reading). A similar speed-up is often found in the SART when participants 
are mind wandering (Smallwood et al., 2004). Thus, there is mixed evidence concerning the 
direction of the mind-wandering–processing-time relationship and further research is needed.    
Franklin et al.’s (2011) algorithm is based on the idea of different sensitivities to the 
lexical qualities of words during mind wandering compared to on-task attention. They found 
people to be less affected by word features such as length and frequency during mindless 
reading. This idea is also supported by Reichle et al. (2010), Foulsham et al. (2013), and now, 
additionally, by our results. We also found a weaker word-frequency effect during mindless 
reading, although this reduction was only significant for the fixation-count measure. Also, 
from a theoretical standpoint, a reduced word-frequency effect should be a good indicator of 
attentional decoupling during mindless reading: While people’s minds wander, they naturally 
disengage from the lexical input in front of them and are thus likely to ignore word features 
that usually affect processing time. Please note, however, that we selected target words in the 
present study that differed considerably in their frequency but were matched in other respects 
(length). Whereas this approach is optimal for demonstrating a mind-wandering-related 
reduction of the word frequency effect, future research is needed to determine to which degree 
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the effects observed in this study are stimulus dependent and whether a meaningful reduction 
would still occur with weaker word-frequency manipulations.  
In most studies examining mindless reading, probes appeared randomly during full-
text reading, resulting in different to-be-analyzed text passages for each participant. Only in 
the Foulsham et al. (2013) study, single-sentence reading allowed for the manipulation of 
linguistic input. These authors compared high- and low-frequency target words during 
mindless versus normal reading. We applied a similar approach and also defined target 
sentences with specific features (high- versus low-frequency words). However, in contrast to 
the Foulsham et al. study, our participants were able to engage in naturalistic reading. This 
was achieved by letting participants’ fixations on the first words of the sentence following a 
target sentence trigger thought probe appearances. Consequently, we could analyze 
predefined target sentences and words even though our participants engaged in full text 
reading. By keeping to-be-examined passages equal for all participants while still enabling 
naturalistic reading, our method combines the advantages of both full-text and single-sentence 
reading. We therefore recommend this method for future research.  
We also recommend using multilevel models in future research. In addition to their 
general advantages (see Results section), they allow for the specific modeling of time-on-task 
effects that are often found for mind-wandering behavior (e.g., Foulsham et al., 2013; McVay 
& Kane, 2009; Rummel & Nied, 2017; Steindorf & Rummel, 2017). As a result, the effects of 
the variables of interest can be examined while controlling for systematic changes due solely 
to time on task. Additionally, mind-wandering research has to deal with data that are not 
normally distributed. This issue can be resolved by specifying responses to thought probes as 
a dichotomous (or categorical) dependent variable in the multilevel framework.   
As we discussed in our literature review outlined in the Introduction section, the 
research using eye-movement measures as mind-wandering indicators is far from being 
coherent: Previous studies have differed regarding the lexical input that was used, the reading 
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time, the number of participants, the analyzed areas of interest, the thought-probing 
procedures, and the types of statistical analyses. However, even when methods were relatively 
comparable, different authors analyzed different measures, found divergent effects and even 
effects of different directions for the same measure. We hope that the present work will aid 
the development of robust and stable indicators of mindless reading and we believe that it also 
emphasizes the importance of validation research. In general, we believe that when a field is 
growing as rapidly as the mind wandering area (Schooler et al., 2014; Seli, Risko, Smilek, & 
Schacter, 2016), researchers should not only focus on conducting more research, but also on 
better connecting new research with existing research. An eye-movement measure that only 
proves to be a valid mind-wandering predictor in one single study under unique conditions 
will not help the field to move forward.      
Special considerations apply to the usage of within-word regressions as a mind-
wandering indicator. Uzzaman and Joordens (2011) observed fewer within-word regressions 
during mindless reading than during normal reading, whereas we did not detect any such 
differences. Of course, this inconsistency might be due to differences in the specific methods 
applied (language, sample, font size, etc.). However, because a valid mind-wandering 
indicator should prove stable across such conditions (as long as the methods are fairly 
comparable), the present study would at least suggest that within-word regressions might be a 
less reliable indicator of mind wandering. Additionally, with our monitor characteristics and 
font size, medium sized words had a length of 2-3°. Since we applied a velocity threshold of 
40 °/s to identify saccades, the detection of within-word regressions could be problematic, due 
to technical issues. Some words in our target sentences might have simply been too small for 
us to detect backwards movements, rendering the measure unreliable8. We would conclude 
that future research will be needed to determine the usefulness of within-word regressions to 
 
8
 We thank Stephanie Huette for raising this point. 
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predict mind wandering, but that measures that strongly depend on technical characteristics 
will probably not become first choice indicators.   
In sum, our study is only one other among those assessing eye-movements in the hope 
to detect mind-wandering indicators, wherefore our results must also be considered as 
preliminary. Moreover, our manipulation of TUT-levels via task-demand expectancies, which 
could have provided a further test of the convergent validity of the eye-movement mind-
wandering indicators, was not successful. We therefore would encourage researchers who 
plan on conducting mind wandering studies and assessing eye movements to incorporate 
better convergent-validity tests. Furthermore, we would encourage them to not only report the 
data for indicators that turned out to be significant in their particular study, but to report 
results for all candidate indicators, as we did here. At the current stage of this field of 
research, non-significant results are just as important as significant results to determine 
whether eye-tracking methods are a valid tool for mind-wandering assessment.  
Whereas the early studies were important for identifying eye movements as a potential 
mind wandering proxy, future research will also have to focus on the role methodological 
details (e.g., those listed in Table 1) play in the divergent results observed so far. Valid 
indicators of mind wandering will, in the end, have to converge across studies imposing 
comparable contextual demands. Additionally, plausible boundary conditions need to be 
identified and tested for those cases in which indicators do not converge. To achieve this goal, 
full transparency concerning methods and (expected) results—optimally preregistered before 
a study is conducted—will be key. In line with these recommendations, we hope for future 
research to fill the gaps that still exist concerning the validation of eye-movement measures as 
indicators for mindless reading.  
We believe that mind-wandering research would greatly benefit if eye-movement 
measures were found to be robust and stable indicators of mindless reading. So far, subjective 
self-reports are the state-of-the-art assessment tool for mind-wandering. Not only might 
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answers to thought probes be prone to memory driven and classification errors, but the 
probing procedure itself might also interrupt a participant’s train of thought and impair task 
performance. Eye-movement measures as non-intrusive, objective mind-wandering indicators 
could circumvent these problems for reading tasks. Similarly, pupillometry represents a 
promising method for predicting TUTs during reading. Pupil dilation has been found to be 
higher prior to mindless reading compared to normal-reading episodes (Franklin, Broadway, 
Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2011, but see Grandchamp, 
Braboszcz, & Delorme, 2014). Eye-movement measures and pupil dilation could bring us one 
step closer to real-time detection of disruptive mind-wandering behavior during reading.      
Additionally, such measures may even have the potential to be used to prevent mind-
wandering in situations in which it is not only disruptive, but even dangerous. Driver 
inattention due to mind-wandering, for example, poses a serious threat to road safety: Driving 
simulation studies have shown that driver behavior is indeed affected by participants’ thought 
mode (Baldwin et al., 2017). Aside from mind wandering, fatigue is a major cause of traffic 
accidents and eye-state bio-feedback methods have already been tested in cars to prevent 
drivers from falling asleep (e.g., Devi & Bajaj, 2008). Detecting TUT episodes by means of 
eye-movements or pupillometry in addition to fatigue detection could be in the interest of 
road safety. Still, as we pointed out above, the validation of these biological markers is a work 
in progress. We hope that our work will drive the validation process forward so that eye 
movements can be used as indicators for mindless reading in the not-too-distant future.  
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Table 1. Studies comparing eye movements during self-categorized episodes of mindless reading (MR) versus normal reading (NR). 
 Reichle, Reineberg,      
& Schooler, 2010 
Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 
2010 
Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011 
Foulsham, Farley, & 
Kingston, 2013 
Frank, Nara, Zavagnin, 
Touron, & Kane, 2015       
Task characteristics      
 N 4 12 22 26 29 
 Reading materials Sense and Sensibility  
Two passages of A Short 
History of Nearly 
Everything  
16 pages from War and 
Peace  
120 single sentences 
Five chapters from War and 
Peace  
 Reading duration 13.5 hours (average) Up to 30 min  30 min  
 Probe count 151.5 (average) 20 10 (average) 9 (average) 20 
 Area of interest 
2.5 s, 5 s, 10 s, 30 s, 60 
s, and 120 s intervals 
preceding thought 
probes 
5 s intervals preceding 
thought probes 
5 s intervals preceding 
thought probes 
Target sentences 
3-8 s intervals preceding 
thought probes 
Eye-movement measures      
 Fixation count MR = NR (first-pass 
fixations) 
MR < NR MR = NR MR > NR 
MR = NR (first-pass 
fixations) 
 
 Fixation duration MR = NR (first-fixation 
durations) 
MR = NR MR = NR MR > NR  
 Between-word 
regression count 
MR = NR   MR = NR MR > NR 
 
Within-word 
regression count 
  MR < NR   
 Blink count  MR > NR MR = NR  MR > NR 
 Reading time 
MR > NR (gaze 
duration & total 
viewing time) 
  MR > NR MR = NR (gaze duration) 
 Word frequency 
effect 
   MR < NR  
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Note. < and > symbols represent significant effects with p < .05. For example, Uzzaman and Joordens (2011) found that there were less 
within-word regressions during mindless compared to normal reading. For comparability reasons, only effects on eye-movement measures 
that appeared preceding probe-caught mind-wandering are reported from the Reichle et al. (2010) study, although the authors also examined 
self-caught mind-wandering. From the Frank et al. (2015) study, only effects for younger adults are reported. The authors differentiated 
between task-unrelated thoughts and task-related inferences, but only effects found for task-unrelated thoughts are reported here. They also 
advise not to use blinks as mind-wandering markers, because effects on this measure were found for only about half their participants. 
Uzzaman and Joordens (2011) additionally found a significant effect for a measure they called run count. Because it was not precisely 
defined, and it is not a commonly used eye-tracking measure, we did not include it as a measure of interest. MR = mindless reading; NR = 
normal reading. 
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the behavioral measures. 
Measure M SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Comprehension accuracy (%) 80.87 13.18  -- [-.21, .17] [-.48, -.13] [-.37, -.03] [-.07, .28] [-.34, .03] [-.22, .17] 
2. Expected difficulty (1 to 10) 6.42 2.01  -.03 -- [-.22, .18] [-.33, .06] [-.06, .32] [-.34, .01] [-.08, .29] 
3. Perceived difficulty (1 to 10) 5.46 1.71  -.31* -.02 -- [-.12, .26] [-.24, .15] [-.18, .23] [-.33, .04] 
4. Online TUTs (%) 17.57 14.46  -.19* -.15 .08 -- [-.30, .11] [.58, .79] [-.14, .25] 
5. Online TTIs (%) 31.96 13.35  .12 .15 -.05 -.11 -- [-.22, .16] [.42, .65] 
6. Retrospective TUTs (%) 16.42 13.74  -.16* -.17* .04 .70* -.04 -- [-.16, .23] 
7. Retrospective TTIs (%) 27.75 13.68  -.03 .11 -.15 .06 .54* .02 -- 
Note. Values in parentheses indicate the scale of the measure. Values for the comprehension test’s expected and perceived difficulty relate 
to a ten-point scale from very easy (1) to very difficult (10). Pearson correlations are displayed below, and bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals for the correlation coefficients are displayed above the diagonal. Numbers in the first row of the table refer to the corresponding 
measure in the first column. *p ≤ .050 (one-tailed, in the predicted direction); TUT = task-unrelated thought; TTI = task-triggered 
intrusions. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the eye-movement measures of interest for target sentences 
categorized as either task-related thought (TRT) or task-unrelated thought (TUT) episodes. 
Eye-tracking measure MTRT SDTRT MTUT SDTUT 
Within-word-regression count  1.52 1.60 1.49 1.68 
Between-word-regression count 3.17 2.60 3.16 2.41 
Blink count 2.86 2.85 2.69 2.30 
Reading time (ms) 9526.67 3624.36 9947.95 3249.09 
Fixation count 33.26 12.16 34.88 11.26 
First-fixation duration (ms) 198.46 32.15 205.68 31.25 
Note. Values are to be interpreted sentence-wise (e.g., on average, participants exhibited 34.88 
fixations per mindlessly read target sentence), except those for first-fixation duration, which are 
to be interpreted word-wise (e.g., on average, participants’ first-fixation durations on mindfully 
read single words lasted 198.46 ms). In order to calculate means, we aggregated across 
participants and target sentences that were categorized as TRT or TUT episodes, respectively. M 
= mean; SD = standard deviation; TRT = task-related thought; TUT = task-unrelated thought. 
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Table 4. Eye-tracking measures (Level 1) predicting TUT occurrences in separate multilevel 
logistic regressions also including time-on-task (Level 1) and the effect-coded experimental 
condition (Level 2) as further predictors. Intercepts were allowed to vary with target sentences 
and participants. 
Predictor b SEb 95% CI Wald Z p 
Within-word regression count  0.03 .11 [-0.19, 0.24] 0.29 .769 
Between-word regression count 0.11 .12 [-0.12, 0.35] 0.98 .328 
Blink count -0.11 .13 [-0.37, 0.14] -0.82 .413 
Reading time (ms) 0.27 .12 [0.03, 0.52] 2.24 .025 
Fixation count 0.35 .12 [0.12, 0.60] 2.95 .003 
First-fixation duration (ms) 0.24 .11 [0.01, 0.46] 2.11 .035 
Note. In three of the six regression models, the eye tracking measure of interest (reading time, 
fixation count, and first-fixation duration) positively predicted TUT occurrences. In all of the 
models, time-on-task significantly predicted TUTs (all p-values < .001) with the likelihood for a 
TUT occurrence generally increasing over time. The effect-coded experimental condition 
remained nonsignificant in all of the models (all p-values > .05). SE = standard error; CI = 
confidence interval. 
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 Table 5. Main and interaction effects of four multilevel regressions, each predicting an eye movement measure by word frequency (low 
versus high), thought mode (TUT versus TRT), and the interaction of both. Intercepts were allowed to vary with target words and 
participants. 
 
Note. Three of four regression models showed a word frequency effect. That is, word-frequency predicted the eye-movement measure of 
interest (gaze duration, total viewing time, and fixation count). Critically, the interaction between word frequency and thought mode was 
a significant predictor of fixation count, indicating a reduced word-frequency effect during TUT compared to TRT episodes (see Figure 
1). Regressions into target words were rare and did not show a reliable word-frequency effect. SE = standard error; CI = confidence 
interval. 
Dependent variable Predictor b SEb 95% CI t p 
Gaze duration  
Word frequency -45.50 8.38 [-61.96, -29.04] -5.43 < .001 
Thought mode -9.49 8.59 [-26.37, 7.40] -1.10 .270 
Word frequency  thought mode  -7.94 8.43 [-24.49, 8.62] -0.94 .347 
       
Total viewing time 
Word frequency -71.26 10.45 [-91.79, -50.73] -6.82 < .001 
Thought mode 6.22 10.94 [-15.29, 27.73] 0.57 .570 
Word frequency  thought mode -16.93 10.56 [-37.68, 3.81] -1.60 .109 
       
Fixation count 
Word frequency -0.24 0.05 [-0.33, -0.15] -5.23 < .001 
Thought mode 0.00 0.05 [-0.09, 0.09] -0.00 .996 
Word frequency  thought mode -0.12 0.05 [-0.21, -0.03] -2.63 .009 
       
Regressions into target word 
Word frequency -0.01 0.01 [-0.04, 0.02] -0.53 .597 
Thought mode -0.02 0.01 [-0.05, 0.01] -1.54 .124 
Word frequency  thought mode -0.02 0.01 [-0.05, 0.01] -1.41 .159 
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Figure 1.Mean values for gaze duration (duration of all fixations on a target word during the first 
pass), total viewing time (sum of all fixations on a target word, including fixations following a 
regression), fixation count (total number of fixations on a target word), and regressions-into-
target-word count (total number of regressions back to a target word) for high- and low-
frequency target words during TRT and TUT episodes. Higher bars for low-frequency than for 
high-frequency target words represent the word-frequency effect, which is descriptively smaller 
during TUT episodes. Because regressions into the target word were very rare and because the 
measure did not produce a reliable word-frequency effect, it was not interpreted further. Error 
bars represent standard errors of the means.
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Appendix 
Target words used to examine the word-frequency effect during episodes of mindless versus normal reading including their English 
translation and information on frequency and character count 
frequency 
target word (in 
German) 
English translation frequency character count 
mean 
frequency 
mean character 
count 
low 
Chanukka Hanukkah 4 8 
8.40 10.60 
Musikologe musicologist 1 10 
Imaginieren imagination  9 11 
Pathologien pathologies 27 11 
Frontallappen frontal lobe 1 13 
high 
Gehirn brain 2146 6 
1892.80 10.40 
Eifersucht jealousy 882 10 
Strukturen structures 2229 10 
Gesundheit health 3773 10 
Eigentümlichkeit  peculiarity 434 16 
Note. Word frequencies (type frequencies) were extracted from the dlex database (obtained under http://dlexdb.de/) which constitutes a 
corpus of the German language consisting of different text sources such as newspapers, fiction books, and scientific works (Heister et al., 
2011). 
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Abstract 
Mind-wandering is mostly studied for its negative effects on ongoing cognitive tasks but may 
be also of adaptive value. We tested the idea of mind-wandering providing opportunities for 
rehearsal by asking participants to study twenty grocery items for a cued recall test. After 
cued recall of ten items, participants were either told that the recall task was finished or that it 
was interrupted for another task. All participants then performed a 2-back task during which 
thought contents were repeatedly probed. Cued recall of the remaining items was better in the 
interrupted than in the finished condition and this effect was accompanied by a more efficient 
rehearsal strategy: Participants’ thought-reports in the interrupted condition revealed a 
stronger and more persistent engagement in shopping-task related thoughts. Activating a 
relevant goal led to mind-wandering episodes being persistently used as opportunities for 
rehearsal revealing participants’ adaptive usage of off-task thoughts.   
 
 Keywords: Mind-wandering, Adaptive cognition, Task-unrelated thought  
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“I should not forget the apples!” – Mind-wandering episodes used as opportunities for 
rehearsal in an interrupted recall paradigm 
As much as half of our daily thoughts can be described as being unrelated to current 
external events (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger, 1999). You are probably not going to 
be able to read this article without your thoughts unintentionally trailing off every once in a 
while. A so called mind-wandering episode like this is most likely going to impair your 
reading comprehension. When thoughts are off-task, performance on a wide range of tasks 
like reading (Feng, D’Mello, & Graesser, 2013; Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay & Kane, 
2012), simple vigilance tasks (McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2004) or even 
sustained attention tasks (SAT; Mrazek et al., 2012) suffers. Therefore off-task thoughts have 
mostly been studied for their negative effects on ongoing cognitive tasks, raising the question 
why people spend so much of their time mind-wandering. Given the considerable costs of off-
task thoughts to concurrent tasks, it appears likely that these thoughts do have some kind of 
functionality. Indeed, there is recent evidence that people also sometimes intentionally engage 
in mind-wandering for various reasons (Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016). With or without 
intention, from an adaptive viewpoint, it seems unlikely that people would mind-wander up to 
50 % of their waking hours if off-task thoughts were not functional to some extent.   
Already Singer (1975) described positive constructive daydreaming—one out of three 
styles of daydreaming—as being characterized by planful, creative thought, highlighting the 
constructive nature of off-task thoughts. Taking a closer look at specific thought contents, it is 
found that off-task thoughts are often future related, concerning unfulfilled tasks or personal 
problems (e. g., Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009b). Future oriented mind-wandering is 
not only observed under laboratory conditions  but also in real life (D'Argembeau, Renaud, & 
Van Der Linden, 2011) and might help people to achieve personals goals or plan future 
actions (cf. Klinger, 1999; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). Besides their planful nature, off-
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task thoughts are also found to enhance creativity (Baird et al., 2012, but see Smeekens & 
Kane, 2016) and to facilitate problem solving (Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, & Singer, 2013). 
Given these potential positive effects of mind-wandering and considering the context-
regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013) that states that people adjust the 
occurrence of off-task thoughts to some extent to situational requirements, it seems advisable 
to engage in goal-related off-task thoughts when the situation requires and or allows it. That 
is, people should benefit from adjusting their thought allocation to current and future task 
goals. Especially for individuals that are aware that they will have to fulfill a certain task goal 
in the future, it seems advisable to maintain this task goal—even while engaging in other 
ongoing activities. We define goal-related mind-wandering as off-task thoughts that are used 
for the maintenance of future task goals. In contrast, goal-unrelated off-task thoughts concern 
personal issues, worries, and other thoughts unrelated to future or current task goals. Working 
on a current task and having in mind a future task goal, one can allocate thoughts either to the 
current task goal, to the future task goal (goal-related mind-wandering) or to issues unrelated 
to any task goal (goal-unrelated mind-wandering). In order to not sacrifice the current and 
future task goals, it seems advisable to prevent intrusive goal-unrelated off-task thoughts from 
interfering with one’s goals. In line with this idea, Rummel, Smeekens, and Kane (2016) 
recently demonstrated that people tend to engage less in goal-unrelated off-task thoughts 
during an ongoing task when they have to additionally watch out for the right moment to 
fulfill a prospective memory intention. Also, a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies 
(Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015) confirmed the association between mind-wandering and 
personal goal processing by demonstrating that both domains depend on a common set of 
brain regions. 
There is a considerable amount of research showing that mind-wandering situationally 
increases due to personal states like bad mood (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 
2009a), nicotine cravings (Sayette et al., 2010), or acute personal worries activated via 
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triggers (McVay & Kane, 2013). However, there are hardly any empirical demonstrations that 
active (versus inactive) future task goals change mind-wandering behavior (but see Rummel 
et al., 2016).   
As a daily-life example for a situation where people will have to devote some 
conscious thought to a future task goal in order to maintain it despite of being occupied by 
other current duties, one may think of the common situation of having to do some shopping 
later but being engaged in another ongoing task meanwhile. In this situation, thinking about 
the grocery shopping list (i.e., engaging in goal-related off-task thoughts) while transcribing 
some text, for instance, might prove helpful later in the store. It may prevent one from 
forgetting to buy necessary ingredients for tonight’s dinner due to mind-wandering providing 
opportunities for rehearsal (as proposed by Singer, 1964). In the present study, we therefore 
examined possible rehearsal strategies during mind-wandering episodes engaged towards the 
maintenance of a future shopping-task goal and their success. First, our aim was to investigate 
whether mind-wandering episodes are used for rehearsal and goal maintenance rather than 
goal-unrelated thoughts by looking at people’s thought contents in the presence versus 
absence of a future task goal. Second, we wanted to determine the nature of rehearsal 
strategies by examining the persistence of rehearsal thoughts over time. Third, we assessed 
the success of rehearsal during mind-wandering episodes to make a point in favor of the 
adaptiveness of goal-related mind-wandering.  
To accomplish these objectives, we asked participants to study a grocery shopping list 
and framed the recall phases as shopping episodes in two supermarkets. After the first recall 
phase (recall of half the shopping list items), we intended to manipulate mind-wandering 
content by activating a relevant goal in one condition: Participants in an interrupted condition 
(IC) were told that they would set out for another supermarket to buy the remaining items. 
While on their way, they would work on a different task and would finish the recall task 
afterwards. In contrast to IC participants, participants in a finished condition (FC) were told 
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that they did not urgently need the remaining items, that the recall task was finished and that 
they would now work on a different task. We expected that with the second shopping episode 
still in mind, IC participants would use mind-wandering episodes more often for goal-related 
rehearsal than FC participants during a ten minute retention interval that was filled with a 2-
back task (cf. Cohen, 2013 for a similar idea). According to our experience, the intervening 2-
back task is feasible for our student population so that mind-wandering can be expected to 
occur during this task, on the one hand. On the other hand, we considered this task to be 
attention demanding enough to motivate participants to disengage from no longer relevant 
task goals in the FC. Also, from an applied perspective, many daily tasks impose a certain 
level of cognitive demands and do not allow people to unrestrictedly rehearse future task 
goals, like shopping lists for a later shopping trip. For these reasons, we chose the 2-back 
version of the n-back task as the intervening task accepting that it might limit the overall 
frequency of mind-wandering. We expected fewer goal-related thoughts (i.e., shopping-item 
rehearsal) for FC than IC participants during the 2-back task. Also, concerning the nature of 
rehearsal strategies, we expected a more persistent rehearsal pattern for IC compared to FC 
participants. Further, we expected these between-group differences in mind-wandering 
behavior to go along with better shopping item recall during the second recall phase for FC 
compared to IC participants.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Sixty subjects were recruited at Heidelberg University, Germany and were tested in 
groups. Data of 5 subjects were discarded due to poor performance in the 2-back task (d’ < 1), 
resulting in N = 55 (Mage = 22.07, SDage = 4.01; 84% female; 28 subjects in the FC) for all 
further analyses. In light of the other participants’ good performance (mean d’ = 3.13) and the 
moderate difficulty level of the task, we assumed that these participants did not pay sufficient 
attention to the 2-back task, possibly changing their mind-wandering behavior. Removal of 
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these data did neither change the pattern nor the significance of results. We used a 2 × 2 
mixed-factorial design for the investigation of off-task thoughts and 2-back performance with 
test-instruction condition (IC vs. FC) manipulated between participants. The time of 
assessment (before list encoding, after list encoding) depicted the within-participants factor. 
Recall performance was investigated via a 2 (IC vs. FC) × 2 (recall phase: first, second) 
mixed-factorial design. 
Materials 
N-back task and thought probes. Participants were presented with the 2-back 
version of the n-back task. In this task, single letters were successively presented for 500 ms 
each with an inter-stimulus interval of 3000 ms. Participants were supposed to press a green-
labeled key (C-key) as soon as the currently presented letter matched the one presented two 
trials earlier. On all other trials they were supposed to press a red-labeled key (B-key). 
Participants performed two blocks of the 2-back task. Each block contained 120 trials in total 
consisting of 30 non-match buffer trials (not analyzed), 50 non-match experimental trials and 
40 match experimental trials. During the task, participants were interrupted by a thought 
probe after each sequence of twelve trials, which lasted for 42 sec., resulting in a total of ten 
probes per block. We made sure that a probe never appeared in the middle of a target 
sequence, but was always followed by 3 of the non-match buffer trials. To assess the amount 
of mind-wandering and the content of participants’ thoughts, we used a two-step thought-
probe procedure. First, participants were asked to categorize their current thoughts as being on 
or off task. In the second step, participants were further asked to type in a brief description of 
their current thought’s content. 
Recall task.  For the study phase, we selected 24 grocery shopping items from the 
dlex database (Heister et al., 2011), four of which to be used as buffer items. Items were 
presented in random order on a white screen for 2000 ms each followed by a 500 ms inter-
stimulus-interval. For the test phases we created two sets consisting of ten test items each. 
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Sets were matched by category (e.g. fish, fruit, vegetable), word length and word frequency. 
All items had different first letters which were provided as cues in the recall phases.       
Procedure  
Participants signed a consent form and answered demographic questions before 
receiving detailed instructions for the 2-back task and the thought probing procedure. They 
then performed 15 practice trials of the 2-back task which contained two thought probes. 
After practice, participants performed one block of the 2-back task including ten thought 
probes. We then asked participants to study 24 grocery shopping items for a fictitious 
shopping trip to the supermarket embedding a cued recall paradigm in a grocery shopping 
scenario. Item presentation order was determined randomly across both sets. For a first recall 
phase, participants were presented with the first letters from one item set (set assignment to 
the first and second test was counterbalanced) and asked to complete each letter in accordance 
with the previously studied words. After recall of the first set, critical instructions for the 
experimental manipulation and a 10-minute retention interval followed: All participants were 
told that they had left the supermarket with the recalled items, but hadn’t been able to find all 
the items from their grocery list. IC participants were told that they would set out for another 
supermarket to buy the remaining items. While on their way, they would work on a different 
task and would finish the recall task afterwards. FC participants were told that they did not 
urgently need the remaining items, that the recall task was finished and that they would now 
work on a different task. Then, the second 2-back block (including ten thought probes) 
started. After this block, all participants performed a first-letter cue recall test with the study 
items from the second set. Finally, participants were debriefed and dismissed.  
Results 
Because set order did not affect the results in any way, we collapsed across this 
counterbalancing factor. Performance in each 2-back block was computed in terms of d’ 
scores. The amount of off-task thoughts in each 2-back block was defined as the sum of 
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probes on which participants categorized themselves as being off task. Participants’ thought 
contents from the open-format thought questions from the second 2-back block were rated as 
to whether they concerned the shopping scenario or not creating the binary dependent variable 
shopping thoughts (i.e., goal-related off-task thoughts) with ten measurement points. Because 
the shopping scenario started after the first 2-back block, shopping thoughts did not occur 
during the first block. Thoughts that did not concern the shopping scenario and the 2-back 
task were subsumed under goal-unrelated off-task thoughts, which concerned personal issues, 
worries, etc. Recall performance was defined as the number of correctly recalled items for 
each recall phase. Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were employed for the analyses of 2-
back performance, self-categorized off-task thoughts, as well as recall performance. To 
account for the repeated thought assessment and the resulting dependencies in the data set, we 
used a multilevel regression model for the analysis of shopping thoughts.    
2-back task performance.  A 2 × 2 ANOVA with test-instruction condition (IC vs. 
FC) as between-participants and block (first, second) as within-participants factor for 2-back 
discrimination abilities (d’) showed no significant difference in the 2-back task performance 
between blocks (M (Block1) = 3.15, SD (Block1) = .81; M (Block2) = 3.12, SD(Block2) = .78), F(1, 53) < 
1, p = .826, η2p < .01, and test-instruction conditions (M(IC) = 3.04, SD(IC) = .82; M(FC) = 3.22, 
SD(FC) = .60), F(1, 53) < 1, p = .356, η2p = .02. The interaction was also not significant, F(1, 
53) < 1, p = .606, η2p = .01. That is, 2-back task performance was not affected by the presence 
versus absence of the shopping goal1. 
 
1 There was also no significant difference in the hit rates between blocks (M(Block1) = .86, 
SD(Block1) = .10; M(Block2) = .86, SD(Block2) = .12), F(1, 53) < 1, p = .753, η2p < .01, and test-
instruction conditions (M(IC) = .84, SD(IC) = .12; M(FC) = .88, SD(FC) = .08), F(1, 53) = 2.13, p = 
.150, η2p = .04. The interaction remained insignificant, too, F(1, 53) < 1, p = .872, η2p < .01. 
Also, false alarm rates did not differ between blocks (M(Block1) = .04, SD(Block1) = .04; M(Block2) 
= .04, SD(Block2) = .03), F(1, 53) < 1, p = .638, η2p < .01, and test-instruction conditions (M(IC) 
= .04, SD(IC) = .03; M(FC) = .04, SD(FC) = .03), F(1, 53) < 1, p = .547, η2p = .01, and the 
interaction remained insignificant, F(1, 53) < 1, p = .993, η2p < .01. 
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Mind-wandering behavior. The amount of self-categorized off-task thoughts differed 
between the first (M = 2.09, SD = 1.90) and the second 2-back block (M = 3.11, SD = 2.29), 
F(1, 53) = 11.76, p < .001, η2p = .18, but not between test-instruction conditions (M(IC) = 2.70, 
SD(IC) = 1.93; M(FC) = 2.50, SD(FC) = 1.69), F(1, 53) = < 1, p = .679, η2p < .01. The interaction 
was not significant, F(1, 53) < 1, p = .951, η2p < .01. Thus, the overall amount of off-task 
thoughts was not influenced by the presence versus absence of the shopping goal. Overall, 
participants in the IC did not spend more time mind-wandering. However, they could still 
have used a larger proportion of their off-task thoughts for the rehearsal of shopping list items 
than FC participants. Figure 1 depicts the proportion of goal-related off-task thoughts versus 
goal-unrelated off-task thoughts during the second 2-back block. The descriptive pattern 
suggested that there might have been more shopping thoughts in the IC than in the FC.  
To statistically secure the influence of an active shopping goal on goal-related 
thoughts and their persistency, we used a multilevel modeling approach. Multilevel models 
can account for dependencies within a data set and are thus suitable for the analysis of the 
dependent variable shopping thoughts which was measured repeatedly during the second 2-
back block. We treated these measurements (Level 1) as being nested in participants (Level 
2). To account for the binary nature of the dependent variable, we used a logit-link function to 
regress shopping thoughts on the effect-coded test-instruction condition (Level 2), time course 
(variable on Level 1 ranging from 1 to 10, depicting the time of thought assessment), and the 
interaction of the two. Results of this multilevel logistic regression are depicted in Table 1 and 
show that both test-instruction condition and time course significantly predicted the extent to 
which participants reported shopping thoughts. These results indicate that IC participants 
experienced more shopping thoughts than FC participants and that the likelihood for a 
shopping thought occurrence generally decreased over time. Importantly, the interaction 
between test-instruction condition and time course also predicted the likelihood of shopping-
thought occurrence revealing differences between conditions concerning the time course of 
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shopping thoughts, as illustrated in Figure 2. Both FC and IC participants still showed goal-
related off-task thoughts at the beginning of the second 2-back block, but FC participants 
stopped thinking about the shopping goal after the forth thought probe, whereas participants’ 
thought reports in the IC revealed a rather persistent mental occupation with the shopping 
goal. 
Recall performance. A 2 × 2 ANOVA with test-instruction condition (IC vs. FC) as 
between-participants and recall phase (first, second) as within-participants factor showed that 
participants performed better in the first (M = 6.91, SD = 2.19) than in the second recall phase 
(M = 4.25, SD = 1.96), F(1, 53) = 65.60, p < .001, η2p = .55, and better in the IC (M = 6.15, 
SD = 1.38) than in the FC (M = 5.04, SD = 1.76), F(1, 53) = 6.76, p = .012, η2p = .11. There 
was a marginal interaction, F(1, 53) = 3.05, p < .087, η2p = .05. As evident from Figure 3, 
pairwise comparisons revealed no significant difference between IC (M = 7.19, SD = 1.88) 
and FC participants (M = 6.64, SD = 2.45) in the first recall phase, F(1, 53) < 1, p = .363, d = 
0.25. In the second recall phase, however, IC participants (M = 5.11, SD = 1.87) recalled 
significantly more items than FC participants (M = 3.43, SD = 1.69), F(1, 53) = 12.31, p < 
.011, d = 0.96. 
Discussion 
 We tested whether people who are in an active goal state of having to remember a 
shopping list would devote some of their off-task thoughts to the maintenance of the shopping 
items despite being occupied by another current task goal. To this end, after recall of half of 
the shopping list’s items, participants were either told that shopping-item recall was finished 
or that it was interrupted for another task. Participants who considered the other task an 
interruption of the shopping task more intensively maintained the shopping goal over the time 
course of this task, as evident from the considerably higher amount and persistency of 
shopping-item related thoughts compared to participants for whom the shopping task was no 
longer active. Interestingly, participants with and without an active shopping goal reported to 
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think about the shopping task, but participants for whom the shopping was finished stopped 
thinking about the future task goal early on during the following task. In contrast, participants 
for whom the future task goal was still active kept on thinking about the shopping list from 
time to time during the whole time course of the task. As expected, participants who thought 
they interrupted the shopping task performed better on the final recall test than participants 
who thought that they had already finished the shopping task. This pattern of results suggests 
that the increased and longer-lasting engagement in goal-related off-task thoughts may have 
been indeed effective in maintaining memory for the not yet recalled shopping items, thereby 
revealing the adaptive nature of mind-wandering about unfulfilled goals. As a daily-life 
example for mind-wandering benefits, it has been repeatedly suggested that thinking about a 
grocery shopping list while performing other tasks may prove helpful later in the store. In line 
with this idea, we found evidence that mind-wandering may actually prevent one from 
forgetting to buy necessary ingredients for tonight’s dinner due to these off-task episodes 
providing opportunities for rehearsal.  
 The present experimental study was not designed to rigorously investigate 
correlational patterns and thus the power for correlational tests was generally very low. We 
aimed to manipulate mind-wandering behavior and to investigate group differences in the 
amount and persistency of shopping thoughts and recall performance. Although we found 
significant effects on all of these measures, we cannot be sure that the manipulation-induced 
changes in shopping thoughts caused the observed changes in recall performance. Because the 
distributions of the shopping-thoughts sum score deviated from a normal distribution in both 
groups, as indicated by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (D(27) < 0.27, p < .001, for the IC; D(28) 
= 0.37, p < .001, for the FC), the conditions for testing for a linear correlation between 
shopping thoughts and recall performance were not met. Therefore, and because of the low 
power of this test (1 - β = .35, for a medium-sized effect), we refrained from testing it here. 
But even if we had been able to test for this relationship it would not have been a strict test of 
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our hypothesis that the persistency of shopping thoughts (rather than their bare amount) 
caused the shopping-recall advantage. In light of recent theoretical work in the intention 
memory literature considering attention allocation to a to-be-delayed task goal as crucial for 
later goal fulfillment (Smith, 2003, 2010), it seems very likely that successful shopping-goal 
fulfillment requires persistent mental maintenance of the goal over time. Admittedly, our 
design does not allow to directly test this assumption. Thus, future research needs to address 
this point. 
 The manipulation of shopping-task goals did not affect 2-back task performance 
implying that the changes in goal-directed off-task thoughts did not affect performance on this 
(moderately difficult) task at hand. This finding suggests that people are able to devote some 
conscious thought to active future task goals without sacrificing their concurrent task goals—
probably because they engaged less in goal-unrelated off-task thoughts in the presence versus 
absence of the active future goal (see Figure 1). Indeed, the overall engagement in off-task 
thoughts was very similar in the presence and absence of the shopping-goal. Only the 
proportion of goal-related versus goal-unrelated off-task thoughts was influenced by the 
activation of a future task goal. This general idea is well in line with the context-regulation 
hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013) that suggests that the engagement and 
disengagement from mind-wandering depends on situational requirements (see also Rummel 
& Boywitt, 2014). However, the present results suggest that context adjustment is more 
dynamic than previously assumed. People engaged in goal-related off-task thoughts about a 
shopping-task goal—independent of whether they thought that the shopping task was finished 
or only postponed, but, whereas people without an active shopping goal stopped thinking 
about the shopping items relatively early on, people with a still active shopping goal 
maintained this goal over a longer time period despite performing another task. Also, people 
did not sacrifice a proportion of their current goal-related thoughts for the maintenance of the 
future task goal (there was no difference in the overall amount of off-task thoughts), but a 
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proportion of their goal-unrelated off-task thoughts. It seems that with a second (future) task 
goal in mind, it was even more important for people to prevent intrusive goal-unrelated off-
task thoughts from interfering with their task goals. 
 In the present study, the temporal rate of thought probe presentation was rather high 
(i.e., every 42 sec.) and previous research has shown that people are less likely to report mind-
wandering when probes occur more frequently (Seli, Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 2013). 
However, we needed to obtain a reasonable number of thought reports during a rather short 
period of time and our participants still reported decent levels of mind-wandering: thoughts 
were categorized as being off-task in about 30% of all thought probes in the second 2-back 
block, which is similar to the rates found in some real-life experience sampling studies (Kane 
et al, 2007). Also and most importantly, as both experimental groups were probed equally 
often, the critical group comparison could not have been influenced by the thought probe 
presentation frequency.  
Although we found decent levels of overall mind-wandering and a significant group 
difference in the frequency of shopping thoughts, the latter did not occur very frequently. This 
might have been due to the fact that the 2-back task kept the participants readily engaged: 
Easier tasks without a working memory component allow for more future-oriented mind-
wandering (Smallwood et al., 2009b) and one could expect to find higher levels of shopping 
thought reports during such tasks. Another possible explanation for the low frequency of goal-
related off-task thoughts might have been the shopping task’s low personal relevance. Using a 
predefined shopping list creates a well controllable experimental setting, but less controlled 
and more personally relevant materials (maybe even a self-created shopping list) might induce 
more goal-related mind-wandering. 
The increased recall performance for the IC in the second recall phase can be 
considered a Zeigarnik-like effect. The Zeigarnik Effect (Zeigarnik, 1927) describes an 
advantage of remembrance of uncompleted tasks in contrast to completed tasks. Within the 
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scope of this study’s results, the observed effect could be explained by an increased mental 
occupation with the shopping task after the interruption. Activating the goal to later complete 
the task may have increased its availability and may have led to more off-task thoughts 
concerning the uncompleted task. This may have gone along with a more persistent 
occupation with the task and could thus explain the advantage of remembrance of 
uncompleted tasks.  
 To conclude, this study extends the line of research highlighting the constructive 
nature of off-task thoughts. Mind-wandering might help people to achieve personals goals or 
plan future actions (cf. Klinger, 1999; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013), enhance creativity 
(Baird et al., 2012, but see Smeekens & Kane, 2016), and facilitate problem solving (Ruby et 
al., 2013). Additionally, we now showed that off-task thought episodes can also function in a 
goal-directed manner (e.g., for rehearsal of task goals that are known to become relevant in 
the future). A similar idea has already been pushed forward by Singer (1964) and recently by 
Cohen (2013) and the present results render empirical support to this idea. We conclude by 
pointing out that mind-wandering should not be viewed one-sidedly as only being distractive 
for the task at hand. We do acknowledge that performance often suffers when thoughts are 
off-task, but these costs of mind-wandering may be tolerable, as long as there are benefits on 
other—maybe more important or personally relevant—levels. If people are able to adjust their 
mind-wandering behavior in accordance with their current and future task goals, they may 
freely decide that remembering a shopping list in addition to one’s concurrent task is either 
worth engaging in a particularly strong goal-related task focus (cf. Rummel et al., 2016) or 
more important than some of their intervening tasks and adjust their task-focus accordingly.  
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Table 1. Multilevel logistic regression predicting shopping thoughts by the effect-coded test-
instruction condition (Level 2), time course (Level 1), and the interaction of the two. 
Predictor b SEb 95% CI Wald Z p 
test-instruction 
condition 
0.87 .40 [0.10, 1.70] 2.16 .030 
time course -0.62 .15 [-0.96, -0.37] -4.12 < .001 
test-instruction 
condition × time 
course 
0.42 .15 [0.17, 0.76] 2.81 .005 
Note. SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval. 
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Figure 1. Structure of all off-task thoughts in the second 2-back block. Shown are the 
proportions of goal-related (shopping thoughts) versus goal-unrelated off-task thoughts for the 
interrupted and the finished condition.  
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Figure 2. Time course of shopping-task related thoughts during the intervening 2-back task. 
FC = finished condition, IC = interrupted condition. Participants in both conditions showed a 
substantial amount of shopping thoughts at the beginning of the 2-back task that quickly 
decreased. However, IC participants reported some shopping thoughts almost every time they 
were probed, whereas FC participants stopped thinking about the shopping items after the 
fourth thought probe.  
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Figure 3. Mean recall performance values (i.e. number of correctly recalled items) for the two 
test-instruction conditions and recall phases. FC = finished condition, IC = interrupted 
condition. No differences between conditions are found for the first recall phase (before the 
intervening 2-back task). In the second recall phase (after the intervening 2-back task), 
participants in the IC recalled significantly more items than participants in the FC. Error bars 
depict 95% confidence intervals for the between-group comparison. 
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Abstract 
Unconscious Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis, 2004) states that thinking about a complex 
problem unconsciously can result in better solutions than conscious elaboration. We take a 
fresh look at the cognitive processes underlying “unconscious” thought by analyzing data of 
822 participants who worked on a complex apartment-evaluation task in three experiments. 
This task’s information-presentation and evaluation parts were separated by different kinds of 
filler-interval activities, which corresponded to standard conscious-thought and unconscious-
thought manipulations. Employing experience-sampling methods, we obtained thought 
reports during and after filler-interval engagement. Evidence concerning the existence of the 
Unconscious Thought Effect was mixed, with such an effect being present in the first two 
experiments only. In these experiments, we further found that less problem deliberation is 
associated with better performance on the apartment task. Interestingly, this benefit 
disappeared when we probed participants’ thoughts during the filler interval. We suggested 
that explicit thought awareness diminishes the Unconscious Thought Effect.  
 
Keywords: mind wandering; task-unrelated thought; Unconscious Thought Effect 
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A fresh look at the Unconscious Thought Effect: Using mind-wandering measures to 
investigate thought processes in decision problems with high information load 
Introduction 
Life is full of situations requiring decisions. Some of them are rather simple, others are 
rather complex. What should I make for dinner? Which college should I go to after high 
school? Should I buy this washing machine or another one? From a layman’s perspective, it 
sounds reasonable that in such situations serious, conscious deliberation should help us make 
good and satisfying choices. At the same time, other people might argue that—faced with a 
difficult decision—one should rather sleep on it, or at least stop thinking about it for a while, 
to get a fresh look at the situation. Especially for complex decisions, the Unconscious 
Thought Theory (UTT, Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) recommends 
using the latter strategy. Unconscious thought is supposed to lead to better and more 
satisfying decisions when choosing, for example, between four apartments, which are 
characterized by a multitude of attributes. In the present work, we took a closer look at 
thought processes during conscious- and supposedly unconscious-thought intervals by 
applying methods used in current mind-wandering research within a standard UTT paradigm. 
In three experiments, retrospective thought protocols as well as thought reports collected 
online via thought probes offered insights into the cognitive processes leading to decisions 
within a complex apartment-evaluation task.  
Unconscious thought, which is thought or processing in the absence of conscious 
attention being directed towards a pending problem, was proposed as a separate form of 
thought distinct from and, in specific situations, superior to conscious thought (Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006). In a typical UTT experiment, participants are introduced to several objects 
(e.g., apartments) which are characterized by a specific number of positive and negative 
attributes per object (e.g., “Apartment 1 has a balcony.”). The objectively best object 
possesses a relatively high number of positive attributes, the objectively worst object a 
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relatively high number of negative attributes. Before evaluating the objects, participants are 
presented with a distraction-task period or a period of conscious thought about the presented 
objects. Evidence for the existence of an Unconscious Thought Effect (UTE) comes in form of 
better decisions after distraction periods in complex decision-situations, that is, when objects 
are described by a high total number of attributes. According to the UTT, the power of the 
unconscious stems from its high information-processing capacity. The unconscious system is 
supposed to allow for large amounts of information to be integrated, whereas the conscious 
system suffers from a low information-processing capacity (e.g., Miller, 1956; Nørretranders, 
1998). The latter refers to task-related cognitive processes that one is consciously aware of 
during task completion and has the advantage over the unconscious system of being rule-
based and very precise (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Consequently, when faced with simple decisions, 
the conscious system’s capacity is not exceeded and our choice benefits from rule-based 
cognition. We are able to consciously process all available information, which should result in 
the best possible decision. When faced with complex decision problems, however, its low 
information-processing capacity renders the conscious system less efficient because not all 
available information can be processed simultaneously. Here, our choice should benefit from 
the ability of the unconscious system to integrate a high number of decision-relevant 
attributes. Indeed, unconscious-thought advantages are most prevalently found for complex 
decision problems (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Strick et al., 2011).  
Some assumptions of the UTT have been recently criticized and, despite many 
successful replications, the UTE, which states that unconscious thought improves decision 
making in complex problem situations, does not always replicate (e.g., Acker, 2008; Calvillo 
& Penaloza, 2009; Newell & Rakow, 2011; Rey et al., 2009). According to Strick et al. 
(2011), the debate concerning the UTE focuses on three main open questions: First, how 
stable and replicable is the UTE? Second, which boundary conditions are necessary for the 
UTE to appear? And third, what are the cognitive processes underlying periods of 
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unconscious thought (Abadie et al., 2016, 2017; Damian & Sherman, 2013; Dijkstra et al., 
2013)? Not neglecting the first two, the present work primarily addresses the third question. 
We were interested in participants’ thoughts—unconscious as well as conscious—during 
distraction periods and intended to shed light on the question of which cognitive processes 
foster decision making or attitude formation within a standard UTT paradigm. 
Schooler and Melcher (1995) suggested that incubation phases, that is phases during 
which a pending creative or complex problem is put aside to work on something else, cause a 
change of people’s “mental sets”: By doing so, one may get a fresh look at the situation, 
which eventually results in better problem solving. This view implicates a passive process of 
unconscious thought as something that “just happens” while a person is working on a 
different task. Dijksterhuis (2004) suggested that unconscious thought is rather active, as it 
renders mental representations more polarized as well as better organized and clustered. 
However, research on the UTE has been mostly output-centered so far. Measures such as 
choices, evaluations or attribute-memories have been the variables of interest used to draw 
conclusions concerning the cognitive processes during presumed unconscious-thought 
periods. For a long time, in-the-moment thought processes leading to specific manifestations 
of such output-variables have been neglected, probably because they are difficult to assess 
with standard cognitive methods, making it challenging to directly address the third main 
question (see above) raised by Strick et al. (2011). To overcome this problem, current mind-
wandering research has been applying experience-sampling methods, which have been shown 
to be a valid instrument for the assessment of participants’ thought contents during all sorts of 
tasks (see Smallwood & Schooler, 2015 for an overview). Therefore, we argue that UTT 
research can benefit from the employment of such methods as they have the potential to offer 
a “fresh look” at the cognitive processes underlying unconscious- as well as conscious-
thought periods.  
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Mind wandering can be described as disengaged or decoupled task-attention and has 
been intensively studied in recent years (Mason et al., 2007; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
Although handling many daily tasks requires our focused attention, it is a well know 
phenomenon that our thoughts drift off from time to time. Even though performance on the 
task at hand often suffers (e.g., Mrazek et al., 2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014), drifting 
thoughts also seem to be of adaptive value (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; Smallwood & 
Andrews-Hanna, 2013). For example, mind wandering towards unsolved problems or tasks 
may be beneficial for problem solution or task fulfillment (Baars, 2010; Steindorf & Rummel, 
2017). Mind wandering is typically measured via self-reports. So-called thought probes 
interrupt ongoing tasks and ask participants to briefly describe and/or classify their current 
thoughts. Responses to these probes have proven to be valid (McVay & Kane, 2012) and to be 
good estimates of mind-wandering frequency as they do not rely on thought-awareness 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Finally, they are also often found to correlate with 
retrospective thought questionnaires (e.g., Steindorf & Rummel, 2020), which are a similar, 
yet distinct mind-wandering assessment method. In such questionnaires, after task 
completion, participants are asked to categorize the entirety of thoughts they had experienced 
while working on the task into several categories. In the present experiments, online as well as 
retrospective mind-wandering self-reports were employed to measure and quantify thought-
contents occurring within a standard UTT paradigm.  
Furthermore, we considered wandering thoughts as an alternative explanation for 
UTEs. Previous research concerning the underlying cognitive processes of complex-problem 
incubation suggests that either unconscious processes or short retrieval intervals during the 
incubation task foster post-incubation performance (Abadie et al., 2016, 2017; Damian & 
Sherman, 2013; Dijkstra et al., 2013; see also Sio & Ormerod, 2009). Automatically 
occurring, drifting thoughts concerning a still pending problem might represent such short 
retrieval intervals (cf. Steindorf & Rummel, 2017): Considering a typical UTT paradigm, one 
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might argue that during the presentation of object-attribute combinations, an unsolved 
problem is activated within a participant’s cognitive system (Watkins, 2008). This activation 
might lead to an increase in mental occupation with—or mind wandering towards—the 
problem during a period of distraction (Zeigarnik, 1927). Since mind wandering might foster 
problem solving (Baars, 2010), wandering apartment-thoughts during a distraction period 
might explain increased problem-solving performance for distracted participants. Moreover, 
the idea that too much deliberation can have destructive effects (Waroquier et al., 2010) as a 
current problem might be “thought to pieces” led us to assume that mind-wandering episodes 
during distraction tasks might offer just the right amount of necessary problem engagement.  
Further support for our assumptions comes from the combination of findings that, 
during more demanding tasks, lower levels of mind wandering are reported (e.g., Rummel & 
Boywitt, 2014) and that more demanding distraction tasks within UTT paradigms often lead 
to worse problem solving compared to less demanding tasks (Abadie et al., 2013; McMahon 
et al., 2011; Strick et al., 2011; Waroquier et al., 2014). Focusing only on the latter finding, 
Strick et al. (2011) conclude that distraction tasks with high demands might compete with 
unconscious thoughts for resources. A different conclusion might refer to mind-wandering 
processes. That is, as high-demanding tasks do not leave a lot of room for mind wandering to 
occur, we assume that without this engagement in productive mind wandering towards the 
active problem, the benefit of a distraction-task period is reduced. In other words, high 
demands might compete with adaptive mind-wandering processes for attentional resources.    
Whether high demands compete with unconscious-thought or with mind-wandering 
processes, both lines of argumentation suggest that during distraction tasks we allocate 
attentional resources towards a second ongoing cognitive process, contradicting the definition 
of unconscious thought as being deliberation-without-attention (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). 
Waroquier et al. (2014) offer a solution for this dilemma by considering that attention and 
consciousness are not identical to each other. One can allocate cognitive resources towards 
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the processing of specific information (attention) without being aware of the process 
(consciousness, or meta-awareness as it is often termed in the mind-wandering literature). For 
this reason, Strick et al. (2011) suggested replacing the term deliberation-without-attention 
with the term deliberation-without-consciousness. Concerning mind wandering, it is found 
that off-task thoughts occur with and without awareness (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
Sometimes we know and “feel” that our minds are drifting off, sometimes we might realize 
that we have been pondering tonight’s dinner plans only when asked about our current 
thoughts. However, although at times we are not aware of our thoughts at the exact moment 
they are occupying our minds, we are able to put these thoughts into words later, suggesting 
that we have nevertheless allocated attentional resources towards them. During distraction-
task periods within UTT experiments, aware as well as unaware cognitive processes could 
foster problem solving. Our thoughts might wander towards the still active, unsolved 
problem, with or without awareness. Attention-demanding, but unaware wandering thoughts 
might be what is referred to as “unconscious” in UTT. In the present work, using self-report 
methods, we intended to bring wandering thoughts into awareness by directly asking 
participants about their current thought processes. Especially thought probes, which do not 
rely on thought awareness, could reveal themselves as a promising method for gaining insight 
into the actual attentional processes occurring during distraction-task periods. That is, 
participants might experience a compound of aware and unaware problem-related mind 
wandering, which we intend to capture and to relate to problem-solving abilities. 
In the following sections, we describe three experiments, in which we hypothesize 
UTEs to be mirrored by changes in mind-wandering behavior. More precisely, we expected 
the amount of apartment-thoughts during distraction-task incubation phases (i.e., typical 
unconscious-thought phases) to be related to post-incubation performance. In the first 
experiment, we relied on retrospective mind-wandering questionnaires for a first insight into 
participants’ thought processes during periods of distraction and conscious thought. In the 
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second experiment, additional thought probes were employed to capture in-the-moment 
thoughts including unaware processes. The third experiment was conducted to take a closer 
look at awareness processes in UTT paradigms including thought probes. We first describe 
our general methods and plan of analyses before attending to the respective experiments. 
General Methods and Plan of Analyses 
In all following Methods and Results sections, we report how we determined our 
sample sizes and all data exclusions, manipulations, and measures in the study (Simmons et 
al., 2012). Following the recommendations of Seli et al. (2018), we conceptualized mind 
wandering as task-unrelated thought and explained the concept to our participants 
accordingly. We named experimental conditions in which participants were instructed to think 
about previously presented objects during a filler interval conscious thought conditions. 
Experimental conditions in which participants worked on a distraction task during a filler 
interval were named unconscious thought conditions. These labels refer to the standard 
thought-mode manipulations from the UTT literature and do not imply participants’ actual 
mode of thought, as the latter represents a to-be-examined variable in the reported 
experiments. Our data are available under https://osf.io/4375q/ (doi: 
10.17605/OSF.IO/4375Q). 
Instruments 
Apartment Task  
In all three experiments, we used a German version of an apartment task1 originally 
developed by Dijksterhuis (2004) to assess participants’ problem solving abilities in situations 
with high information load. Participants of this task are presented with information about four 
apartments. Imagining being on apartment hunt, they are supposed to familiarize themselves 
                                                          
1 We thank Arndt Bröder and his lab at the University of Mannheim, Germany for sharing 
their materials as well as their expertise concerning the implementation of the apartment task 
with us.  
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with and to visualize all apartments so that they will later be able to choose the best one. Each 
apartment is characterized by twelve attributes in total. The objectively best apartment is 
described by eight positive (e.g. “Apartment B has a balcony.”) and four negative (e.g. 
“Apartment B does not have a washing machine.”) attributes. The objectively worst apartment 
is described by eight negative and four positive attributes. The remaining two neutral 
apartments are described by six positive and six negative attributes each. For each apartment, 
attributes are assigned randomly from a list of twelve positive and twelve negative attributes 
with the only restriction being the number of positive/negative attributes. Apartment 
characteristics that are most essential in apartment-hunt situations (rental cost, apartment size, 
etc.) are not considered in the attribute list, so that they cannot overshadow other, 
intermediately essential, characteristics. The apartment task is typically divided into two 
phases, namely a presentation and an evaluation phase, which are separated by a filler 
interval. In the present studies’ presentation phases, the 48 apartment-attribute combinations 
were displayed sequentially and randomly intermixed for four seconds each, resulting in a 
total presentation time of 192 sec. In the later evaluation phases, participants were asked to 
indicate their attitude towards each of the apartments on a scale from one (extremely negative) 
to ten (extremely positive).  
Filler Interval Activity 
In the present experiments, two versions of the n-back task were used as distraction 
tasks within the filler interval between the apartment task’s two phases. In the n-back task, 
single letters are displayed consecutively. Participants of this task are supposed to press one 
key when the currently presented letter matches the one presented n trials earlier (target 
trials). For all other letters (non-target trials), they are supposed to press another key.  
For the present implementations of this task, 20 different letters (B C D F G H J K L 
M N P Q R S T V W Y Z) were used and presented for 500 ms each in the center of the screen 
with a 300-ms inter-stimulus interval. Participants always performed one block of the n-back 
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task consisting of 32 non-target and 16 target trials. The B-key was used as the response key 
for non-targets and was labeled with a red sticker. The green-labeled C-key was used as the 
target key. In the conditions with demanding distraction n equaled three, resulting in more 
letters to be constantly monitored compared to the conditions with undemanding distraction, 
in which n equaled one. Including one short introduction screen, the distraction task lasted 
approximately three min. Instead of working on a distraction task, the participants in the 
conscious thought conditions were asked to consciously think about their attitudes towards 
four previously presented apartments for three minutes during the filler interval. 
Retrospective Thought Assessment 
To assess the amounts of task-related and task-unrelated thoughts during the filler 
interval, participants of all three experiments were asked to retrospectively categorize the 
entirety of thoughts they had experienced during this interval into several categories using 
percentage scores. Participants in the conscious-thought conditions were given two response 
categories: (1) thoughts about the apartment task and (2) thoughts about something 
completely unrelated. In addition to these categories, participants in all other conditions, that 
is conditions including an n-back distraction-task, were asked to indicate the percentage of (3) 
thoughts about the distraction task and (4) thoughts about their performance on the distraction 
task. For all participants, category (2) corresponded to general off-task thoughts and was 
explained accordingly using multiple examples. For conscious-thought participants, category 
(1) corresponded to on-task thoughts. For all other participants, category (1) corresponded to a 
special kind of off-task thoughts and category (3) to on-task thoughts. Category (4) described 
task-related interferences.  
General Procedure 
The general procedure (excluding instructions and practice) is illustrated in Figure 1. 
At the beginning of each experiment, participants signed a consent form and provided 
demographic information. Afterwards, all participants received instructions for a distraction 
THE NATURE OF THE WANDERING MIND  A3-13 
 
task they would have to perform later. They were then presented with the to-be evaluated 
apartments. The apartment task’s presentation phase was followed by a filler interval that 
differed between conditions and experiments. Next, participants indicated their attitudes 
towards the previously presented apartments in the evaluation phase. Finally, participants’ 
thought contents during the filler interval were retrospectively assessed, before participants 
were debriefed and dismissed. Detailed procedure descriptions for each experiment are 
provided below. 
General Plan of Analyses 
In all three reported experiments, we realized a conscious thought and several 
unconscious thought conditions, which differed with regard to the filler interval activities and 
thought assessment methods. We employed a consistent plan of analyses for all experiments 
regarding the main dependent variables, which were apartment-task performance, amounts of 
apartment-related thoughts during the filler interval, and amounts of task-unrelated thoughts 
during the filler interval. We always first ran a one-factorial ANOVA with the experimental 
condition as fixed factor testing for overall group differences. We then conducted follow-up 
analyses using Helmert contrasts, for which the first contrast always tested for an overall UTE 
and the following contrast(s) for the experiment-specific manipulations within the 
unconscious thought conditions. When necessary, we finally conducted additional simple 
comparisons to further disentangle significant effects.  
General Measures 
The performance on the distraction task (n-back) was defined in terms of the 
sensitivity index d′. The performance on the apartment task was defined as the difference in 
the subjective attitude values between the objectively best and worst apartment (see for 
example Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). Higher values thus represent a 
better performance. The amounts of retrospectively reported task-unrelated and apartment-
related thought during the filler interval were specified using percentage scores. Thoughts that 
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were completely unrelated to any of the study’s tasks and thus corresponded to response 
category (2) were considered as task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) in all analyses. Thoughts that 
were related to the apartment task (response category (1)) were considered as apartment 
thoughts (ATs). Thoughts about the distraction task itself and the performance on this task are 
both distraction-task-related. Because they directly result from TUTs and ATs ((%distraction-task-
related thoughts = 100 % - (%TUTs + %ATs)) and because the latter two were our variables of 
interest, we only analyzed TUTs and ATs. 
Experiment 1 
We ran the first experiment to establish the apartment-task paradigm and to gain initial 
insights into thought processes during conscious and unconscious thought filler intervals. For 
this purpose, we employed a standard UTT experiment, in which one group of participants 
was supposed to consciously think about previously presented apartments before evaluating 
them. Two other groups worked on a distraction task instead during the filler interval. To 
additionally examine the influence of the distraction task’s difficulty on thought reports as 
well as the apartment-task performance, we employed both an undemanding and a demanding 
version of the distraction task. In Experiment 1, retrospective thought reports were supposed 
to provide insights into participant’s cognitive processes leading to the solution of the 
apartment problem. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
An a-priori power analysis with the software G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) was 
conducted to determine the required sample size for the planned contrast analysis central to 
our hypotheses that would allow to reveal medium-size effects with an α = 5% and 1-β = 
80%. This analysis suggested a required sample-size of at least N = 128. To cover for 
potential drop-outs, we tested a total of 153 participants at Heidelberg University, Germany in 
groups no larger than six. Data of five participants were excluded due to poor performance on 
THE NATURE OF THE WANDERING MIND  A3-15 
 
the distraction task (d′ < 0). Comparing these participants’ performances to the non-excluded 
participants’ good performances (mean d′ = 1.99 for the demanding distraction task, mean d′ 
= 3.00 for the undemanding distraction task), we assumed that the excluded participants did 
not pay sufficient attention to the distraction task, potentially changing their mind-wandering 
behavior and/or influencing possible unconscious thought processes. Another three 
participants’ data were excluded due to missing values on at least one of the dependent 
variables of interest. Missing values resulted from participants not properly filling out the 
though-assessment questionnaire or the apartment evaluation. Analyses were thus executed 
with N = 145 (Mage = 21.82, SDage = 3.96; 123 female). We employed a one-factorial design 
with thought condition being manipulated between participants: conscious thought (n = 48), 
unconscious thought with demanding distraction (n = 49), and unconscious thought with 
undemanding distraction (n = 48). 
Procedure 
The three experimental conditions differed regarding the filler interval activity. 
Accordingly, at the beginning of the experiment, the participants in the unconscious thought 
condition with demanding distraction received instructions for the 3-back task and were 
presented with practice trials. The participants in the unconscious thought condition with 
undemanding distraction and in the conscious thought condition (to keep the procedure equal 
for all conditions) read instructions for and practiced the 1-back task. Having finished the 
practice trials, all participants were told that they would later work on more trials of the task. 
For the current moment, however, they would work on a different task. All participants were 
instructed regarding the apartment task and the presentation of apartment-attribute 
combinations started. After the apartment task’s presentation phase, the participants in both 
unconscious thought conditions worked on the respective version of the distraction task while 
participants in the conscious thought condition were asked to actively think about their 
attitude concerning all previously presented apartments. Then, in the evaluation phase of the 
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apartment task, all participants indicated their attitude towards each of the presented 
apartments. Finally, they filled out the retrospective thought-assessment questionnaire. 
Results 
Distraction-Task Performance 
The performance in the condition with a demanding distraction task (3-back, M = 
1.99, SD = 0.70) was significantly worse than the performance in the condition with an 
undemanding distraction task (1-back, M = 3.00, SD = 0.66), t(95) = 7.37, p < .001, d = 1.50, 
reflecting the fact that the demanding task was more difficult than the undemanding one.   
Apartment-Task Performance 
As illustrated in Figure 2a, there was a marginally significant difference between the 
three experimental conditions regarding the apartment-task performance, F(2, 142) = 2.96, p 
< .055, η2p = .04. Helmert contrasts indicated an UTE. That is, performance was generally 
worse in the conscious thought condition compared to the two unconscious thought 
conditions, p < .022. Between the two unconscious thought conditions, the apartment-task 
performance did not differ, p = .451. Thus, employing a distraction task during the filler 
interval, regardless of this task’s difficulty, fostered participants’ problem solving abilities in 
comparison to those participants who actively thought about the problem during the filler 
interval. 
Retrospective Thought Reports  
The amount of TUTs (see Figure 2a) differed significantly between the three 
experimental conditions, F(2, 142) = 50.58, p < .001, η2p = .42. Helmert contrasts showed that 
the percentage of TUTs in the conscious thought condition was generally higher than in the 
two unconscious thought conditions, p < .001. Between the two unconscious thought 
conditions the percentage of TUTs only differed marginally, p = .097, with a numerically 
higher number in the condition with undemanding distraction (cf. Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). 
The amount of ATs (see Figure 2a) also varied with experimental conditions, F(2, 142) = 
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99.59, p < .001, η2p = .58. Helmert contrasts indicated that there were more ATs in the 
conscious thought condition than in the two unconscious thought conditions, p < .001. The 
percentage of ATs in the undemanding unconscious thought condition was still higher than in 
the demanding unconscious thought condition, p = .046. That is, participants in the conscious 
thought condition thought about the apartments for roughly half of the time. During the other 
half, they thought about unrelated matters. Participants in both unconscious thought 
conditions spent the majority of their filler interval time thinking about the distraction task. 
However, there was still room for TUTs and ATs, especially for participants working on the 
undemanding task. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we established the apartment task paradigm producing an UTE. This 
effect was independent of the distraction task’s difficulty, although thought patterns differed 
between both unconscious thought groups. Overall, distracted participants, who reported 
lower levels of ATs, performed better on the apartment task. Moreover, conscious-thought 
participants, who showed the highest levels of apartment thought, performed worse on the 
apartment task. Using mind-wandering-assessment methods, we were able to demonstrate that 
a distraction task does not leave a lot of room for deliberation about the apartment-task 
problem. Hinting towards a competition for attentional resources of task-related and adaptive-
mind-wandering processes, we found the lowest levels of ATs for participants in the 
demanding distraction condition. We had additionally expected worse problem-solving 
performance for participants in this condition as a result of this competition. However, 
participants in the demanding condition did not perform worse on the apartment task, 
challenging our assumptions about apartment-related mind wandering being an alternative 
explanation for the UTE. Still, because all participants working on any kind of a distraction 
task showed lower levels of ATs as well as a better apartment task performance than 
conscious-thought participants, the possibility remains that the unconscious thought 
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conditions fostered “just the right amount” of ATs, which may be necessary and sufficient for 
a good apartment task performance.        
Participants in the conscious thought condition indicated high levels of general TUTs. 
They only spent about half of the filler-interval time thinking about the apartments, which was 
their actual task. This finding might indicate that the filler interval was too long, so that 
participants had too much time and “thought the apartment problem to pieces.” Thus, a 
possible alternative explanation for our findings might be that unconscious thoughts, or fewer 
apartment thoughts, do not generally lead to better evaluations. Rather, too intensive 
conscious thought about the apartment problem may have had destructive effects on the 
apartment task solution.  
Experiment 2 
In the second experiment, we included an additional baseline condition to better be 
able to interpret the effects of conscious thought manipulations. In this condition, participants 
did not have time to consciously (or unconsciously) think about the previously presented 
apartments before evaluating them. The objective was to investigate whether a high amount of 
ATs in the conscious thought condition would result in poorer apartment-task performance 
due to overthinking compared to no ATs in a condition without a filler interval.  
Apart from including this new condition, the structure of Experiment 2 resembled the 
first experiment’s structure with unconscious thought conditions differing in task demands for 
the distraction task. Additionally, to examine thought processes in the exact moment they are 
happening and to capture possible unaware processes, we employed online thought probes 
during the filler interval. As stated in the introduction section, thought probes are frequently 
used in mind-wandering experiments and interrupt participants who are working on a task by 
asking them to briefly describe and/or classify their current thoughts’ content. Another 
advantage is that they do not rely on thought awareness (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), so 
that they might be able to capture thought processes that participants are unaware of, which 
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possibly are not captured as well by retrospective thought reports. Thought probes proved to 
be reasonably valid mind-wandering indicators (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2012) and do not 
interfere with performance on ongoing cognitive tasks (Wiemers & Redick, 2019). Yet, it 
may well be that asking participants to report on their thoughts during the filler interval might 
disrupt unconscious thought processes. For this purpose, we additionally employed a 
condition without such task-interruptions to control for possible reactive effects on apartment-
task performance. Furthermore, such a condition ensures comparability with regard to 
Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
In groups of up to six, we tested 152 participants at Heidelberg University, Germany, 
and 162 participants at Mannheim University, Germany, ensuring that participants had not 
participated in Experiment 1 and that group sizes were comparable to those in Experiment 1. 
Data of seven participants were discarded due to poor performance (d′ < 0) in the distraction 
task (to compare, means for the non-excluded participants, d′ = 2.14 for the demanding 
distraction task, d′ = 2.89 for the undemanding distraction task). Another four participants’ 
data were excluded due to missing values on at least one of the dependent variables of 
interest. Analyses were thus executed with N = 303 (Mage = 22.78, SDage = 4.06; 219 female). 
We employed a one-factorial design with the thought condition being manipulated between 
participants (immediate evaluation (n = 59), conscious thought (n = 61), and three 
unconscious thought conditions: demanding distraction with thought probes (n = 60), 
undemanding distraction with thought probes (n = 60), undemanding distraction without 
thought probes (n = 63)). 
Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, we employed the procedure outlined in the General Procedure 
section with the experimental conditions differing regarding the filler interval activity. We 
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used a 1-back task as the filler interval distraction task for the two unconscious thought 
conditions with undemanding distraction and a 3-back task for the unconscious thought 
condition with demanding distraction. While working on these tasks, the participants in the 
conditions including thought probes were interrupted after each sequence of 12 trials 
(resulting in a total of four thought probes) and asked about their current thoughts. They were 
supposed to categorize their current thoughts’ content as being n-back-task-related, related to 
their performance on the n-back task, related to the apartment task, or unrelated to any task in 
the current study. Participants in the conscious thought condition were supposed to actively 
think about their attitude towards all previously presented apartments during the filler interval.  
Having been presented with distraction-task instructions, the apartment task’s 
presentation phase, the filler interval activity, and the apartment task’s evaluation phase in this 
order, participants were asked about their thoughts during the filler interval. We employed the 
same retrospective thought-assessment questionnaire as in Experiment 1, but for Heidelberg 
participants only. We decided to include this questionnaire on short notice at a time point at 
which data collection was already ongoing in Mannheim. The participants in the conscious 
thought condition filled out the version with two response options, that is, (1) thoughts about 
the apartment task, and (2) thoughts about something completely unrelated. The participants 
in all other conditions filled out the version with four response options, that is, (1), (2) as well 
as (3) thoughts about the distraction task, and (4) thoughts about their performance on the 
distraction task.  
The participants in the immediate-evaluation condition worked on the individual parts 
of the experiment in a different order. They were asked to indicate their attitude towards each 
of the presented apartments directly after the presentation phase of the apartment task. That is, 
for these participants there was no filler interval between the apartment task’s two phases. 
After completing the evaluation phase, they worked on the 1-back version of the n-back task 
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including thought probes and filled in the retrospective thought-assessment questionnaire 
afterwards.  
Results  
Immediate Evaluation Condition 
To keep the main analyses comparable between all experiments, we prepend all 
analyses concerning the immediate evaluation condition. Our main objective for including 
this condition was to test whether a large amount of ATs in the conscious thought condition 
would result in poorer apartment-task performance due to overthinking compared to no ATs 
in the immediate evaluation condition, but this was not the case. Both conditions showed a 
comparable apartment-task performance (see Figure 2b), t(118) = 1.00, p = .321, d = 0.18. 
Furthermore, we found that there was no significant difference between the unconscious 
thought conditions and the immediate evaluation condition regarding the apartment-task 
performance, all ps > .149. That is, a 3-min distraction interval within the apartment task 
paradigm did not result in better apartment evaluations compared to evaluations submitted 
right after apartment presentation.  
When additionally comparing the immediate evaluation condition to the unconscious 
thought conditions with undemanding distraction (because participants in these conditions 
worked on the same task (1-back) as immediate-evaluation participants) concerning filler-
interval measures, we neither found significant group differences regarding the distraction 
task performance (all ps > .324) nor did we find any significant differences regarding online 
as well as retrospective TUTs (all ps > .418). However, we found more ATs (online as well as 
retrospective) for participants in the unconscious thought conditions compared to those in the 
immediate evaluation condition, (all ps < .043). Participants who performed the distraction 
task after the apartment task was finished showed fewer ATs than participants who performed 
it before they made their apartment judgments. This pattern could be interpreted as a 
Zeigarnik-like effect (Zeigarnik, 1927). 
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Distraction-Task Performance 
The performance on the distraction task varied between experimental conditions, F(2, 
180) = 18.15, p < .001, η2p = .17. Helmert contrasts revealed that the performance in the 
unconscious thought condition with a demanding (3-back) distraction task (M = 2.14, SD = 
0.86)) differed significantly from the performance in the unconscious thought conditions with 
an undemanding (1-back) distraction task, p < .001. Performance between the undemanding-
distraction condition without thought probes (M = 2.90, SD = 0.68) and that with thought 
probes (M = 2.82, SD = 0.76) did not differ, p = .570. As in Experiment 1, performance on the 
demanding distraction task was worse than on the undemanding one. The presence of thought 
probes did not affect distraction task performance.   
Apartment-Task Performance 
Performance on the apartment task (see Figure 2b) varied with experimental 
conditions, F(3, 240) = 3.011, p < .031, η2p = .04. The first Helmert contrast (conscious 
thought versus the three unconscious thought conditions) did not indicate an UTE, p = .515. 
That is, participants who performed a distraction task during the filler interval did not 
generally perform better than participants who consciously thought about the apartment 
problem during the filler interval. Further comparing the three unconscious thought conditions 
with each other, we found that participants who worked on the demanding version of the 
distraction task achieved a similar apartment-task performance as participants who worked on 
the undemanding distraction task, p = .128. When comparing both undemanding distraction 
conditions, we found that participants who were not probed while working on the distraction 
task performed better than those who were probed, p = .014. Finally, employing simple 
contrasts to compare the conscious thought conditions with each of the unconscious-thought 
conditions, we found an UTE for the condition with undemanding distraction without thought 
probes only, p = .026, both other ps > .725 . This patter suggests that unconscious thought 
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participants whose thoughts were not probed during the filler interval found better solutions to 
the apartment problem than participants who consciously thought about the apartments. 
Retrospective Thought Reports 
As in Experiment 1, we analyzed TUTs and ATs as reported in the retrospective 
questionnaires (see Figure 2b). Because we had retrospective thought data available for the 
Heidelberg participants only, we ran the analyses with N = 116. The amount of TUTs differed 
significantly between the experimental conditions, F(3, 112) = 40.47, p < .001, η2p = .52. 
Helmert contrasts revealed that conscious thought participants reported more TUTs than 
participants in the unconscious thought conditions, p < .001. Participants who had worked on 
the demanding distraction task showed fewer TUTs than participants who had worked on the 
undemanding distraction task, p = .006. Undemanding distraction-task participants who had 
received thought probes showed similar levels of TUTs as participants who did not receive 
any thought probes, p = .407.  
Regarding the amount of ATs, there was a significant difference between the 
experimental conditions, F(3, 112) = 25.92, p < .001, η2p = .41. Helmert contrasts showed that 
more ATs were reported in the conscious thought condition than in the unconscious thought 
conditions, p < .001. Participants who had performed the demanding distraction task showed 
fewer ATs than participants who had performed the undemanding distraction task, p = .014. 
Moreover, undemanding-distraction participants, who had received thought probes while 
working on the distraction task, showed similar levels of ATs as participants who did not 
receive thought probes, p = .732.  
These findings suggest that conscious thought participants had followed our 
instructions to consciously think about the apartments. However, they only did so for roughly 
40 percent of the time. The high demands of the 3-back task almost entirely kept participants 
in the demanding unconscious thought condition from thinking about the apartments and 
unrelated matters whereas participants in both undemanding unconscious thought conditions 
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still thought about the apartments and other issues from time to time. Thought probes had no 
influence on reported thoughts. 
Online Thought Reports  
The amounts of online reported TUTs and ATs were defined as the sum of thought 
probes in which participants self-categorized their thoughts as being task-unrelated or 
apartment-related, respectively. Unconscious-thought participants who had performed the 
demanding 3-back version of the distraction task (M = 0.42, SD = 0.59) reported significantly 
fewer TUTs than unconscious-thought participants who had performed the undemanding 1-
back version (M = 1.17, SD = 1.04), t(118) = -4.84, p < .001, d = -0.88. The same pattern was 
found for ATs, with a fewer ATS for participants who had worked on the demanding version 
(M = 0.18, SD = 0.43) compared to those who had worked on the undemanding version of the 
distraction task (M = 0.46, SD = 0.67), t(118) = -2.90, p = .004, d = -0.53. Overall, patterns of 
online thought reports mirrored retrospective thought reports patterns. Even numerically, 
percentages of TUTs and ATs were very similar whether measured by online or by 
retrospective methods2.    
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we found an UTE only for participants who did not receive thought 
probes while performing the distraction task during the filler interval. These participants 
performed better in the apartment-task than participants who consciously thought about the 
apartments during the filler interval. They also retrospectively reported less apartment-related 
thoughts compared to conscious thought participants, replicating the findings from 
Experiment 1. The second experiment’s results also ruled out the possibility that conscious 
                                                          
2 Calculating percentages from the total values yielded 10.50 % TUTs and 4.50 % ATs out of 
100% for participants in the condition with demanding distraction including thought probes. 
In the condition with undemanding distraction, 29.25 % TUTs and 11.50 % ATs were 
reported. 
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thought participants might overthink the apartment problem, as they did not perform worse 
than participants who were not given time to consciously or unconsciously think about the 
apartments before evaluating them.  
In Experiment 2, we validated the retrospective thought reports employed in 
Experiment 1. Thought probes provided similar thought descriptions as retrospective 
questionnaires. This finding suggests that after and during task completion, participants seem 
to be well aware of their recent thought processes. Because thought probes were found to be 
valid mind-wandering-frequency indicators (McVay & Kane, 2012) which do not rely on 
thought awareness because they capture participants’ thoughts in the moment they are 
happening (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), we conclude that we might have captured a 
compound of aware as well as unaware wandering thoughts. A distinction between the two 
kinds of mind-wandering assessment might be that retrospective reports were not intrusive, 
due to them capturing mind wandering after distraction-task completion, that is, without 
interfering with any thought processes during the task. Thought probes, however, might have 
altered participants’ thought experiences during the distraction task by bringing the unaware 
portions of the thought compound into awareness. 
Unexpectedly, we found that the UTE disappeared when we employed thought probes 
during the filler interval, leading us to assume a detrimental nature of such probes to the 
processes producing the UTE. It has already been found that changing thought-probe 
characteristics within mind-wandering experiments can lead to differences in results (Robison 
et al., 2019; Seli et al., 2013; Weinstein et al., 2018), which made it reasonable to assume that 
the mere presence of thought probes might have interfered with (unconscious) thoughts for at 
least two reasons (Steindorf et al., under review): One reason could be that thought probes 
may have interrupted the ongoing task and thereby ongoing (unconscious) thought processes. 
Alternatively or additionally, thought probes may have made participants more aware of their 
current states of thought during the distraction task, whereas an absence of thought awareness 
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might be a necessary criterion for an UTE to appear. To test these two competing assumptions 
and to further replicate the negative association between AT-levels and apartment-task 
performance, we conducted a third experiment.      
Experiment 3 
In the third experiment our aim was to, once more, replicate the UTE and its negative 
association with the number of ATs. For this reason, we included the same conscious thought 
condition as well as the same unconscious thought condition (undemanding distraction task 
without thought probes) as in the first and second experiments. To take a closer look at the 
effect of thought probes on thought processes as well as on apartment-task performance, we 
included one condition with an undemanding distraction task and thought probes (see 
Experiment 2) and one new condition in which participants were only interrupted during the 
undemanding distraction task, but not asked about their current thoughts. If mere interruption 
was responsible for the lack of an UTE when including thought probes as found in 
Experiment 2, the UTE should be absent in this condition. If, however, thought awareness 
was a necessary condition for the effect to vanish, we would expect a better apartment-task 
performance in this condition compared to both the condition including regular thought 
probes and the conscious thought condition. A lack of thought awareness as a necessary 
condition for the UTE would further support the assumption of a deliberation-without-
consciousness effect (Strick et al., 2011). Thought probes might add consciousness/awareness 
to the deliberation part, diminishing its beneficial effect on problem solving performance.    
Method 
Participants and Design  
In groups of up to six, we tested 289 participants at Heidelberg University, Germany, 
and 108 participants at the University of Mannheim, Germany. To be able to calculate 
correlations between AT-levels and apartment-task performance within experimental 
conditions, we substantially increased the group sizes for this experiment. Participants of 
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Experiment 3 had not taken part in Experiment 1 and 2. Data of one participant were 
discarded due to poor performance (d′ < 0) in the distraction task (to compare, mean for the 
non-excluded participants, d′ = 3.07). Another five participants’ data were excluded because 
they were handed out no or a wrong retrospective thought-assessment questionnaire. Yet 
another 17 participants’ data were excluded due to missing values on at least one of the 
dependent variables of interest. Analyses were thus executed with N = 374 (Mage = 21.64, 
SDage = 3.19; 292 female). We employed a one-factorial design with the thought condition3 
being manipulated between participants. We had a conscious thought (n = 96) and three 
different unconscious thought conditions with undemanding distraction: one without thought 
probes (n = 92), one with thought probes (N = 94), and one with trivia probes (n = 92). 
Procedure 
We adhered to the general procedure and implemented the differences between 
experimental conditions within the filler interval as follows: We employed the 1-back version 
of the n-back task as the filler interval distraction task for all three unconscious thought 
conditions. The two conditions with and without thought probes were equivalent to those 
employed in Experiment 2. Instead of being presented with thought probes, participants in the 
trivia-probe condition were presented with a trivia question after each sequence of 12 trials 
                                                          
3
 While running the experiment, we added a fifth condition and collected data from 42 
additional participants in this condition with modified thought probes. Only slightly deviating 
from the procedure with regular thought probes, participants in the condition with modified 
thought probes were supposed to categorize their current thoughts’ content as being task-
related (related to the 1-back task), related to their task performance, or task-unrelated. That 
is, we did not mention the apartment task in any of the response options to the modified 
thought probes. This group’s data (apartment-task performance (M = 3.00, SD = 0.61), TUTs 
(M = 18.64, SD = 16.54), ATs (M = 9.83, SD = 11.84)) will not be further considered, because 
it did not deviate from the regular online thought-probe condition and we thus would not have 
gained any new insights from adding it to our design.    
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(as was the case for the thought probes). Each trivia question had four response options, only 
one of which was correct (e.g., Who wrote the fantasy novels “Lord of the Rings”? (1) John 
Ronald Reul Tolkien (2) Joanna Kathleen Rowling (3) Pete Johnson (4) Jeff Kinney). As in 
the previous experiments, participants in the conscious thought condition were supposed to 
actively think about their attitude toward all previously presented apartments during the filler 
interval.  
Having been presented with instructions, the apartment task’s presentation phase, the 
filler interval activity, and the apartment task’s evaluation phase in this order, participants 
were asked about their thoughts during the filler interval. We employed the same 
retrospective thought-assessment questionnaire as in Experiments 1 and 2. The participants in 
the conscious thought condition filled in the version with two response options, that is, (1) 
thoughts about the apartment task, (2) thoughts about something completely unrelated. The 
participants in all other conditions filled in the version with four response options, that is, (1), 
(2), (3) thoughts about the distraction task, and (4) thoughts about their performance on the 
distraction task.  
Results 
Distraction-Task Performance  
All unconscious thought conditions featured the same 1-back distraction task in 
Experiment 3. As expected, there was no significant difference between the unconscious 
thought conditions concerning the performance on the distraction task, F(2, 275) = 1.26, p < 
.29, η2p = .009. 
Apartment-Task Performance 
There was no significant main effect of the experimental condition for the 
performance on the apartment task (see Figure 2c), F(3, 370) = 0.38, p = .765, η2p = .00. 
Simple contrasts further indicated that performance in each unconscious thought condition 
was comparable to the performance in the conscious thought condition, all ps > .343. 
THE NATURE OF THE WANDERING MIND  A3-29 
 
Retrospective thought reports 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we analyzed TUTs and ATs as reported on the 
retrospective questionnaires (see Figure 2c). The amount of TUTs during the filler interval 
varied between experimental conditions, F(3, 370) = 41.94, p < .001, η2p = .25. The first 
Helmert contrast indicated that the percentage of TUTs was higher in the conscious thought 
condition compared to all three unconscious thought conditions, p < .001. Further comparing 
the unconscious thought conditions with each other, we found that participants who had 
received thought probes reported higher levels of TUTs than participants who had received 
trivia probes or no thought probes, p < .001. The latter two conditions did not differ from each 
other concerning the amount of TUTs, p = .649. 
The amount of ATs also varied between experimental conditions, F(3, 370) = 228.70, 
p < .001, η2p = .65. Helmert contrasts indicated higher AT levels in the conscious thought 
compared to all other conditions, p < .001, but no differences between thought-probed, trivia-
probed and unprobed unconscious-thought conditions, all ps > .122. 
Online Thought Reports 
Thought probes were employed in one condition only. Participants reported 
numerically similar levels of TUTs (M = 1.22, SD = 1.01) and ATs (M = 0.38, SD = 0.55) as 
in the corresponding condition in Experiment 2.  
Correlational Analyses 
To more directly test for a relation between ATs during the filler interval and later 
apartment-task performance, we correlated these measures within conditions. Retrospectively 
reported ATs did not correlate with the apartment-task performance in any of the 
experimental conditions, all ps > .242.  
Discussion 
In Experiment 3, we did not replicate the UTE, which we had previously found in both 
Experiments 1 and 2. In addition, comparisons of apartment-task performance between the 
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unconscious thought conditions were not conclusive. We did not replicate the detrimental 
effect that thought probes had had in Experiment 2. Consequently, we cannot draw any 
conclusions concerning a lack of thought awareness as a necessary criterion for the UTE to 
appear. However, thought probes had an influence on retrospectively reported general TUTs, 
with more wandering thoughts found in participants who had been explicitly asked about their 
state of thought compared to participants whose thoughts had not been probed. This influence 
of thought probes goes beyond mere interruption, because participants who were merely 
interrupted did not show such increased levels of TUTs. One could speculate that the online 
thought probes made participants more aware of mind wandering instances during the 
distraction task which, in turn, resulted in higher levels of retrospectively reported TUTs. 
Joined Analysis of the Unconscious Thought Effect 
Having employed the same conscious thought and the same unconscious thought 
(undemanding distraction without thought probes) condition in all three experiments allowed 
us to collapse the data for these conditions to conduct a joined analysis of the UTE with N = 
408 (nconscious = 205, nunconscious = 203). We ran a 2 (experimental conditions) x 3 (experiments) 
ANOVA for the apartment-task performance, which revealed no significant main effect of 
experiment, F(2, 402) = 1.23, p = .295, η2p = .01, but a significant effect of experimental 
condition, F(1, 402) = 4.33, p = .038, η2p = .01, suggesting that, overall, there was an UTE: 
Participants in the unconscious thought condition (M = 2.73, SD = 2.69) performed better on 
the apartment task than participants in the conscious thought condition (M = 2.33, SD = 2.66), 
which equates to a small effect with a Cohen’s d of .15. Notably, the interaction was 
significant, F(2, 402) = 3.42, p = .034, η2p = .02, bolstering the cross experimental observation 
that the UTE was, at least tentatively, present in Experiments 1 and 2, ps ≤ .09,  but not in 
Experiment 3, p = .345.   
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General Discussion 
Unconscious Thought Effect 
 Making tough decisions without any cognitive effort sounds like a good deal. Because 
of this obvious appeal, the UTT has been extensively studied. A meta-analysis by Strick et al. 
(2011) identified the UTE as a real effect, which is, however, moderated by many factors such 
as distraction-task features, problem-presentation features, and filler-interval length. A later 
meta-analysis by Nieuwenstein et al. (2015) heavily criticized the UTT, stating that there 
exists no support for its notions. Adding to this ongoing discussion, we ran three experiments 
with the goal to get a fresh look at the UTE and its underlying cognitive processes. Overall, in 
our joined analysis, we found an UTE of a small effect size. However, even though we 
employed similar methods in all three experiments, our findings were still mixed. An UTE 
was present in Experiments 1 and 2, but absent in Experiment 3. The possibility remains that 
due to Type II errors this is a natural occurrence when running nearly the same experiment 
repeatedly.  
 However, furthermore speaking against the UTT, we found that unconscious thought 
participants did not produce better apartment evaluations compared to immediate-evaluation 
participants in Experiment 2. As for example Waroquier et al. (2010) stated, it might be just 
as good to trust your first intuition as to think unconsciously. Also, thinking consciously did 
not benefit (nor harm) apartment evaluations when taking immediate evaluations as a 
baseline, suggesting that it might indeed be the most efficient strategy to „just trust your 
immediate gut feeling“.    
Thought Processes Within a UTT Paradigm 
Current mind-wandering research has been applying self-report methods such as 
online thought probes or retrospective questionnaires. These instruments allow scientists to 
assess participants’ internal thought processes, which is the reason why we implemented them 
within a standard UTT paradigm. We believed that an insight into participants’ thoughts 
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during unconscious- as well as conscious-thought periods might help us to better understand 
the processes leading to decisions within a complex-problem scenario.  
Across all three experiments, we found that conscious-thought instructions indeed led 
to considerably higher levels of mental occupation with a previously presented evaluation 
problem. Still, participants did not use all of the available time for conscious problem 
deliberation. Indeed, they spent roughly about half of the time thinking about the problem and 
the other half thinking about unrelated matters. It appeared as if the deliberation time had 
been too long so that people’s minds started wandering. However, Experiment 2 ruled out the 
possibility that participants in a conscious condition would overthink the problem at hand, 
possibly deteriorating evaluation quality: Participants in the conscious-thought condition 
performed similarly well as participant in the immediate-evaluation condition. However, this 
also implies that high amounts of conscious thought about the evaluation problem did not lead 
to better evaluations compared to those formed only by first impressions, so that one could go 
so far as to describe conscious thought as unnecessary. In addition, the results of Experiments 
1 and 2 revealed that conscious-thought participants showed worse performances evaluating 
the apartments than unconscious-thought participants (unless thought probed), who showed 
significantly lower levels of problem-related thought. Only taking into account these two 
experiments, one could indeed argue that lower levels of problem deliberation foster higher 
quality evaluations, as is assumed by the UTT. However, the results from Experiment 3 put 
this notion into perspective, as evaluation performance did not differ between groups, 
although the extent of problem deliberation differed. 
In a survey concerning real life purchase decisions, Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) asked 
participants how much they had thought about a product they had recently bought. For 
complex products, the authors found that a higher amount of conscious product-thought was 
associated with lower satisfaction with the product. To directly test for such an association 
within our paradigm, we correlated the amount of problem-related thought with problem-
THE NATURE OF THE WANDERING MIND  A3-33 
 
solution quality within the experimental conditions in Experiment 3. These correlations were 
around zero (and not significant). That is, we did not find evidence for a relationship between 
the amount of ATs and decision performance within conditions on an individual level. It may 
still be, however, that the individual variations in ATs within each condition were just too 
small to affect decision performance. 
In the present work, we constantly found that distraction-tasks with high demands did 
not leave as much room for mind wandering, problem-related or unrelated, as tasks with low 
demands. Such effects of task demands are found to be stable within the mind-wandering 
literature (e.g., Rummel & Boywitt, 2014) and suggest that task demands compete with 
wandering thoughts for attentional resources. Concerning a UTT paradigm, our results 
suggest that demanding filler-interval tasks occupy attentional resources to a higher degree 
than undemanding tasks, leading to fewer conscious problem-related thoughts. Before, we 
considered wandering thoughts as an alternative explanation for UTEs and argued that high 
filler-task demands would compete with adaptive mind-wandering processes for attentional 
resources. Further, we argued that without engagement in productive mind wandering towards 
the pending evaluation problem, the benefit of a distraction-task period would be reduced. 
Although the results within the different unconscious-thought conditions mirrored the first 
part of this line of reasoning, there was no evidence for a connection between higher amounts 
of problem-related mind wandering and better evaluations, qualifying our alternative 
explanation for UTEs. Yet, because working on any kind of distraction resulted in lower 
amounts of problem-related thoughts as well as better evaluations than engaging in conscious 
problem thought (at least in Experiments 1 and 2) in general, the possibility remains that “less 
is better,” or that there is “just the right amount” of problem-related thought which is 
necessary and sufficient for good decision making. Research showing that self-paced 
conscious thought periods are shorter than experimenter-paced conscious thought periods 
whilst also leading to better decisions supports this assumption (Payne et al., 2008).   
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Furthermore, the question remains whether what we called ATs in all our experimental 
conditions is qualitatively the same across conditions. Instructing participants to consciously 
think about a solution to the apartment problem might lead to other kinds of thought than 
asking them to work on a letter-task. Conscious-thought participants might have actively tried 
to engage in various strategies such as remembering attributes and weighting them, which 
might not be the best strategy within a complex decision situation given the conscious’ 
system’s low information-processing capacity. By contrast, while working on a distraction-
task, ATs might have been of a completely different nature, possibly more focused on a 
holistic visualization of or a feeling evoked by a respective apartment. Such potential 
differences of qualitative nature should be addressed in further research, which could possibly 
employ qualitative methods and more detailed thought reports.  
Effects of Thought Awareness  
Another issue which we addressed in the present work was whether UTEs are really 
the result of deliberation without attention (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). Strick et al. (2011) 
already suggested replacing this term with the term deliberation-without-consciousness, 
focusing on the distinction between attention and consciousness, or rather awareness. 
Participants of an unconscious-thought experiment might allocate attentional resources 
towards the active problem during a filler interval, without being aware of this process. The 
same is true for mind wandering in general, which is found to occur with and without 
awareness (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). By applying thought probes in Experiment 2, we 
aimed to capture both aware as well as unaware thoughts in order to relate them to problem-
evaluation quality. The results indicated that self-reports from online thought probes mirrored 
those from retrospective questionnaires, thereby validating each other. After and during task 
completion, participants seem to be well aware of their recent thought processes, when asked. 
Although both mind-wandering assessment methods produced similar estimates on thought 
variables, evaluation performance varied between the two conditions which differed in 
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nothing but the mind-wandering assessment method. A distinction between the two kinds of 
assessment might be that thought probes are intrusive and might bring thought processes into 
awareness during the task. A lack of thought awareness might, however, be a necessary 
criterion for an UTE to appear, which would explain the increase in evaluation performance 
for the condition without thought probes only. However, results from Experiment 3, which 
was supposed to test this assumption, were inconclusive.  
Depending on the choice of mind-wandering assessment method, results of studies 
applying thought probes have been found to fluctuate (Seli et al., 2013; Weinstein, 2018; 
Weinstein et al., 2018). Given that changing probe characteristics can lead to considerable 
differences in results, one might argue that the mere presence of probes produces similar or 
even larger discrepancies. As we recently found in our lab (Steindorf et al., under review), 
probing participants’ thoughts during an incubation interval within a creativity task resulted in 
fewer creativity-task-related thoughts (reported retrospectively) compared to not applying any 
probes or applying trivia probes (cf. present Experiment 3). Because trivia probes interrupt 
participants just as thought probes do, this effect cannot be attributed to mere task-
interruption. We interpreted the findings as an awareness-effect: Thought probes might have 
made participants more aware and more cautious of their mind-wandering behavior, thereby 
changing the experience itself. Also, in the present work’s third experiment, thought reports 
were affected by differences in mind-wandering assessment methods. Participants who were 
thought-probed retrospectively reported more general TUTs compared to those who were 
trivia-probed or not probed at all. Asking people about their current thoughts might either 
change their in-the-moment mind wandering behavior or their recollection of mind-wandering 
instances when asked after task completion. Further research will be needed to investigate the 
potentially intrusive nature of thought probes for complex decisions in more detail.  
To gain further insights into thought-awareness processes during UTT experiments, 
further research could rely on self-caught mind-wandering assessment. Employing such 
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methods, a researcher asks participants to monitor their awareness of mind-wandering 
instances (Cunningham et al., 2000). Unlike probe-caught mind wandering, it requires 
participants to be aware of their thought experiences (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
Employing both measures within one and the same experiment could help disentangle actual 
mind-wandering instances and awareness of such instances (e.g., Sayette et al., 2009).  
Conclusion 
Across three experiments, we examined the nature of thoughts during UTT 
experiments. We relied on retrospective mind-wandering questionnaires as well as on online 
thought probes to gain insights into participants’ cognitive processes during distraction and 
conscious-thought periods. Although we found evidence for the existence of an UTE in the 
first two experiments, results of the third experiments were inconclusive. In the first two 
experiments, participants who reported fewer problem-related thoughts during a filler interval 
showed better problem-solving abilities later, however only when their thoughts were not 
probed online during the distraction task. We took a closer look at thought-awareness 
processes in Experiment 3 and found that thought reports were influenced by the applied 
mind-wandering assessment method. Problem solving, however, was unaffected. 
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Figure 1. Experimental procedure. All participants worked on the apartment task’s 
presentation phase and evaluation phase, with both phases being separated by a filler interval. 
The filler interval activity varied between experimental conditions and experiments. After 
evaluating the apartments, participants filled in a retrospective thought-assessment 
questionnaire, which related to their thoughts during the filler interval. Participants in the 
immediate evaluation condition (Experiment 2) made an exception to this general procedure, 
as they worked on both apartment task phases one after the other without a filler interval.  
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Figure 2. Descriptive data for the main analyses. Columns represent the respective experiment, rows the respective variable. The bars’ colors stand 
for the thought-mode manipulations employed, with darker grey representing conscious-thought manipulations and lighter grey unconscious-
thought manipulations. The immediate-evaluation condition of Experiment 2 is displayed in white. Patterns of results are explained and discussed 
within the running text. Error bars represent standard errors of the means.   
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Abstract 
 
The present study was designed to conceptually replicate and to further test previous findings 
that have shown a beneficial influence of mind wandering during incubation phases on post-
incubation creative problem solving. Additionally, online thought probes and the effects their 
occurrence might have on incubation thought-processes were investigated. Participants 
worked on verbal and figural creativity tasks. In one condition, their thoughts were probed 
during an incubation interval, possibly interrupting and/or making aware creative thought-
processes. Participants in this condition retrospectively reported fewer creativity-task-related 
thoughts compared to two other incubation conditions, that is, one without interruption and 
one interrupted by trivia questions. Creativity-task performance did not differ between these 
three incubation conditions and all three incubation conditions achieved a similar performance 
as a no-incubation control condition. These results add to the ongoing discussion regarding 
the relationship between mind wandering and creativity by challenging the idea of mind-
wandering states contributing to a creative-incubation process. 
 
Keywords: mind wandering, task-unrelated thought, creativity, incubation 
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Mind wandering outside the box – About the role of off-task thoughts and their assessment 
during creative incubation 
It almost sounds self-evident: Creative thinkers need time and space to let their minds 
wander and to let their thoughts run freely. Tales of influential scientific thinkers solving 
problems following periods of distracted thought seem to have been told since the blossoming 
of scientific interest (e.g., Archimedes' "Eureka!" moment). However, such moments of 
sudden insight do not exclusively happen to famous scientists or artists. We have probably all 
made the experience that focusing too intently on a problem’s solution does not stimulate 
inspiration. Sometimes, we get stuck and need to step away from the problem for a while. 
Then, out of the blue, while doing the dishes for example, the solution pops into our minds. 
Simple distraction tasks, such as household chores, seem to allow time for creative 
incubation, thereby fostering creative insight. Recent research has discussed the beneficial 
influence of mind wandering during incubation tasks on post-incubation creative performance 
(Baird et al., 2012; but see Smeekens & Kane, 2016). In the present study, we aimed to add to 
this discussion by conceptually replicating and extending previous findings. To this end, we 
tested for a causal link between incubation mind-wandering and creative performance. 
Moreover, we took a closer look at the role that different types of mind-wandering assessment 
might play during incubation intervals.  
Many daily tasks require focused attention for successful task-goal achievement. 
However, it is a ubiquitous phenomenon that the mind wanders away from the task at hand 
towards feelings or needs, unsolved problems, personal goals or plans, and other such things 
(Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). When taking an important, difficult exam, or while 
driving in heavy traffic, performance decrements due to off-task thoughts can come at high 
costs and even endanger the mind-wandering individual. Given such far-reaching 
consequences, it comes as no surprise that off-task thoughts have been extensively studied for 
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their negative effects on performance in a wide range of task domains. Increased mind 
wandering is associated with, for instance, poorer reading comprehension (Feng, D’Mello, & 
Graesser, 2013; McVay & Kane, 2012; Steindorf & Rummel, 2020), lower working memory 
capacity (Mrazek et al., 2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014), lower academic achievement (Kane 
et al., 2017; Seli, Wammes, Risko, & Smilek, 2016; Wammes & Smilek, 2017), and poorer 
driving performance (Albert et al., 2018; Lin et al., 2016; Yanko & Spalek, 2014). 
Since off-task thinking is found to be a pervasive phenomenon (Kane et al., 2007), it 
comes as good news to us frequent mind wanderers that there are benefits to match the 
aforementioned costs. Recent findings support the idea of mind wandering as a potentially 
functional practice in fields such as future and autobiographical planning (Baird, Smallwood, 
& Schooler, 2011; D'Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011; Steindorf & Rummel, 
2017), as well as in social problem solving and socio-emotional adjustment (Poerio, 
Totterdell, Emerson, & Miles, 2016; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, & Singer, 2013). Mentally 
travelling through time during mind-wandering episodes might also allow us to connect and 
compare our past and imagined future selves to the person we are today (Smallwood & 
Andrews-Hanna, 2013), thus providing us with a sense of self-identity, meaning, and 
continuity across time (Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013).  
In the present work, we focus on yet another construct that has been found to benefit 
from mind-wandering processes, namely creative problem solving. In the field of creativity, 
the question of how people produce ideas that can be defined as novel and useful (Diedrich, 
Benedek, Jauk, & Neubauer, 2015) is of central interest. Does creative cognition involve 
controlled and structured processes, or does it rely on more spontaneous and maybe even 
unconscious thoughts, which, while not exclusive to the drifting mind, might increasingly 
arise during mind-wandering episodes? Previous research suggests that both types of thought 
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processes contribute to the production of creative solutions1 and that the time course of 
creative cognition might reveal how these processes interact: In a recent review,  Benedek and 
Jauk (2018) differentiate between a short-term and a long-term perspective of creative 
problem solving. The short-term perspective considers the active idea generation phase, that 
is, getting to know the problem at hand and actively trying to solve it, involving both 
controlled and spontaneous processes. According to the controlled-attention theory of creative 
cognition (Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014), this phase requires the 
engagement of top-down processing, which involves executive functions. The long-term 
perspective, however, allows for a prolonged, intermittent processing of the creative problem, 
following the acknowledgement that it cannot be solved right away. According to the explicit-
implicit interaction model of creative thinking (Hélie & Sun, 2010), such an incubation phase 
involves unconscious and implicit associative processes, rather than conscious, explicit, and 
rule-governed processes.  
Recent research connecting mind wandering to creativity fits well into this theoretical 
distinction between a short-term and long-term perspective of creative problem solving and 
the cognitive processes involved. Hao, Wu, Runco, and Pina (2015) found that mind 
wandering during active engagement in creative thought (short-term perspective, see Benedek 
& Jauk, 2018) is disruptive to creative performance. The authors assumed that controlled 
processes, which are necessary for active idea generation, are impaired by wandering 
                                                          
1 Recent neuroimaging studies report the association of both default and controlled network 
regions with creative cognition (Jung, Mead, Carrasco, & Flores, 2013), with results from 
Beaty, Benedek, Kaufman, and Silvia (2015) even supporting the idea of a dynamic 
cooperation between both networks. The so-called default-mode network subsumes brain 
regions that are active when the brain is at rest and has previously been connected to mind 
wandering (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, 
Smith, & Schooler, 2009).  
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thoughts. However, many other recent studies report a positive relationship between mind 
wandering and creative performance: Professional writers and physicists describe a 
noteworthy proportion of their most significant ideas as being formed during spontaneous 
mind-wandering episodes (Gable, Hopper, & Schooler, 2019). Furthermore, an increased 
tendency towards mind wandering was found to coincide with more aha-experiences, which 
can be described as the solving of creativity tasks due to sudden insights (Zedelius & 
Schooler, 2015). Similarly, mind wandering was found to be related to improved performance 
on commonly used tests of divergent and convergent thinking (Leszczynski et al., 2017; 
Preiss, Cosmelli, Grau, & Ortiz, 2016).  
These results connecting mind wandering to improved creative performance can easily 
be integrated into the long-term perspective of creative processing (Benedek & Jauk, 2018) by 
assuming that “people spend more of their daily lives engaged in an incubation-like state than 
they probably realize” (Sawyer, 2011, p.146), and that mind-wandering individuals seem to 
allow more time for incubation and/or seem to make better use of this incubation time. 
Especially for long incubation times (e.g. a creative problem being on one’s mind for a week), 
mind-wandering episodes might allow for prolonged, possibly unconscious and implicit 
processing of the creative problem. For short incubation periods, the short-term and long-term 
perspectives of creative processing might overlap, and conscious, rule-governed processes 
might still play a role (see below). 
One should keep in mind, however, that most of the just reported findings are 
correlational in nature. That is, they imply that people who experience creative thoughts more 
often also tend to mind wander more frequently or that when people experience creative 
thoughts, they often do so after episodes of mind wandering. Direct causal evidence for 
incubation mind-wandering benefitting creative problem solving is rare. In one such study, 
Baird et al. (2012) found that compared with a demanding task, a period of rest, or no break at 
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all, engaging in an undemanding task during an incubation interval lead to significant 
improvements in performance on previously encountered versions of the Unusual Uses Task 
(Torrance, 1968). Furthermore, participants working on the undemanding filler task reported 
increased levels of off-task thoughts in a retrospective questionnaire. That is, engaging in an 
undemanding task during incubation was associated with both increased mind wandering and 
increased incubation effects on creative performance. This double association is well in line 
with a meta-analytic review suggesting that low-cognitive-load incubation tasks offer the 
greatest problem-solving benefits (Sio & Ormerod, 2009) and the finding that mind 
wandering is more frequent during such low-load tasks (Mason et al., 2007; Rummel & 
Boywitt, 2014; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009). It is worthwhile mentioning that Baird 
and colleagues (2012) did not find more thoughts explicitly related to the creativity task 
during the incubation period, suggesting that it is a general increase in unconscious, 
associative processes rather than a conscious consideration of the creativity problem during 
incubation mind-wandering that fosters creative performance. Interestingly, however, 
Smeekens and Kane (2016) did not replicate Baird and colleagues’ (2012) results. In their 
methodologically very similar study2, incubation mind-wandering, which was assessed via 
online-thought probes, did not predict post-incubation creative performance, calling the 
claims made by Baird and colleagues into question. Therefore, it remained unclear whether 
off-task thoughts during undemanding incubation tasks directly foster creative performance. 
However, there was one striking distinction between the opposing studies that might 
account for the discrepancy between results: Whereas Baird and colleagues assessed mind 
wandering with retrospective questionnaires, Smeekens and Kane chose to use thought probes 
to assess mind wandering online during incubation. Consequently, the employed mind-
                                                          
2 Especially in Experiment 3, Smeekens and Kane (2016) employed similar materials to those 
employed in the study by Baird et al. (2012). 
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wandering assessment tools might have caused divergent results. Indeed, depending on the 
choice of measurement method, results of mind-wandering studies which applied thought 
probes have been found to fluctuate to an alarming level (Seli, Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 
2013; Weinstein, 2018; Weinstein, De Lima, & van der Zee, 2018, but see Schubert, 
Frischkorn, & Rummel, 2019). Differences in probe and instruction characteristics such as the 
probing frequency, the number of response options, or the framing of attentional sates can 
lead to changes in mind wandering and/or to increased proneness to response biases, and 
might affect task performance (Robison, Miller, & Unsworth, 2019). Given that even within a 
single type of mind-wandering assessment (online thought probes), changing probe 
characteristics can lead to considerable differences in results, it seems reasonable to assume 
that studies differing in assessment types (thought probes versus retrospective questionnaires) 
might produce similar or even larger discrepancies. 
Concerning the methodological differences between the Baird et al. (2012) and the 
Smeekens and Kane (2016) studies, we assumed that in the latter online thought probing may 
have had disruptive effects on creative processes during incubation. This may be the reason 
why no incubation mind-wandering benefits were found. Indeed, creative incubation seems to 
be dependent upon implicit, associative processes, as are found during mind wandering (Hao 
et al., 2014; Hélie & Sun, 2010). Therefore, it might be possible that by continually disrupting 
the ongoing incubation task, the thought probes also disrupted the wandering mind’s natural, 
associative dynamics (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) that might have otherwise benefitted the 
creative incubation process. More specifically, two, not mutually exclusive, probe-related 
disruptions of creative thoughts are possible: First, the thought probes’ merely interrupting 
nature might have cut off implicit, associative and possibly creative trains of off-task thought 
(interruption hypothesis). Second, thought probes might even go beyond mere interruption by 
alerting the participants of the key dependent measure of the experiment, namely their state of 
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thought. In doing so, probes might have made participants more aware and more cautious of 
their mind-wandering behavior, possibly changing the experience itself (awareness 
hypothesis). Hence, interruption as well as awareness effects might account for the differences 
in results between the studies by Baird et al. (2012) and Smeekens and Kane (2016). This 
reasoning is based on Baird and colleagues’ findings, which support the idea of unconscious, 
associative mind-wandering processes benefitting creative incubation, but also holds for 
conscious, rule-governed processes (i.e. creativity-directed mind wandering), which are 
crucial for the short-term perspective of creative processing (Benedek & Jauk, 2018). Such 
processes might also be interrupted or made aware due to thought probing.   
The present Study 
The present work’s goal was to test for deleterious effects of thought probes, and to 
thereby resolve inconsistencies between findings by Baird et al. (2012) and Smeekens and Kane 
(2016) to get a clearer picture of the relationship between incubation mind-wandering and 
creative performance. Our study qualifies as a conceptual replication because we realized a 
combination of both studies’ methodologies, which we considered most appropriate to test our 
hypotheses. The inclusion of a figural creativity test (besides a verbal one) to expand the 
informative value of creativity results constitutes the most important methodological difference. 
We also made some other changes, which mostly relate to the aforementioned creativity-test 
expansion such as extending the amount of time participants worked on the creativity test 
(simply because there were more tests) or scoring creativity slightly differently (so that we 
could use a coherent scoring for both verbal and figural tests). Eventually, we aimed at 
integrating both studies’ designs into one single experiment. We asked participants to work on 
the same divergent creativity problems (in our case verbal as well as figural problems) twice3, 
                                                          
3 We only employed repeated-exposure problems, as Baird et al. (2012) found no post-
incubation benefits for new-exposure problems. 
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with the first and second assessment being separated by different types of incubation intervals 
in three experimental incubation conditions: In the first incubation condition, participants 
worked on an easy cognitive task (filler task, 0-back)4 without any probes interrupting the task. 
For these participants, we expected creative incubation benefits as observed by Baird et al. 
(2012). In the second incubation condition, participants worked on the same task, but were 
interrupted by thought probes from time to time. For these participants, due to the probing 
procedure, we expected no creative incubation benefits, as was the case in Smeekens and Kane 
(2016). In the third incubation condition, participants also worked on the filler task and were 
interrupted from time to time. However, in this condition, we interrupted them with trivia 
probes, which had the same format as thought probes (see Method section) but consisted of 
general knowledge questions. We included this condition as a test for the interruption and 
awareness hypotheses. If mere interruption was sufficient to evoke the proposed detrimental 
probing effect, trivia probes should prompt such an interruption, leading to a cut-off of implicit, 
associative processes, thus hindering creative incubation benefits from appearing. If, however, 
thought awareness was a necessary criterion for the proposed detrimental nature of probes, 
trivia questions should not have an effect on mind wandering and/or creativity. Thus, we 
expanded the traditional thought-probe paradigm by adding a trivia-probe condition to gain 
additional insights into the cognitive processes elicited by probes. Finally, in a fourth, no-
incubation condition, participants worked on both creativity assessments without any 
incubation time in between and worked on the same task used in the incubation condition to fill 
the incubation period after the second creativity assessment. This no-incubation condition thus 
                                                          
4 We chose the 0-back task because Baird et al. (2012) found incubation-benefits only for 
simple filler tasks, which allow the mind to wander. In their study, participants working on a 
0-back filler task showed improvement on the second creativity assessment whilst participants 
working on a more demanding 3-back task did not. 
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depicts a baseline condition for incubation effects, whereas the no-probe-incubation condition 
depicts a baseline condition for effects of thought probing on mind-wandering processes.  
As a mind-wandering measure that was congruent for all conditions, every participant 
filled out a retrospective questionnaire concerning on-task and, more importantly, off-task 
thought experiences after finishing the filler task. We differentiated between general off-task 
thought and creative off-task thought to be able to test for influences of both kinds of thoughts 
on creative incubation: Creative mind wandering might be more target-oriented and might 
directly focus on solutions to the previously presented creativity problems. Baird et al. (2012), 
however, stated that such thoughts should not benefit creative incubation. Rather, implicit 
associative processes (i.e. general mind wandering) should lead to an increase in post-
incubation creativity. One could argue that rather short incubation phases such as those 
employed by Baird and colleagues as well as Smeekens and Kane (2016) lie in the interstice of 
the above mentioned short-term and long-term perspectives of creative processing (Benedek & 
Jauk, 2018). Thus, either controlled processes (short term) or possibly unconscious and implicit 
processes (long term) might benefit creativity. The first might be represented by creative mind 
wandering and the latter by general mind wandering, which is why we were interested in both 
types of off-task thought. 
In the following Method and Results sections, we report how we determined our 
sample size and all data exclusions, manipulations, and measures in the study (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). To follow the recommendations of Seli et al. (2018), we 
conceptualized mind wandering as task-unrelated thought and explained the concept to our 
participants accordingly. The study reported in this article was preregistered on June 01, 2017 
(https://osf.io/ghwjm/; doi: 10.17605/OSF.IO/GHWJM) and, if not indicated otherwise, we 
followed the research and analysis protocol as stated in the preregistration. Our data is 
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available under the same URL. Importantly, to be better able to evaluate Null effects, other 
than preregistered, we relied on a Bayesian approach for the present results’ interpretation. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
In line with a preregistered power analysis, we recruited 108 students at Heidelberg 
University, Germany, which were tested in groups no larger than six.5 Data of one participant 
were lost due to technical errors. Another participant’s data had to be excluded due to an 
experimenter mistake. Yet another five participants were excluded because they miscalculated 
their self-reported mind-wandering scores (see below), resulting in N = 101 (Mage = 22.55, 
SDage = 2.57; 79 female, see Table 1 for the distribution across the experimental conditions) 
for all further analyses.  
The incubation condition (thought-probe incubation, trivia-probe incubation, no-probe 
incubation, no incubation) constituted our between-participants factor; the time of creativity 
assessment (before incubation, after incubation) our repeated measures factor. The order of 
creativity tasks (figural, verbal) was held constant for the two measurement points but was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Materials 
Verbal creativity assessment. Participants worked on two paper-and-pencil versions 
(3 min per version) of the Unusual Uses Tasks (UUT) that were based on tasks from the 
Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT, Torrance, 1968). Instructions were adapted from 
the original TTCT and translated into German by a native speaker. Participants were asked to 
write down as many unusual and interesting uses for a tin can (or a cardboard box in the 
                                                          
5 As evident from the results of the Bayesian analyses, our predetermined sample size seemed 
large enough to allow for the interpretation of all effects relevant for our main hypotheses, 
thus rendering sequential sampling unnecessary.  
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second version) as possible within 50 response fields. They were told not to limit themselves 
to one size of object, to use as many objects as they wished and to not limit themselves to 
uses, they had already seen but instead to think of as many new ones as possible.  
Figural creativity assessment. We adapted two versions of a figural sketching task 
from the TTCT. Instructions were adapted and translated into German by a native speaker. 
Participants were asked to sketch as many pictures with as much detail as possible within and 
around 42 given squares (or circles in the second version) within a three-minute time frame, 
and to thereby try and think of ideas nobody else could come up with. They were informed 
that the squares (circles) were supposed to be the center part of the picture and that they could 
add as many details as they liked to complete a picture. Additionally, participants were asked 
to add a title for each picture. 
Filler task. Participants worked on the 0-back version of the n-back task. Including 
instructions, the filler task lasted approximately 12 min, which is comparable to the 
incubation time in the Baird et al. (2012) study. In the 0-back task, single letters were 
successively presented in the center of the screen for 500 ms each with an inter-stimulus 
interval of 3000 ms. Participants were asked to press a green-labeled key if the presented 
letter was the letter X (target trial) and to press a red-labeled key for all other letters (non-
target trials). They performed one block of the 0-back task consisting of 96 non-target and 32 
target trials. For all three incubation conditions (thought-probe incubation, trivia-probe 
incubation, no-probe incubation), the filler task was employed during the incubation period. 
For the no-incubation condition, the filler task was employed after the second creativity 
assessment.  
Online probes. During the filler task, participants in the thought-probe-incubation and 
no-incubation conditions were presented with thought probes, and participants in the trivia-
probe-incubation condition were presented with trivia probes after each sequence of 16 0-
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back trials, resulting in eight probes in total. Both probe types had the same two-step format. 
First, participants were asked to categorize their current thoughts as being either task-related 
or task-unrelated (thought probe), or to respond with either “yes” or “no” to a random 
knowledge question (trivia probe, e.g., “Is the Eiffel tower higher than 300 meters?”), keeping 
the amount of possible responses equal for both groups. Second, as a response to an open-
ended question, participants typed in a brief description of their current thoughts (thought 
probe), or provided a best guess concerning the exact answer to the knowledge question 
(trivia probe, e.g., “How high exactly?”).  
Retrospective mind-wandering assessment. To retrospectively assess the amount of 
mind wandering during the filler task, we asked all participants to categorize the entirety of 
thoughts they had experienced whilst working on this task into three categories using 
percentage scores: thoughts about the filler task, thoughts about the creativity problems from 
before, or thoughts about something completely unrelated. We considered the latter two 
categories as off-task thoughts, as these kinds of thoughts were unrelated to the filler task. All 
three percentage scores had to add up to 100, otherwise participants were excluded from the 
data analysis (see above). 
Procedure.  
The procedure is displayed in Figure 1. Participants signed a consent form and 
provided demographic information before receiving instructions for the creativity assessment. 
They then worked on both verbal and both figural creativity tasks in a counterbalanced order 
(verbal first versus figural first). Excluding instruction time, they worked on these tasks for 12 
minutes (3 min per task). Afterwards, participants in the three conditions with an incubation 
interval between the first and second creativity assessment (thought-probe incubation, trivia-
probe incubation, no-probe incubation) were told that they would stop working on the 
creativity tasks for now but would return to them later. They received instructions for the 
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filler task and the respective probing procedure (where applicable), including a detailed 
definition of mind wandering (where applicable) as well as examples. They then worked on 
the filler task, completed the retrospective mind-wandering questionnaire (on which mind 
wandering was also defined and described), and then started the second creativity assessment. 
The creativity problems were presented in the same order as during the first assessment. After 
completing the first creativity assessment, participants in the no-incubation condition 
immediately started the second creativity assessment, following the information that they 
would now once again work on the creativity problems in the same order as before. After 
having finished both creativity assessments, no-incubation participants received instructions 
for the filler task and the thought-probing procedure, worked on this task, and completed the 
retrospective mind-wandering questionnaire. Before the second creativity assessment, all 
participants were told that they could re-use or adapt their answers from the first creativity 
assessment, but that coming up with completely new and unusual answers to the creativity 
problems would result in higher test scores. Finally, all participants filled in a trait-based 
mind-wandering questionnaire6 and were then debriefed and dismissed. 
Results 
We chose to employ Bayesian analyses in addition to the preregistered frequentist 
analyses to gain richer information and draw more informative inferences regarding the 
likelihood of our data to occur under the assumptions of the Null as well as the alternative 
hypotheses. In the following sections, we report the common information for frequentist 
ANOVAs and ANCOVAs, but use the additionally reported Bayes factors to draw 
conclusions concerning our hypotheses. To this end, for all of our analyses, we either report 
                                                          
6 As a more trait-based measure of mind wandering, we adapted a scale by Carriere, Seli, and 
Smilek (2013). Unfortunately, these data were not recorded due to programming errors and 
thus will not be included in later analyses. 
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BF10 as the Bayes factor for the alternative versus the Null hypothesis, or BF01 as the Bayes 
factor for the Null versus the alternative hypothesis. For all reported Bayesian ANOVAs and 
ANCOVAs (BANOVAs and BANCOVAs), we employed Cauchy priors (Wagenmakers et 
al., 2018) and followed the guidelines by Jeffreys (1961) for interpretation7. The analyses 
were executed using JASP (JASP Team, 2019). The order manipulation of creativity tasks 
(figural first, verbal first), which was counterbalanced between participants, yielded main 
effects for some of the creativity measures (probably reflecting motivational decreases over 
time) but did not interact with condition effects. Thus, we collapsed across this factor for all 
reported analyses. 
Filler task performance. For the 0-back filler task, performance was defined as the 
percentage of trials (target and non-target) with correct responses in relation to all trials. There 
were no significant differences between conditions for 0-back task performance, F(3, 97) = 
0.70, p = .556, η2p = .02 (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics), as suggested by a one factorial 
ANOVA with incubation condition as between-participants factor. The BANOVA revealed 
substantial support for the Null hypothesis, by showing that our data were more than eight 
times more likely to occur under a model excluding an effect for the experimental condition, 
BF01 = 8.62. That is, 0-back task performance was not affected by the kind of incubation (or 
no incubation) employed in the respective experimental conditions.  
Mind-wandering behavior. The amount of mind wandering measured online via 
forced-choice thought probes (first thought-probing step) during the filler task was defined as 
the percentage of probes in which participants categorized themselves as being off-task. 
Thought probes were employed for two conditions only: Participants’ mind-wandering 
behavior, measured via probes, did not differ for the thought-probe incubation compared to 
                                                          
7 BF 1-3: anecdotal support; BF 3-10: substantial support; BF 10-30: strong support; BF 30-
100: very strong support; BF > 100: decisive support 
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the no-incubation condition, t(48) = 0.01, p = .994, d = 002, BF01 = 3.53 (see Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics), as was suggested by an independent samples t-test. That is, overall 
mind-wandering frequency, measured online during the filler task, was not influenced by 
whether the creativity task was interrupted or already finished during assessment.  
The number of thoughts classified as creativity thoughts (that is, thoughts concerning 
the creativity tasks) from the open-ended thought-probe questions (second thought-probing 
step) was very low, altogether. For this measure, one rater evaluated the thought descriptions 
participants had provided. In the thought-probe incubation, as well as in the no-incubation 
condition, only two participants reported having experienced thoughts about the creativity 
task. For this reason, we refrained from running any further statistical analyses for this 
measure.  
The amount of mind wandering assessed retrospectively after the filler task was 
specified using percentage scores. Overall, participants reported having been on-task for 
67.24 percent (SD = 20.15) of the time. A one factorial (B)ANOVA with incubation condition 
as between-participants factor showed that the amount of off-task thoughts about the 
creativity problems varied between conditions F(3, 97) = 3.60, p = .016, η2p = .10, BF10 = 
2.76. Our primary hypothesis concerned a potential reactivity effect of thought probes and its 
origin. To test for this effect, we used a set of Helmert contrasts. The first contrast tested the 
thought probe incubation condition against the no probe incubation condition and the trivia 
probe condition to investigate whether thought probing would systematically affect 
retrospective thought reports. This was the case, F(1, 97) = 4.99, p = .028, η2p = .06, BF10 = 
2.02. The second contrast tested for differences between the no-probe-incubation condition 
and the trivia-probe condition and revealed that the amount of creativity thoughts did not 
differ between the two, F(1, 97) = 0.22, p = .639, η2p = .01, BF01 = 3.25. To achieve a more 
complete picture of the thought probe effect, we used additional post-hoc comparisons to test 
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each incubation condition against the no-incubation condition. These comparisons revealed 
increased amounts of creativity thoughts in the trivia-probe incubation, t(97) = -2.76, p = 
.034, BF10 = 5.81, and, however with anecdotal evidence, in the no-probe incubation 
conditions, t(97) = -2.21, p = .129, BF10 = 2.84, but not in the thought-probe incubation 
condition, t(97) = -047, p = .966, BF01= 3.11.  
The amount of other, general off-task thoughts (excluding creativity thoughts) did not 
vary between conditions F(3, 97) = 0.43, p = .733, η2p = .01, BF01 = 11.59 (see Figure 2), as 
was suggested by the respective (B)ANOVA. That is, we did not find higher levels of general 
mind wandering (excluding creative thoughts) during the 0-back task for any of the incubation 
conditions as compared to the no-incubation condition.  
Verbal creativity. Two independent raters evaluated the meaningfulness of all 
responses to both UUT versions (tin can and cardboard box), so that far-fetched, non-viable 
answers could be excluded from further analyses. Discrepancies in meaningfulness ratings 
were resolved by a third, independent rater. After excluding non-meaningful responses, we 
computed individual scores on three different measures of verbal creativity: originality, 
uniqueness, and fluency. The same two raters who had evaluated the meaningfulness of 
responses assessed the originality of responses to both UUT versions using a scale of zero 
(“The idea does not extend beyond the traditional use of a tin can/cardboard box.”) to three 
(“The idea is unexpected, inventive, and requires an extraordinary capacity for outside-the-
box thinking”). The two raters’ scores were averaged for each response and summed up for 
each participant and creativity assessment over both UUT versions, creating two originality 
scores (one for the first, one for the second creativity assessment) for each participant. This 
subjective measure of creativity was similar to the one used by Smeekens and Kane (2016). 
Additionally, to produce a more objective measure of originality (see Baird et al., 2011), we 
calculated two uniqueness scores (one per creativity assessment) for each participant. 
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Responses were pooled across all participants separately for the tin can and the cardboard box 
versions of the UUT and each response was assigned a uniqueness value, which was 
computed by dividing one by the number of times the response had been given for the 
respective UUT version. That is, the less often a response had been given, the closer its 
uniqueness value was to one. Separately for the two creativity assessments, uniqueness values 
were summed up for each participant over both UUT versions, creating two uniqueness scores 
for each participant (one for the first, one for the second creativity assessment). As a third 
creativity measure, we calculated a fluency score for each participant and each creativity 
assessment, which simply represented the number of meaningful responses a participant had 
given to both UUT versions.      
To test whether verbal creativity performance in the second assessment differed 
between conditions (that is, depending on whether there is an incubation phase and depending 
on the kind of incubation) whilst controlling for a priori differences in the first assessment, we 
ran frequentist and Bayesian ANCOVAs8 with the respective verbal creativity measure for the 
second assessment as the dependent variable, incubation condition as a between-participants 
factor, and the respective verbal creativity measure for the first assessment as a covariate. 
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics for all three verbal creativity measures and both 
assessments. We did not find any differences between conditions regarding originality in the 
second creativity assessment, F(3, 96) = 0.21, p = .891, η2p = .00, BF01 = 15.46, as was the 
case for uniqueness in the second creativity assessment, F(3, 96) = 0.40, p = .754, η2p = .01, 
BF01 = 10.96. Regarding creative fluency in the second assessment, we again did not find 
differences between experimental conditions, F(3, 96) = 0.18, p = .913, η2p = .00, BF01 = 
                                                          
8 Other than preregistered, we decided to report (B)ANCOVAs rather than repeated-measure 
(B)ANOVAs, because there was no significant interaction between time of creativity 
assessment and incubation condition.  
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13.70. For all three creativity measures, performance in the first assessment was a significant 
covariate (each with p < .001 and a BF10 with decisive support). That is, controlling for the 
performance in the first assessment, verbal creativity performance in the second assessment 
did not vary between groups. Neither incubation per se, nor a special kind of incubation was 
found to produce creative performance benefits. 
     Figural creativity. For figural creativity, a condition-blinded rater evaluated the 
meaningfulness of all responses to both versions of the figural sketching task (squares and 
circles), so that sketches with improper uses of the squares (circles) could be excluded for 
further analyses in the next step. For figural creativity, we computed individual scores on two 
different measures: originality and fluency. Similar to the procedure for verbal creativity, a 
rater assessed the originality of all sketches using a scale of zero (“The idea does not extend 
beyond the meaning of a square/circle.”) to three (“The idea is unexpected, inventive, and 
requires an extraordinary capacity for outside-the-box thinking”) taking into account the 
respective sketch and its title. Scores were summed up for each participant and creativity 
assessment over both versions of the figural sketching task, creating two originality scores 
(one for the first, one for the second creativity assessment) for each participant. The fluency 
score for each participant and each creativity assessment represented the number of 
meaningful sketches a participant had drawn for both the square and the circle version of the 
task. We did not compute uniqueness scores for figural creativity, because the sketches were 
not as objectively comparable as answers to the UUT. Because five participants did not 
produce meaningful sketches on all task versions, we excluded them from all further analyses 
for figural creativity performance, resulting in N = 96 for these analyses.     
We again ran frequentist and Bayesian ANCOVAs with the respective figural 
creativity measure for the second assessment as dependent variable, incubation condition as 
between-participants factor, and the respective figural creativity measure for the first 
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assessment as a covariate (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). We did not find differences 
between experimental conditions for originality in the second creativity assessment, F(3, 91) 
= 0.62, p = .606, η2p = .01, BF01 = 4.11, or fluency in the second assessment, F(3, 91) = 0.57, 
p = .639, η2p = .01, BF01 = 2.77. As for verbal creativity, we conclude that neither incubation 
per se, nor a special kind of incubation was found to produce creative performance benefits.  
Correlational analyses. We correlated incubation mind-wandering with post-
incubation creativity performance. For the thought-probe incubation condition (similar to 
Smeekens & Kane, 2016), as well as for the three incubation conditions combined (thought-
probe incubation, trivia-probe incubation, no-probe incubation), we obtained non-significant 
correlations only, all ps > .1 and BF10 < 1 (for (Bayesian) Pearson correlations) when 
correlating the mind-wandering measures (probe-caught general off-task thoughts, 
retrospectively reported general off-task thoughts, and retrospectively reported creativity-
related thoughts) with the creativity performance measures from the second assessment (all 
verbal and figural measures), which is well in line with Smeekens and Kane’s results.  
Discussion 
Although the last couple of years have brought forth a promising amount of research 
supporting the idea that mind wandering could foster creative problem solving (Gable et al., 
2019; Hao et al., 2014; Leszczynski et al., 2017; Preiss et al., 2016; Zedelius & Schooler, 2015), 
the specific functionality of off-task thoughts during short incubation intervals remained 
unclear. Considering the long-term perspective of creative problem solving (see Introduction 
and Benedek & Jauk, 2018), such incubation intervals should involve unconscious and implicit 
associative processes, which, while not exclusive to the wandering mind, might increasingly 
arise during off-task thought episodes and might benefit creativity. Considering the short-term 
perspective, conscious, rule-governed processes in the form of creative mind wandering might 
also play a role fostering creativity. However, mixed results regarding the causal relation 
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between incubation mind-wandering and creative problem solving had been found in previous 
studies (Baird et al., 2012; Smeekens & Kane, 2016) and we hypothesized that these 
inconsistencies could have been caused by methodological differences in mind-wandering 
assessment.  
In the present study, we had expected to find creative incubation benefits at least in the 
no-probe incubation condition and possibly also in the trivia-probe incubation condition (if an 
increased meta-awareness about one’s mental states, and not only mere interruption, 
hampered the mind-wandering–creativity link). Such a pattern of results would have 
supported the assumption that mind wandering indeed facilitates creative incubation, as long 
as the mind is allowed to actually run freely without any disturbance. However, we found 
neither a post-incubation creative performance benefit for the three incubation groups 
(thought-probe incubation, trivia-probe incubation, no-probe incubation) in contrast to the no-
incubation group, nor any benefits for special kinds of incubation. Additionally, differences in 
mind-wandering behavior evoked by our experimental manipulation (discussed below) were 
not related to creative performance in the second assessment. Neither conscious thoughts 
directed at the creativity problem nor general, possibly implicit and associative mind-
wandering processes were associated with post-incubation creativity. 
Not only were we interested in the causal link between incubation mind-wandering 
and post-incubation creative performance, our expansion of the traditional thought-probe 
paradigm was also supposed to generate new knowledge on the nature of thought probes and 
the (possibly detrimental) effects they might evoke. More specifically, our employed 
paradigm was supposed to test the interruption and the awareness hypothesis (see 
Introduction). Retrospectively applied mind-wandering questionnaires revealed that there 
were no group differences concerning general mind wandering excluding creativity thoughts. 
However, our new paradigm allowed us to observe group differences concerning thoughts 
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about the creativity tasks. We found higher levels of creativity thoughts for two of our 
incubation groups (trivia-probe incubation and no-probe incubation) in comparison to the 
baseline no-incubation group. This increase could be described as a Zeigarnik-like effect 
(Zeigarnik, 1927). Interrupting the creativity assessment with an incubation phase could have 
led to an increased availability of and an increased mental occupation with the demands and 
contents of the creativity problems9. However, interestingly, asking participants about their 
thoughts led to an absence of this increase in the thought-probe incubation group. This 
absence is well in line with our proposed awareness hypothesis. Mere interruption proved 
insufficient to change participant’s mind-wandering behavior in contrast to a no-probe 
condition. However, going beyond mere interruption by alerting the participants of the key 
dependent measure of the experiment, namely their state of thought, might have made 
participants more aware and more cautious of their wandering minds. More precisely, not 
only thought-probe characteristics (Seli et al., 2013; Weinstein, 2018; Weinstein et al., 2018), 
but also the mere occurrence of such probes seems to reactively affect creativity-task-related 
mind wandering through increased thought awareness. 
Alternative explanations for the group differences concerning creativity thoughts may 
exist. For example, thought probes might enable more accurate retrospective thought reports 
by providing participants with initial estimates of the amount of creativity thoughts. 
Participants without such initial estimates might retrospectively report inflated creativity-
thought levels due to demand characteristics of the questionnaire.10 Although plausible, the 
literature on Zeigarnik-like effects deems our initial interpretation of the finding of increased 
                                                          
9Although plausible, our results conflict with the findings from Baird et al. (2012), because 
their undemanding filler task condition was characterized by high levels of general off-task 
thought but not of thoughts especially directed toward the creativity tasks. 
 
10 We thank one of our reviewers for raising this point. 
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creative thought for incubation participants (excluding thought-probe-incubation participants) 
in contrast to no-incubation participants as such a Zeigarnik-like effect more likely. Such an 
increase is well in line with other studies reporting a prolonged mental occupation with still 
active problems or tasks during incubation intervals (e.g., Bugg & Scullin, 2013; Steindorf & 
Rummel, 2017). In this light, it seems more likely that our creativity-thought rates reflect a 
prolonged mental occupation with the pending creativity task rather than occurring due to 
demand characteristics. Consequently, we believe the absence of the creativity-thought 
increase in the thought-probe-incubation condition to be due to an absence of a Zeigarnik-like 
effect (due to effects of thought awareness) rather than a more accurate creativity-thought 
estimation. However, further research is needed to support this interpretation. 
A recent study (Wiemers & Redick, 2019) described thought probes as a non-reactive 
method for the measurement of mind wandering when embedding them into a sustained 
attention to response task. Our results support the notion that probes do not alter performance 
for current cognitive tasks. However, mere thought-probe occurrences might still alter mind-
wandering contents during such tasks and, for example, hinder associative or goal-related 
processes from taking place. Performance in still active, unfinished or interrupted tasks, which 
benefit from or depend on such processes, might thereby also be affected by the occurrence of 
thought probes. However, this was the first time we employed an extended version of the 
traditional thought-probing procedure to disentangle interruption and awareness effects on 
different types of mind wandering. Further research is needed to shed light on the influence of 
thought probing on mind wandering, and we consider our extended paradigm to be a very 
fruitful approach towards this end. For this reason, we are currently examining reactive effects 
of thought probing on mind wandering processes within other problem-solving scenarios, 
such as the unconscious thought paradigm (Steindorf, Rummel, & Boywitt, manuscript 
submitted for publication). 
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Even though our results suggest that online thought probing alters goal-related mind 
wandering during incubation, these changes within participants’ mental states were not related 
to changes in creativity. We did not find evidence for a causal link between incubation mind-
wandering and post-incubation creative performance. Creativity could not be situationally 
increased with mind-wandering manipulations. However, this argumentation does not rule out 
the possibility that incubation mind-wandering might be found to be beneficial within 
paradigms producing reliable incubation effects. In our study, we focused on divergent 
creativity measures. Performance on convergent creativity tasks, for example, might benefit 
from incubation mind-wandering. In these tasks, people are supposed to find one particular 
correct solution to a problem. Specific convergent-creativity-related off-task thoughts during 
an incubation interval might foster post-incubation performance, because they might 
constitute an active search (requiring top-down control, see Colzato, Szapora, & Hommel, 
2012) for the one correct solution.  
A positive relationship between mind wandering and creativity seems to be most 
prevalently found when mind wandering is assessed on a trait level. That is, creative people 
might indeed tend to mind wander more, or in the other direction, frequent mind-wanderers 
might indeed be more creative. However, manipulating state mind wandering to increase post-
incubation creativity in an artificial lab environment might not be possible. Offering people 
the possibility to mind wander (in our case through an easy filler task) might not be sufficient 
for creative incubation.  
Furthermore, one could argue that the relationship between mind wandering and 
creativity is (partially) driven by stereotypes and self-images concerning creative and 
daydreaming people. For example, people who are more creative quite probably identify 
themselves with the stereotype regarding “the creative person”, which could possibly cause 
them to see mind wandering as a positive process that could benefit finding inspiration, and 
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which “belongs” to their creative identity. Subsequently, when asked to report their mind-
wandering propensity, their answers might be tinted by their self-image, thus artificially 
increasing the amount of reported mind wandering compared to less creative individuals. 
In conclusion, in the present work, employing an extended thought probing paradigm, 
we observed mind-wandering changes due to the mere existence of thought probes. Our aim 
had been to relate those changes in incubation mind-wandering to post-incubation creative 
performance to resolve inconsistencies between findings by Baird et al. (2012) and Smeekens 
and Kane (2016). Replicating only the result found by Smeekens and Kane, in-the-moment 
mind wandering during incubation was not associated with post-incubation creativity. 
However, from a daily-life and a rather trait-based perspective, we should not discard the idea 
of a positive relationship between creativity and mind wandering. 
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Table 1. Distribution of N across the experimental conditions, as well as means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for filler task (0-back task) 
performance and probed mind wandering.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Condition 
N  
0-back (% correct) Off-task thoughts (%, thought probes) 
 
M SD M SD 
thought-probe incubation 26 93.00 4.03 25.48 19.20 
trivia-probe incubation  26 91.50 6.16 
not assessed 
no-probe incubation 25 93.16 3.95 
no incubation 24 92.71 3.63 25.52 18.97 
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Table 2. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for creativity performance in the first and second assessment.   
Note. Values for verbal creativity are based on N = 101. Values for figural creativity are based on N = 96. 
 
 
 
 
 verbal creativity figural creativity 
 originality uniqueness fluency originality fluency 
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
 first assessment 
thought-probe 
incubation 
27.38 12.10 3.39 1.89 20.62 7.21 11.42 5.38 7.54 3.78 
trivia-probe 
incubation  
24.40 11.95 2.79 1.85 18.69 7.72 12.09 5.79 8.44 3.67 
no-probe 
incubation 
29.50 11.81 3.14 1.50 22.64 7.72 10.72 7.58 7.20 5.38 
no  
incubation 
28.73 10.04 3.28 1.88 21.75 5.54 13.64 7.63 9.46 4.91 
 second assessment 
thought-probe 
incubation 
26.29 12.20 4.26 2.81 19.00 7.87 14.12 7.27 9.08 3.93 
trivia-probe 
incubation  
24.38 11.05 3.53 2.67 18.00 6.91 15.30 5.72 10.09 4.03 
no-probe 
incubation 
26.12 10.70 3.64 2.38 19.88 8.00 12.44 9.21 8.28 6.07 
no  
incubation 
25.79 9.26 3.60 1.85 19.08 6.83 16.73 7.69 11.27 4.74 
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Figure 1. Experimental procedure. Participants in the conditions including an incubation interval (thought-probe incubation, trivia-probe incubation, 
no-probe incubation) worked on the 0-back task between the two creativity assessments, as is displayed in the upper half of the figure. Participants 
in the no-incubation condition worked on the 0-back task after having finished both creativity assessments, as is displayed in the lower half of the 
figure. 
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Figure 2. Mean values for retrospectively reported mind wandering. The figure on the left depicts general off-task thoughts, excluding creativity-
task-related thoughts. The figure on the right depicts creativity-task-related thoughts, excluding general off-task thoughts. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the means.   
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